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PREFACE 
It was during the research seminar “Elite University“ that the idea for this thesis was 
born. I learnt about the concept of the “Knowledge Society“ and the European Union’s 
policy. At first, my focus was on higher education and the mobility of students and 
researchers. However, over time this research project took interesting turns and the 
emphasis changed. Thus, my internship at the Office of Science and Technology at the 
Austrian Embassy in Washington D.C./USA led to a new focus on EU-USA cooperation. 
Returning to Austria, I enrolled in the IFF (Institute for Interfaculty Research) study 
program “Science Communications and Higher Education Research” 
(Wissenschaftskommunikation und Hochschulforschung), in which I learnt more about 
theoretical approaches and the effects of globalization on science. As a result, I 
entirely dropped the issue of mobility and mobility programs and instead focused on 
the European Union’s science and research policy – with a special focus on the role of 
the USA in this policy field. 
 
It was always my intention to understand why the cooperation between EU and USA 
exists despite of competition and constantly growing competitiveness. At the 
beginning, it was rather difficult to find material on international science and 
technology cooperation. Therefore, I decided to take interviews at the Austrian 
Ministry of Science and the Austrian Ministry for Transport, Innovation, and 
Technology. The thus gained insights gave me a broad overview and led me on the 
way. Between 2009 and 2011 policy and evaluation studies were published, which 
were vital for my thesis. It seemed that I was on the right track as international science 
and technology cooperation had gained prominence on the political agenda. My work 
finally proceeded.  
 
Although the maturing process of this thesis took its time, I would not want to miss 
any of the stages, as all of them were important parts of my life. During this process, I 
learnt a lot such as research skills, knowledge and last but not least gained insights 
about myself. In that spirit this thesis is:  
 
“More than the sum of its parts – it’s a period of my life“ 
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“The EC and the Government of the United States of America DESIRING to establish a 
formal basis for cooperation in scientific and technological research which will extend 
and strengthen the conduct of cooperative activities in areas of common interest and 
encourage the application of the results of such cooperation to their economic and 
social benefit.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Shortly before this thesis was finalized, the “EU-US global partners - global 
responsibilities” homepage was set up. This illustrates a deepening of the transatlantic 
relationship. Research, education and exchanges are explicitly mentioned in the section 
“economy”.2  
                                                 
1 AGREEMENT for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and 
the Government of the United States of America. Official Journal, published 20 October 1998 (L 
284/37) introduction 
2  European External Action Service EU-US global partners – global responsibilities“ 
http://eeas.europa.eu/us/flash/index_interface.html   [22 January 2012] 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the European Union stated in a publication on science and technology 
cooperation,  
”In an increasingly globalized world, science and technology are at the forefront 
of innovation and economic growth.“3  
1.1. Thematic approach 
For the topic of this thesis, which broadly spoken is the transatlantic research 
cooperation, two issues are relevant: the international science, technology and 
innovation policy, to which in recent years more and more attention has been paid and 
transatlantic relations in general, with the formal relationship starting in 1990. 
1.1.1. Growing attention for international science, technology and 
innovation  
In recent years, international science, technology and innovation have appeared on 
the political agenda. This growing attention is due to five “triggers”4, which are 
“changing global trends” and “non-science objectives”. These triggers are seen as an 
opportunity as well as a challenge: 
 
1. Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC): these emerging countries do have a 
great capacity when it comes to research and technology and already reach 
“high international quality standards”. 
2. Global challenges: the increasing political debate on global challenges like 
“climate change, health issues and sustainable energy resources”. 
                                                 
3 European Commission 2007. EC-U.S. Scientific and Technological Cooperation: Reaching New 
Frontiers p.1  
4  Boekholt, Patrice / Edler, Jakob / Cunningham, Paul / Flanagan, Kieron 2009. Drivers of 
international collaboration in research. Final report to European Commission. DG for Research. 
Brussels p.8 
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3. Globalization of research and development: this is more visible in industrial 
research and mobility of researchers, although both are not a new 
development. 
4. Demographic developments: the number of graduates in science and 
engineering is decreasing, which leads to a lack of research talent. 
5. Policy debates in Europe: the claim for international competitiveness and the 
discussions about the European Research Area reached a very high degree. In 
this sense “partnering with the best plays a major role”. 
 
These policy debates on the European Research Area (ERA) have spurred the 
discussions on science and technology cooperation with non-EU countries.5 The 
European Union’s science and technology policy already represents an example for 
“international STI cooperation”6 (Science, Technology and Innovation) with the 
Framework Programmes (FP) as their major tool. These are a success story and are 
currently in their 7th period.  
 
When it comes to cooperation and competition, this dichotomy has always played a 
role in the history of the EU’s science and technology policy. Where “to draw the line”7 
and how to achieve a “balance”8 has always been a central topic for this European 
policy. Although, cooperation within the Union is highly fostered, as is building up the 
ERA, it is the cooperation with non-EU countries, which got increasing attention over 
the last years. The cooperation with the so-called third countries represents a new 
facet of the European Union’s external relations.9  
                                                 
5  ibid p.8 
6  Stein, Josephine Anne 2002. Science, technology and European foreign policy: European 
integration, global interaction. In: Science and Public Policy. volume 29, number 6 December. 
p.463 
7 Ruberti, Antonio 1995. Preface  In: Guzzetti, Luca A Brief History of European Union Research 
Policy. European Commission Studies. Luxembourg 
8  European Commission 2008. Challenging Europe´s Research: Rationales for the European 
Research Area (ERA). Report of the ERA Expert Group. Brussels p.8 
9  Stein, Josephine Anne 2002. p.463 
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It is this “interplay between science, technology and foreign policy”10 that is the core 
topic of this thesis, with a special focus on the European Union-United States of 
America (EU-USA) cooperation. 
1.1.2. EU-USA relation 
As already mentioned, it is the relationship of the two most important11 partners in 
the world: the European Union and the United States of America that is the second 
major issue discussed in this thesis. Scholars called the USA the “most significant other 
of the European integration project in the world arena.”12 A lot has been written on 
the relationship between these two powers, and even by only paying attention to the 
daily news, the various spheres of this relationship become apparent: it encompasses 
culture, politics, security and economics. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on 
the political and trade relations under the aspects of science and research. 
 
The origins of this relationship go back to the 17th century. The strong cultural and 
societal ties over the Atlantic started with the migration from the “old world” to the 
“new world”. Way down the road, in the middle of the 20th century, as WWII was over 
and great parts of Europe were in ruins, the USA’s interest in Europe grew immensely. 
The USA feared that greater parts of Europe would become part of the rival USSR. 
Therefore, the USA paid particular diplomatic, military and financial attention to 
selected European countries. The overall goal13 was an alliance with Europe. 
Compared to this goal, the rebuilding of Europe’s economy was the less important 
                                                 
10  ibid p.464 
11  Bücherl, Wolfgang 2007. Europäisch - amerikanische Beziehungen [European-american relations]. 
In: Weidenfeld, Werner; Wessels, Wolfgang (edts.): Europa von A bis Z. Taschenbuch der 
europäischen Integration. 10th edition. Nomos. Berlin. p.140 
12  Smith, Michael / Steffenson, Rebecca 2005. The EU and the United States. In Hill, Christopher; 
Smith, Michael: International Relations and the European Union. The new European Union Series. 
Oxford University Press. Oxford. p. 343 
13  Bierling, Stephan 2002. Die Europäische Union und die USA [The European Union and the US]. In: 
Weidenfeld, Werner (eds.): Europa- Handbuch. Bertelsmann. p.639-659 
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issue14. This was done through the so-called “Marshall Plan” from 1948-1952, which 
the USA sponsored. According to Bierling, this deal made Europe safe against the 
nuclear power Soviet Union.15  
In any case, in this phase of rebuilding Europe as well as in the early European 
cooperative attempts and the European integration process, the USA played a major 
role. It is even said, that the USA can be seen as the “Geburtshelfer Europas” (Europe’s 
midwife).16  
 
Although, this partnership lasted until 1990, it did not lack smaller and bigger disputes. 
In the past, these disputes were primarily about safety, such as possible nuclear 
attacks from the former Soviet Union, while trade issues, several regional crises or 
currency problems were only of minor interest. As these issues were relatively minor 
compared to the threat of the “red power”, the maintenance of the relationship was 
out of question.17 However, with the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War, the original reason for the stable EU-USA partnership became obsolete.  
This was then the starting point for a new definition of the EU-USA relations: 
“Sustaining the alliance would require a new and different rationale and a different 
modus operandi.”18 The new definition of the EU-USA relations started in 1990 with 
the Transatlantic Declaration.19 It was followed by more agreements. These economic-
driven agreements should even deepen the relation of the two biggest economies in 
the world. Although the world has been majorly shaped by these economic relations it 
also faces severe problems, which “encompass complexity and diversity”.20 
                                                 
14  Ilgen, Thomas L. 2006. The Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe. In: Thomas L.Ilgen.: 
Hard power, soft power and the future of transatlantic relations. Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Hampshire. England p.12 
15  Bierling, Stephan 2002.  
16  Neuss, Beate 2000. Geburtshelfer Europas? Die Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten im europäischen 
Integrationsprozeß 1945-1958. [Europe´s Midwife? About the role of the United States of America 
in the european integration process 1945-1958] Baden-Baden 
17  Bierling, Stephan 2002. p.640 
18  Ilgen, Thomas L. 2006. p.15 
19  Transatlantic Declaration 27 February 1990, Washington 
20  Smith, Michael 1998. Competitive co-operation and EU-USArelations: can the EU be a strategic 
partner for the USAin the world political economy? Journal of European Public Policy Routledge. 
5:4 December 2008. p.562 
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1.2. Research design 
1.2.1. Questions and hypothesis 
As the title of the thesis suggests, the main research question deals with the interplay 
of cooperation and competition within the transatlantic relationship. In this 
framework, the science and technology cooperation policy will be analyzed. 
 
The thesis aims to address the subsequent research questions and to verify the 
following hypotheses: 
 
1) How did the European Union’s science and technology policy evolve and did the 
USA play a role in this process? 
 
Hypothesis: Similar to the economic and political integration, European science and 
technology policy (STP) evolved over time and its competence was extended with 
each EU treaty. 
 
Hypothesis: The USA played several roles in the history of European integration 
process as well as in the process of establishing a European STP.  
 
2) When did the EU-USA cooperation start and what was the role of science, 
research and technology in this cooperation? 
 
Hypothesis: The transatlantic relationship had a specific starting point in history 
and has developed since then. The topics science, research and technology have 
formed an integrate part from the beginning.  
 
3) What reasons can be identified for the EU and USA cooperation in science and 
technology? 
 
Hypothesis: Even though competitiveness is a strong rationale for European STP, it 
is not the only one. There are other relevant rationales, which might not follow the 
same logic. 
 
 
6 | Introduction 
 
Modes:  
HOW? 
Policy instruments 
FP, int.agreements 
Rationales: 
WHY? 
Reasons for 
cooperation 
Actors:  
WHO? 
Relevant people 
Policy Analysis 
EU-USA cooperation 
in Science and 
Technology 
1.2.2. Analytical Framework 
To answer these research questions, the transatlantic science and technology 
relationship will be discussed on the policy level, rather than assessing the actual day-
to-day activities or policy impacts. The analytical framework of this thesis can be 
visualized as follows: 
 
 
Concerning the modes, or to address the question “HOW?”, three policy instruments 
used by the EU will be analyzed. Firstly, the Framework Programmes, which are a 
cooperation process, secondly the EU-USA Science and Technology Agreement and 
thirdly the EU-USA economic relations, which include numerous competitive and 
cooperative elements. No attention will be paid to the cooperation between individual 
EU Member States and the USA. 
 
In the policy fields of science and technology and economy, the emphasis will be on 
searching for relevant actors, thus addressing the question “WHO?”. Finally, the 
Figure 1 Analytical framework of the thesis 
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written justifications, or rationales, for the evolving cooperation will be investigated, 
thus addressing the question “WHY?”. 
References 
This analytical framework will foremost be applied to legal and official documents, 
which are of special importance when analyzing policies. These are the Council 
decisions regarding the European Framework Programmes, European Union 
Parliament documents, the Treaties of the European Union and the original 
transatlantic agreements as well as their subsequent working plans.  
 
The secondary references consist of relevant book chapters, scientific articles, online 
information and, especially important, scientific studies or assessment reports from 
related academic fields.  
 
For general orientation and in order to be able to more clearly define the direction of 
the thesis, several expert interviews were made. Gläser/Laudel21 described experts as 
people, who have specialized knowledge. In the context of this thesis, these are 
(former) employees of the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research as well as the 
Ministry of Innovation, Transport and Technology. 
Notes about the language 
Although the author’s mother tongue is German, she decided to use English as the 
language of this thesis. This choice was made due to two reasons: firstly, most of the 
sources were only available in English. Thus, choosing English as the working language 
was a practical decision.  Secondly, this thesis might be of interest for a broader 
audience, thus English is a way of satisfying this potential interest. 
                                                 
21  Gläser, Jochen / Laudel, Grit 2004. Expertininterview und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse [Expert 
Interview and qualitative content analysis]. VS. Wiesbaden p.11 
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1.2.3. Overview of Contents 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. After the introduction, the following issues will 
be addressed: theoretical approach, European science and technology policy, 
agreements between EU and USA as well as international cooperation, followed by a 
conclusion. 
 
In the chapter on the theoretical framework relevant terminology will be defined. 
Additionally, a first overview on the policy fields relevant for international science and 
technology cooperation will be provided. In the following part several theories, which 
all intend to explain the relationship of cooperation and competition, will be 
presented. Nye’s theoretical approach of “Soft Power” will play a special role. 
 
For the chapter European science and technology policy, a historical approach will be 
chosen. A close look will be taken at the evolution of the EU’s science and technology 
policy from 1957 until 2009. The chapter will have three intentions: on the one hand, 
the changes in legal justification will be observed in an in-depth way. Among these 
justifications are the founding Treaties, the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Amsterdam Treaty as well as the current Lisbon Treaty. It will be pointed out, how 
the EU competences were extended over time and which major changes took place. 
Further on, the evolution of the Framework Programmes (FP) from FP 1-7 including 
their aims, budget and most importantly, their objectives, will be analyzed. All of these 
will show the emphasis of the Commission. Furthermore, evidence for the significant 
role of the USA especially in the evolution of the STP will be searched for. 
 
There will be no examination of a specific program such as Human Resources (HR) or 
International Cooperation (INCO). The ”Europe 2020“ strategy will not be part of the 
analysis nor will the current ongoing discussions on FP8, called ”Horizon“. 
 
For the chapter transatlantic agreements and their relevance for science, research 
and technology, also a historical approach will be chosen. The economic relationship 
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between the EU and the USA from 1990-2007 will be examined. The following 
cooperative agreements will be discussed: the Transatlantic Declaration, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda, and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership until the most 
recent- the Transatlantic Economic Council. Shortly, the annual summits between the 
EU-USA will be mentioned. The relevance of these agreements in regard to science and 
technology will also be discussed.  
 
This part also will focus on the policy level and will not assess the impact of the 
agreements in detail. The suggested Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) nor actions 
on the multi-lateral level like the ones of World Trade Organization (WTO) will be 
discussed. 
 
In the chapter international cooperation in science and technology, several aspects of 
this type of cooperation will be described: The EU-USA science and technology 
cooperation agreement will be described, as is the opening of the ERA and most 
importantly, the rationales for international science and technology cooperation. It is 
the core topic of the thesis. 
 
In the conclusion the findings will be summarized and the hypotheses will be 
commented on and finally, a short outlook for further research will be made.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework consists of two parts: First, the relevant definitions and 
policy fields will be described and second, some relevant theoretical approaches will 
be introduced.  
2.1. Definitions and policy fields 
2.1.1. Policy 
The basic term is policy. Within the European Communities (EC), this is an umbrella 
term for goals in a particular field. For achieving these goals actions are designed. 
Actions can be “proposals, initiatives and legislation”.22 
 
For this thesis, several policy fields are relevant and will be introduced: On the one 
hand there is science policy, technology policy and innovation policy. They are often 
perceived as one single policy field but, at a closer look, different actors, rationales and 
actions become visible. On the other hand there are transatlantic policy and external 
trade policy which are highly interrelated.  
From the synopsis of all these policy fields, a new one emerges: international science 
and technology cooperation policy. In recent years, this policy field became more and 
more recognized by politicians and civil servants. As not much political research has 
been done, the intention of this thesis is to contribute to the investigation of the 
relationships between these areas. 
 
                                                 
22 The Europa Publications EU Information Series 2008. European Union. Encyclopedia and 
Directory 2009. Routledge 9th Edition. London p.148 
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2.1.2. Science, technology and innovation policy 
Lundvall/Borrás are icons in the study of science, technology and innovation. They 
pointed out that these three policy fields, although emerged and developed slowly in 
time, cannot be seen as chronological phases in history and do not succeed or replace 
each other. Science policy and technology policy are not outdated, they still coexist 
and relate to the greater concept of innovation policy.23 By defining these policy fields, 
the authors also paid attention to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which sets international standards in science and technology 
studies.24 For Lundvall/Borrás, the policy fields did not exist in ideal types. For 
understanding the complexity of the topic, they found it helpful to explain objectives, 
issues, policy actors and instruments: 
                                                 
23 Lundvall, Bengt-Ake / Borrás, Susana 2006. “Science, Technology and Innovation Policy”. In: 
Fagerberg, Jan (edts.): The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford University Press p. 602 
24 For more information on the related OECD documents see pages 603-604 of the book chapter by 
Lundvall/Borrás. 
Economic 
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Figure 2 Policy field International Science and Technology Cooperation 
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Science Policy 
Lundvall/Borrás laid down the history of science policy. It emerged in the late 1930s, 
when the scientist John Desmond Bernal made recommendations on the increase of 
research and development (R&D) activities. In his book “The Social Function of 
Science” he stated that science policy would stimulate economic growth and welfare. 
In 1945, Vannevar Bush had a significant impact on the shaping of USA post-war 
science policy. With his work “Science: The Endless Frontier”, Bush outlined the aims 
for science policy as “contributing to national security, health and economic growth”.25 
Both saw that investments in science would have an economic impact, and so had 
Dieter Schumacher26  in 1975, as he wrote about international science cooperation. In 
addition Schumacher identified the impact of science policy in the fields of society, 
infrastructure and science itself:  
 
• Society: with actions for the advancement and sake of the society 
• Infrastructure: with actions for the infrastructure in science and technology 
• Science itself: with actions in the field of general education, science and 
cultural relations 
 
In 2006, Lundvall/Borrás27 characterized science policy as follows: 
• The major objectives are diverse and besides economic targets they also 
include “national prestige and cultural values besides social (and) national 
security (…) activities”. 
• The major issues are investing sufficient resources, including human 
resources (i.e. number of students and researchers) on science and 
technology and, consequently, allocating them in a reasonable proportion 
                                                 
25 Lundvall, Bengt-Ake / Borrás, Susana 2006. p.605 
26 Schumacher, Dieter 1975. Perspektiven einer internationalen Forschungspolitik. Problemskizze 
am Beispiel der Europäischen Gemeinschaften [Perspectives of an international research 
policy.The European Union- an analysis]. Verlag Otto Schwartz&Co. Göttingen. p.11 
27 Lundvall, Bengt-Ake / Borrás, Susana 2006. p.605 
14 | Theoretical Framework 
 
among the disciplines and programs, thus securing the impact of science on 
social welfare.  
• The major policy actors are public institutions such as ministries of 
education and research or research councils.  
• The major instruments are “budgetary decisions”, either financing 
universities or giving tax relieves to private research institutions- and of 
course connecting universities and the private institutions. The regulations 
on intellectual property is another instrument of science policy. 
Technology policy 
When it comes to technology policy28, it are the size and the level of economic well-
being of a state which define the policy area. Big “science-based technologies” such as 
“nuclear power, space technology, computers, drugs and genetic engineering” are 
considered as key technologies. Depending on the size of a state, the focus is either on 
“producing” and “applying” or “absorbing” and “using” these technologies. While high-
income countries mostly produce and apply, smaller countries mostly absorb and use 
these technologies. 
According to the “strategic” technologies and sectors identified, states formulate their 
policies and implement them: A well-known example is the 1957 “Sputnik” project 
(described in detail later in the thesis) where the invention by the former Soviet Union 
caused a very ambitious space program in the USA. The book “The American 
challenge” by Servan-Schreiber29 gave a poor picture of European competitiveness 
confronted with the American high-technology sectors. This book, which had a great 
impact on the shaping of Europe's technology policy, will be described later in the 
thesis in Chapter 3.2.2 . 
 
                                                 
28  ibid pp.608 
29  Servan-Schreiber, Jean- Jacques 1968. The American Challenge. Hamish Hamilton translated from 
the French by Ronald Steel. London 
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Lundvall/Borrás described technology policy as follows: 30 
• The major objectives are mainly the same as those of science policy, but 
with a hands-on approach on national prestige and economic growth. 
• The major issue is legitimation of state subsidies for technological 
advancement.  
• The major policy actors are ministries. In the USA, these are the ministries of 
telecommunication, defense, health, transport and energy. In Japan, the 
most involved ministries are those responsible for industry and trade. In 
addition other public institutions are involved, e.g. ministries for education 
and authorities responsible for industrial competition. 
• The major instruments are “public procurement”, “subsidies and tax 
reduction” and financing of public research on new technologies. 
 
It is important to understand that Lundvall/Borrás' characterization of science and 
technology policy by means of its objectives, issues, actors and instruments serves only 
for academic purposes. They stressed that in reality these policy types do not exist 
disconnected from each other. Innovation policy is the third type they characterized, 
which generally spoken is a wider collection of different policies.  
Innovation policy 
Innovation policy31 can be considered as a significant form of “economic policy”, 
because it covers all stages of the innovation process: from “diffusion, use and 
marketing of new technologies.”32 
Innovation policy has two different approaches: The first can be called  “non-
interventionistic” and the second “systemic”. Whereas in the “non–interventionistic” 
approach only “framework conditions” for certain sectors are guaranteed, in the 
“systemic” approach we speak about an “innovation system”. A radical non-
                                                 
30 Lundvall, Bengt-Ake / Borrás, Susana 2006. p.608 
31  ibid p.611-615 
32  ibid p.612 
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interventionistic innovation policy only secures the basic funding education and basic 
research. It is left to the business enterprises to decide what is the best for 
themselves. On the other hand, the “systemic” approach considers many other policy 
fields and how they may interact best with each other.  
As far as market and competition is concerned, in the first approach competition is the 
“most important prerequisite”, while in the second type, although competition is 
appreciated, “closer cooperation vertically between users and producers and 
sometimes even horizontally among competitors”33 is considered vital.  
In innovation policy, universities and institutions in the technological sector are no 
longer in the centre of interest, as they were in science policy and technology policy. In 
innovation policy all areas of economy are requested to contribute to an overall 
innovation system. 
 
Lundvall/Borrás characterized innovation policy as following: 34 
• The major objectives are economic growth, international competitiveness and 
“social cohesion”. In the context of the European Union, the overall goal is 
economic well-being. 
• The major issues are the limits of public interventions, innovation within the 
institutions or rather innovating and changing the institutions. 
• The major policy actors are ministries of economics or ministries of industry, 
but also all other public offices, trade unions and private business are involved. 
• The major instruments are the implementation of intellectual property rights 
(IPR) and accessibility to “venture capital”. 
 
This thesis will show that nowadays the systemic type of innovation policy prevails in 
the European Union. Thus the terms “competitiveness and economic growth” are 
almost used in an inflationary way. In addition, not only competition but also more 
cooperation is being promoted. In the Lisbon Strategy for the period of 2000 - 2010, 
                                                 
33  ibid p.612 
34  ibid p.612-613 
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public spending on R&D and the promotion of an innovation system have been 
implemented as part of Europe's economic policy. Even though the Strategy's goals 
were not achieved, at least it gave a boost to Europe's science and technology policy. 
This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.5.1.1 The successor policy is “Europe 
2020”. In the new strategy, the goal prevails: 3% of GDP on public and private 
spending on R&D. 
For a better understanding of the relationship between science, technology and 
innovation policy, Lundvall/Borrás created the following figure: 
 
Figure 3 Relationship between science, technology and innovation policy35 
                                                 
35  ibid p. 615 
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Lundvall/Borrás suggested, that policy makers need to consider a “broader social 
framework” for a successful innovation system, even when the aim is “to promote 
economic wealth creation”.36 According to the authors, also competence building is 
essential. Competence building refers to learning and renewals of skills and know-how. 
This is a social process since it happens as an “interaction between people and 
organizations” based on “trust, power, and loyalty”.37 Trust, power and loyalty are 
essential pillars of diplomacy. Science diplomacy can help to build these pillars.  
2.1.3. External Relations and Transatlantic Policy 
Defining it accurately, one can say that the external relations of the European Union 
incorporate two types:38 First, bilateral and multilateral trading agreements between 
the EC and third countries such as “Association Agreements, Co-operation 
Agreements, Europe Agreements, Partnership and Co-operation Agreements”. Second, 
the development of a European foreign policy (CFSP) through “political co-operation 
and the common foreign and security policy.” 
 
Both types are the outcome of a very complex39 decision-making process on different 
political and administrative levels. This makes the study of external relations rather 
delicate. Several policy areas such as security, trade, development aid and the 
participation in international organizations play major roles in shaping the policy. In 
addition further policy areas become more and more important and relevant to 
external policy such as: culture, environment, education, as well as research and 
technology.  
                                                 
36  ibid p.617 
37  ibid p.617 
38 The Europa Publications EU Information Series 2010. European Union. Encyclopedia and 
Directory 2011. Routledge 11th Edition. London p.107 
39  Schmalz, Uwe / Diedrichs, Udo 2010. Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur [The European 
Union as an international actor]. In: Woyke, Wichard(ed.): Handwörterbuch Internationale Politik. 
12th edition. Verlag Barbara Budrich Opladen&Farmington Hills p.154- 168 
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The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) introduced rather fundamental changes of the European 
Union's external policy: Not only were the external policy re-organized and the  policy 
competence extended, but also an EU “High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy” was installed. Baroness Catherine Ashton currently fills this 
position and is therefore also heading the “European External Action Service” (EEAS).  
 
A specific area of the external relations policy is the transatlantic policy40. The 
transatlantic relations are defined as a “strategic partnership” because the EU and the 
USA are the biggest trading partners on the globe. In addition, they cooperate in 
several areas as for instance in security issues. The legal basis for the EU's cooperation 
with the USA is Article 207 Lisbon Treaty on the common commercial policy (ex Article 
133 TEC). The evolution of this bilateral cooperation begins in 1990 with the 
Transatlantic Declaration. Chapter 4 of the thesis discusses this topic, in terms of their 
relevance to cooperation in science and technology. 
2.1.4. International Science and Technology Cooperation Policy 
Where external policy and science policy overlap, international science and 
technology cooperation policy is the outcome as shown in Chapter 2.1.1. 
It is defined when federal employees take measures to: 
“influence the intensity, content and direction of collaboration between 
research performers in the public and private sectors across borders.”41  
For international science and technology cooperation policy, several instruments42 can 
be used: 
 EU Framework Programmes 
 Bilateral collaboration agreements  
                                                 
40 European Parliament. Factsheets European Union online. Transatlantic Relations: The USA and 
Canada 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=en&id=73&ftuId=FT
U_6.4.7.html [7 November 2011] 
41 Boekholt, Patrice / Edler, Jakob / Cunningham, Paul / Flanagan, Kieron 2009. Brussels p.7 
42  ibid p.7 
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 Fellowship programs, exchange programs 
 Memoranda of understanding  
 Financial investments  
 European multi-lateral organizations 
In this thesis, the EU Framework Programmes and the bilateral collaboration 
agreement EU-USA will be described. 
2.1.5. Competitiveness  
Competition and competitiveness are core terms in political economy and business 
administration. When talking about competitiveness, it is important to distinguish 
competitiveness on the level of business enterprises on the one hand and on the level 
of state on the other. Business administration focuses on the competitiveness of firms, 
like small and medium - sized enterprises (SME). Business administration deals with 
optimizing those decisions of SMEs that ensure their competitiveness, that are 
decisions about offers, organizational matters, personnel, material, goods, services, 
knowledge, concepts, etc.43 
 
On the other hand, there is competitiveness on the state level, and since the EU 
traces its origins from an economic project, competitiveness is as well a crucial issue 
within the EU. Various economic schools of thought approach competitiveness 
differently, thus making a brief definition difficult. For the purpose of this thesis, it will 
be outlined descriptively rather than studied in-depth.  
 
Competitiveness on the state level is achieved through the quality of location.44 The 
OECD defined competitiveness as: 
“a measure of a country's advantage or disadvantage in selling its products in 
international markets.”45 
                                                 
43  Koch, Eckart 2006. Internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit [International competitiveness]. In: 
Eckart, Koch: Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. Verlag Franz Vahlen 3rd edition München 
p.245 
44  ibid pp.245 
Theoretical Framework | 21 
 
John Cantwell46 saw the prerequisite of the advantage in “the possession of the 
capabilities needed” and the constant observation of these capabilities in international 
trade.  
 
Eckart Koch47 described Eßer’s systemic approach on competitiveness on the state 
level. State action can be taken on three different levels: meta-level, macro-level and 
meso-level. 
 
Actions on the meta-level are the definition of policies that support an overall 
awareness of entrepreneurship. For example, deregulation, education measures, social 
welfare and environment policies. Also related policy fields are: external trade, capital 
market policy and tax policy. 
Actions on the macro-level target the legal framework, where suitable laws and 
regulations for competitiveness are formulated.  
The actions on the meso-level aim directly at strengthening competitiveness. A so 
called “sector policy” can be formulated, where specific business sectors or regions are 
boosted. The collective term for these actions is “industrial policy”. This 
interventionistic approach aims at optimizing conditions of market and locations. Even 
though the state might support the competitiveness of the business sector, it is 
important to collaborate with other private sectors, research institutions, and labor 
unions. Further policy fields are involved: subsidies, interest- and credit policy, as well 
as research and science policy. 
Competitiveness policy in the European Union 
Although the idea of competitiveness had been on the EU's agenda before, it was in 
1994, that the Commission48 proposed a “White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness 
                                                                                                                                               
45  Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development: economics glossary online 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_34573_1968510_1_1_1_1,00.html#1966912  [11 
October 2011] 
46 Cantwell, John 2006. Innovation and Competitiveness. In: Fagerberg, Jan (edts.): The Oxford 
Handbook of Innovation. Oxford University Press. p.544 
47 Koch, Eckart 2006. pp.252 
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and Employment”. In this paper, the Commission focused on global competitiveness 
and four policy aims were given: support for European enterprises, firms benefitting 
from the competitive advantage, sustainable industrial development and the reduction 
of “time differential between the pace of change in supply and the corresponding 
adjustments in demand”.  
Competitiveness through science and technology policy 
As described before, the interventionistic competition policy is characterized by state 
actions e.g. financing science and technology (S&T).49 Although some theorists argued 
that the state should not be in charge of supporting S&T at all, others take different 
approaches. The FPs or the international agreements of the EU are other 
interventionistic approaches in order to foster competitiveness.  
Funding of S&T must be supplemented by STP relevant to markets, patent and 
intellectual property rights, general education and specific education and training in 
science, as well as partnerships between universities, research institutions and 
SME´s.50 Peterson/Sharp identified “the application of new technology”51 as a 
prerequisite for competitiveness.  
2.1.6. Research and Experimental Development 
The OECD took a leading role in defining the terms and set up the “Frascati Manual”. In 
its current issue from 2002, research and experimental development (R&D) was 
defined as:  
                                                                                                                                               
48 The Europa Publications EU Information Series 2008. European Union. Encyclopedia and 
Directory 2009. Routledge 9th Edition. London p.40 
49 Koch, Eckart 2006.  
50 ibid p.252 
51 Peterson, John / Sharp, Margret 2007. Technology Policy in the European Union- The European 
Union Series. MacMillan Press LTD 10th edition. New York p.2 
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„creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock 
of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of 
this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.“52 
In addition, the OECD systematized types of research:53 
• Basic research: This type of research is “experimental or theoretical work”. It 
is done without a specific goal or outcome in mind, but rather with the 
intention of understanding how and why certain things function. 
• Applied research: For this type of research, the target is not only the 
understanding of functions, its main focus is on a specific goal, for example 
the design of a new product. 
• Experimental development: This type is a “systematic work” taking know-
how and knowledge as a basis and trying to improve it. It helps to improve 
materials, inventions, processes etc.  
 
The “Frascati Manual” is internationally recognized, and is only one manual of the so-
called “Frascati family”. This “family” of manuals also includes the “Oslo Manual” and 
the “Canberra Manual”. In the “Oslo Manual” the measurement of innovation is 
outlined, whereas in the “Canberra Manual” a classification of human resources in 
science and technology is made. All these papers suggest standards for measuring and 
evaluation of the many components of the innovation system. These standards  build 
the ground for comparisons between states. 
While Lundvall/Borrás discussed science, technology and innovation policy (STI), 
others suggest to substitute the term “science” with “research”. Nowadays, the 
acronym “RTI” is more and more used. 
                                                 
52 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2002. Frascati Manual. 6th edition 
p.31 
53 ibid p.31 
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2.1.7. Cooperation in Science and Technology 
Cooperation and competition are as old as humankind itself. A rough definition of 
cooperation is therefore:  
“an interaction between entities that results in a net benefit to each of them.”54 
Not only working together, but distinguishable advantages for both of the partners are 
a precondition. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, we need to differentiate between formal and informal 
cooperation in S&T. In his often cited paper on “Global cooperation in research”, Luke 
Georghiou55 from the University of Manchester described these two types of 
cooperation. The decisive criterion of distinction is whether it is based on a contract or 
not. 
Informal Cooperation: These are activities without any formal / legal contract. As 
scientists travel to conferences, exchange ideas with colleagues or share the same 
basic, data informal collaboration is going on. This type of collaboration is presumably 
as old as science itself. It is a constituent part of the science community. Co-authorship 
for example represents informal cooperation and is a prevalent indicator of scientific 
cooperation. To this regard, at the end of the 1990s, Georghiou concluded in his paper 
that a “very substantial increase in activity between Europe and the other 
industrialized countries” was taking place.56 
Formal Cooperation: This covers any type of cooperative activity based on whatever 
kind of contract, within or among institutions. These are: large centers (e.g. CERN), 
Programs (e.g. Framework Programme) or scientific agreements (e.g. bilateral 
agreement EU-USA). 
 
                                                 
54 Noë, R. 2010. Cooperation. Encyclopedia of Behavioral Neuroscience G. Koob, M. Le Moal and 
R.Thompson (eds). Academic Press, Oxford, UK p.346 
55 Georghiou, Luke 1998. Global cooperation in research. In: Research Policy 27, p.611-626 
56 ibid p.614 
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This thesis focuses on formal cooperation between the EU and the USA - rather on the 
policy level than on the day-to-day micro level. One important policy tool are the 
“Framework Programmes”: 
2.1.8. Framework Programmes 
The so called Framework Programmes57 (FP) are the main instrument of the EU's 
science and technology policy (STP). Originally named as “Framework Programmes for 
Research and Technological Development and Demonstration” also known as the 
“Research Action Programmes (RAP)”, funding was not only provided for research but 
also for demonstration, training and dissemination. First intended to “strengthen the 
scientific and technological bases of Community Industry”, the FP are now as well open 
to non-EU Member States. Funding is granted only for research which is considered 
“pre-competitive”, thus leaving product development and marketing to the private 
industries.58  
The first Framework Programme (FP1) covered the period 1984-1989. Currently we are 
in FP7 running from 2007-2013. The evolution of the FP is described in Chapter 3 and 
represents a success story of the EU. The FP are performed through specific programs 
where the details are defined. In the current FP, “Cooperation” is such a specific 
program.59 
 
                                                 
57 European Commission 2000. Towards a European Research Area. Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions. 18 January 2000 COM(2000) 6 final, Brussels p.86 
58 Jones, Robert A. 1996. Competition, Industrial and Research and Technological Development 
Policies. In: Jones, Robert A. The Politics and Economics of the European Union. An Introductory 
Text. Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham p.204 
59 Council Decision of 19 December 2006 concerning the Specific Programme “Cooperation” 
implementing the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, 
technological development and demonstration activities (2007 to 2013). Official Journal of the 
European Union. L400/86 from 30 December 2006 p.1 
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As stated above, the FPs were originally designed to promote industrial 
competitiveness, over time their purpose has changed. As Georghiou60 argued, the FPs 
lead to “broader political or economic opportunities.”  
2.1.9. Rationale and Driver 
To put it short, the term rationale means “the reasons for doing something.”61 The 
Oxford Dictionary defines it as: 
“a set of reasons or a logical basis for a course of action or a particular belief”.62  
Identifying a rationale means answering the question of “Why did something occur?” 
or “What are the reasons for the current situation?” 
Another term used as a synonym in this thesis is driver. This is  
“something that creates and fuels activity, or gives force or impetus”.63  
2.2. Relevant theoretical approaches 
In the following Chapters, some relevant theoretical approaches are introduced. At 
this point of the thesis, none of them are prioritized.  
2.2.1. International cooperation 
Theories of international relations deal with the two terms cooperation and 
competition as the two sides of one coin. Correspondent terms are „peace“ and 
„war“.64 
 
                                                 
60  Georghiou, Luke 1998. p.622 
61 European Commission 2008. Challenging Europe´s Research: Rationales for the European 
Research Area (ERA). Report of the ERA Expert Group. Brussels p.8 
62 The New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998. Oxford University Press. New York. p.1539 
63  The free dictionary http://www.thefreedictionary.com/driver [4 November 2011] 
64 Meyers, Reinhard 2006. Theorien internationaler Kooperation und Verflechtung. [Theories of 
international cooperation and interdependence] In: Woyke, Wichard (eds): Handwörterbuch 
Internationale Politik. Lizenzausgabe für Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Bonn p.482 
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When looking at theories of international relations, according to Reinhard Meyers65 
five different hypotheses can be identified on the reasons why two actors cooperate: 
 
• Basically, actors cooperate in order to maximize their benefit (Axelrod 1984). 
• Future expectations are relevant. The more opportunities for sustainable 
cooperation are expected in the future, the closer cooperation will be in present. 
(Milner 1992) 
• International regimes boost cooperation. In the international arena the level of 
confidence raises due to the fact the actors get to know each other, learn about 
each other's behavior, experience benefits through cooperation that is based on 
following the rules. (Keohane 1984) 
• The power of “epistemic communities” in the course of decision-making 
processes. “Epistemic communities” are groups of experts which share the same 
scientific basis and values, identify the same problems and suggest the same 
approaches to solutions. These groups influence the sustainability of 
cooperations. (Haas 1992) 
• Asymmetrical relations between the actors can lead to cooperation. This is the 
case when “hierarchical dependencies” evolve and the stronger actor attracts 
and motivates the weaker actor to cooperate by means of benefits and awards. 
2.2.2. Competitive cooperation 
In 1998, Michael Smith66 wrote about the transatlantic relationship, predominantly 
from the economic viewpoint, and he characterized it as “competitive cooperative”. 
He defined competitive cooperation as “several linked levels at which competition and 
co-operation are to be found”.  
He came to this conclusion by analyzing the EU-USA relations on four different levels: 
bilateral institution-building, inter-regional and inter-system competition, multilateral 
                                                 
65 ibid p.482 
66 Smith, Michael 1998. Competitive co-operation and EU-USArelations: can the EU be a strategic 
partner for the USAin the world political economy? Journal of European Public Policy Routledge. 
5:4 December 1998: p.561-577 
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rule-making, and private management of the global political arena. He then asked if 
the EU could be a strategic partner for the USA, predominately looking at the 
economic relationship where sustainable “strategic bargains”67 could become reality. 
 
The first level he analyzed, is what he called “bilateral institution-building” that 
started with the Transatlantic Declaration in 1990. Roughly speaking, this level can be 
defined as: 
“the making of institutional bargains and the constituting of institutions 
themselves with the explicit aim of regulating EU-USA economic relations”.68  
It was the first time such discussions of economic and political issues were held - as a 
consequence of the end of the Cold War. However, it is essential to bear in mind, 
when discussing the EU's external actions, that these institutions have always been the 
result of long internal EU consultations.69 
 
The second level, according to Smith, is the inter-regional and inter-system 
competition resulting from “regionalization of economic processes”. Smith cited 
Cable/Henderson (1994), who described inter-regional competition as the 
“intensification of regional processes of production and exchange” which is “often 
accompanied by formal institutionalization”.70 Both, the USA and the EU, are active in 
these economic fields, hence becoming competitors with respect to other 
geographical areas of the world, e.g. the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America. In this 
respect the EU may have a “competitive advantage” resulting from deep-rooted 
experience in integrating markets since the very beginnings of the EU. 
On the other hand, the USA may have the ability to attract potential economic 
partners through existing bonds by using “soft power”. To this respect, Smith saw the 
USA clearly in advantage. The theory of “soft power” that goes back to Joseph Nye is 
                                                 
67 ibid p.563 
68  ibid p.570 
69 ibid p.570 
70 ibid p.571 
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also relevant in order to explain research cooperation and will be discussed in detail 
later on.  
 
The third level is the multilateral rule-making where Smith refered to the Bretton-
Woods system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Smith called 
this issue “one of the key areas of mutual entanglement” between the EU and the 
USA. He pointed out that the EU has enjoyed credibility in “multilateral rule-making 
from an early stage”.71 In recent years, the GATT was integrated into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), where the EU achieved the “status of interlocuteur valable” (valid 
negotiator). In this respect actions taken by the EU, and therefore legitimated by the 
EU Member States, according to Smith, often lead to a beneficial outcome. The EU has 
become not only a strong but also a “strategic actor” when it comes to international 
trade issues. 
 
The fourth level is the private management of the global political economy. Smith 
argued that EU takes advantage due to profound experience in managing and acting in 
the multinational arena. A disadvantage might only result from the existing cultural 
differences among the Member States of the EU, which may restrict the liability of the 
EU as a “strategic actor” on this level.   
The regulation and observation of business is a prime facet of the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership, as well as public and private interests have to be balanced 
sensitively. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue was thus set up in 1995, giving the 
private sector an arena. Both will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
In summary, the EU-USA cooperation will continue to be accompanied by policies 
within the EU which are of competitive nature. In addition, cooperative actions taken 
on bilateral, regional or multilateral basis can become “a strategic instrument”, leading 
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to a “control (of) competing actors” based on bargains and dedications and the 
resulting entanglement.72 
Competitive cooperation is therefore a “complex of mixed motives, actions and 
processes”.73 
 
On the political level, Smith/Steffenson74 identified the notion of “competitive 
cooperation” in the transatlantic relation as a result from the twofold role that the 
USA played in the European integration process: first, European leaders took the 
American federal system as a model (Jean Monnet) and the idea of the “United States 
of Europe” was born. Second, Europe's vision of “creating a third force” against the 
superpowers USA and the former Soviet Union was a significant factor in the 
integration process. Smith/Steffenson said, that 
“This ambivalence - the USA as a key partner and leader but also as a potential 
rival in world politics - has been central to EU-USA relations and to the 
international relations of the EU ever since” .75 
2.2.3. Interdependence 
With the current economic crises in Europe and the USA “interdependence”76 
becomes manifest: The actions or non-actions of one state cause problems in other 
states. Besides the economic crises, along with other transnational issues as climate 
change and global security also civil society and state leadership came into the focus of 
interest. All these issues clearly prove the mutual dependency between states. 
 
Scholars of international relations theory have moved the focus of their work to 
interdependence. It is only by understanding the effects of interdependence that 
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political leadership can be adjusted. Spindler77 suggested, that interdependence is not 
a theory of international relations as such, but rather an “analytical concept” for 
international cooperation and coordination. 
 
Two political scientists have been working intensively on “interdependence” since 
1977: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye. In their book “Power and Interdependence. 
World Politics in Transition” they saw a change going on within the international 
system. The change becomes evident as the national states have to face more and 
more obstacles in their scope of action in certain policy fields. These obstacles limit the 
achievement of economic and political targets on a national level.78 
In addition to domestic policies, the states must focus not only on foreign politics 
(optimizing tools of foreign policy) but also on international politics (cooperation with 
other states) in order to achieve their goals. 79 
 
The question on how interdependence can be measured is central. Basically, it is a 
question of methods. In political economy, quantitative methods often measure 
transactions between states in order to describe interdependence. It is often the trade 
flows and transactions that are used for this purpose. In this quantitative sense, 
Spindler refered to Inkeles who introduced the term “interconnectedness”:  
Interconnectedness “refers to the volume or frequency of communication, 
interaction, or exchange between two socio-cultural systems. It is most often 
expressed in the exchange of goods and services, i.e., in trade (…)”80 
The corresponding data for the transatlantic relation are outlined in 4.1.1 in this thesis. 
With these data, the EU and the USA both point out their importance for each other's 
economy. 
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But according to Keohane/Nye the term “interdependence” goes one step further81: it 
is not a purely quantitative phenomena, it also has political significance. 
Interdependence as they define it, has to do with “costs”. “Interdependence only 
exists if mutual interactions cause costs on both sides”. However, the costs can be 
unequally distributed between the two partners.  
In the other cases, where interactions do not cause (major) costs, we speak of the 
above described concept of “interconnectedness”. 
 
However, interdependence not only causes costs, but normally brings also “benefits in 
both directions”82 as for example in economic and ecologic issues. Nowadays, “mutual 
advantage” in these issues can only be achieved by means of cooperation.83 
 
Even though it seems that interdependence causes mutual advantage, “harmony” is 
not the prerequisite. Interdependence does not mean a balanced situation. Normally it 
is a “mutual dependence” where the weaker part is threatened by the stronger part. 
Misbalance arises from several areas, as for example from “security, trade and 
finance”. The weakness or the strength in either area constitutes the partners’ 
bargaining power which characterizes “the art of the power game”. 84 
 
How to act in this “power game” is an essential issue in international relations. The 
concept of “hard power” or “soft power” is just one possible way to discuss it. Soft 
power is regarded as especially important for this thesis and will be described in detail 
subsequently. 
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2.2.4. Soft Power 
The American political scientist Joseph Nye introduced the term “soft power” in his 
article of 1990. Ever since it has been discussed in theory and practice of international 
relations. Joseph Nye, who had earlier introduced the analytical concept of 
interdependence, together with Keohane, worked on his concepts from an US- point of 
view, in order to optimize the foreign policy of the USA. Nevertheless, he developed a 
general theoretical basis which is highly relevant for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
Nye started with a definition of power taken from a dictionary: 
 “Power is the ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what 
they otherwise would not.” 85 
In this definition, the “possession of certain resources”, as there are “population, 
territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability”86 
needs to be taken into account. Only by owning at least some of these resources 
power can be exercised over others. 
 
Looking back in history, military forces and territory were of great importance. In 
addition to these two terms, economic strength is what Nye called “hard power”.87 It 
is exercised when a state is “ordering others to do what it wants”88 and “the ability to 
coerce” 89.  Although “hard power” is still the “ultimate form of power”90 other issues 
have proofed to be also effective in international relations. These are for example: 
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“communications, organizational and institutional skills, and manipulation of 
interdependence”.91  
All these examples are part of a new form of power which has become relevant in 
international politics: “soft power”. This new “face of power” or “co-optive power”92 
as Nye called it, “occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it 
wants”93. In this concept, attraction94 becomes a great pull factor. This co-optive 
power is therefore the  
“power of attractive ideas or the ability to set the political agenda and 
determine the framework of debate in a way that shapes other's preferences.”95  
Nye identified the sources of soft power as follows:96 
• Culture 
• Domestic policies and values 
• Foreign policy 
 
Therefore, soft power is not only in the hands of policy makers, e.g. when we look at 
“culture”. 
One example of USA culture playing a decisive role in history is, when the economically 
motivated Marshall Plan was imposed to and introduced in post-war Europe. At that 
time, blue jeans, Coca-Cola or special cigarettes had already started to become 
attractive to the youth. Values such as “freedom, casualness, vitality, liberty, 
modernity and youthfulness”97 were transported through the popular culture and 
boosted the success of the Marshall Plan. So, both policy and culture were vital to 
meeting the goals of the USA in post-war Europe. Nye expressed this more radically as 
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he stated: “If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly 
follow”.98 
It is also, when the “style” of foreign policy is “inclusive”, not shaped too narrowly but 
more farsighted that others might want to follow.99 
 
In 2004 Nye introduced a further “face of power” which he called “smart power”. This 
occurs when a state differentiates and uses either hard or soft power. For the purpose 
of this thesis, it is not relevant and will not be described any further. 
 
The appearance of “soft power” is somehow related to the changing political arena. 
Nye built his theory at the end of the Cold War, acknowledging a new actor in the 
political arena and thus verifying a new “diffusion of power”: the smaller states and 
the transnational corporations appeared on the arena of world politics. Although the 
latter having “enormous economic resources”, it is still the states that have the greater 
influence.100 Due to the appearance of these new actors, new state “goals” arose in 
order to secure state safety. These are for example issues in the field of economics or 
environment. The “diffusion of power” can be identified with five phenomena: 
“economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the 
spread of technology, and changing political issues”.101 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, “economic interdependence”, “the spread of 
technology” and “changing political issues” are especially important. New technologies 
made communication and transportation easier and more efficient and, on the long 
run, cheaper as well. This had an enormous impact, resulting in the so called 
“economic interdependence” which entailed an extreme expansion of world trade. 
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The upcoming new technologies not only caused economic interdependence but also 
changed the power game: in defense industry where knowledge and technology is no 
longer limited to a few “superpowers”. With more and more states being able to 
produce weapons and even nuclear weapons, the distribution of power changes 
considerably. 
 
Nye also payed attention to the “changing political issues” such as “ecological changes, 
(…) health epidemics such as AIDS, illicit trade in drugs, and terrorism.” These issues 
are not only relevant for one state, they are “transnational” and consequently can be 
resolved only by international cooperation. All these factors increase the level of 
interdependence between states.  
2.2.4.1. Soft power - the EU and the USA 
As mentioned above, Nye was thinking about optimizing the US foreign politics. But he 
also identified the EU's soft power, which he saw as “the closest competitor to the 
United States in terms of soft power resources”.102 As a matter of fact, one single 
European state can not “compete” with the USA, but the European Union with its 
enormous seize and population has a “good deal of soft power”. The integration 
process led to peace and economic wealth on the continent, thus presenting a 
“positive image” around the world. Nye recognized the strong soft power of the 
European countries in “art, literature, music, design, fashion, and food”.103 However, 
also domestic policies such as social policy and regulations on economic matters make 
the EU attractive to young people in the world. In terms of foreign policy the positions 
of the EU in global problems like “climate change, international law, and human rights 
treaties”104 make it very attractive. 
 
This enormous source of European soft power may become a problem for American 
soft power, because it could interfere with American objectives, Nye pointed out. On 
                                                 
102 Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2006. pp.30 
103 ibid p.30 
104 ibid p.32 
Theoretical Framework | 37 
 
the other hand: “Soft power can be shared and used in a cooperative fashion.”105 This 
means, where the values of the EU and the USA are congruent, as for example in 
“promotion of democracy and human rights”, working together would lead to a higher 
pay-off in world politics. 
2.2.4.2. The soft power of science 
As discussed in the previous section, Nye identified a changing “diffusion of power”, 
and soft power becomes more and more relevant. In earlier times, the military power 
(hard power) of a country indicated its overall status in world politics. Now other 
features shape power in the world, as Nye defines:  
“The factors of technology, education and economic growth are becoming more 
significant in international power.”106 
Bringing it more to the point, Keohane/Nye wrote later that “KNOWLEDGE IS 
power”.107 Subsequently - by seeing science as organized knowledge - the one who 
leads in science has an advantage over others. Keohane/Nye provided a theoretical 
basis for this view. 
 
Norman Neureiter, the director of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS) Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy in Washington D.C., 
brought together the concept of “soft power” with “science cooperation”. Looking 
from the USA perspective, he argued that:  
“International scientific and technical cooperation have the potential to be one 
of America's most powerful and effective soft-power instruments for a 
constructive foreign policy.”108 
Mostly, he directed his thoughts towards U.S. cooperation with the Muslim World, 
where diplomatic relations are particularly weak. But by cooperating in matters of 
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S&T, the USA gained respect. Neureiter brought to the point, that the role of the USA 
scientists is so important because they establish dialogues on a daily basis. 
 
This “critical link” between international relations and science must be strongly 
recognized by policy makers and actions must follow, so Neureiter. He said that the 
use of this soft power as a tool by the USA would will create the opportunity for 
establishing “global diplomacy”, which means that even in times where the USA does 
not have a prevalent positive image in the world, cooperation in science can foster 
diplomatic relations. It is in that sense what Nye had stated earlier:  
“soft power is about mobilizing cooperation from others without threats or 
payments.”109 
The soft power of science and its interplay with traditional diplomacy is shown in the 
following graph: 
 
 
Figure 4 The soft power of science110 
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3. THE EUROPEAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
3.1. Overview 
Stein/Ahmed111 characterized the EU´s science and technology policy (STP) as: 
“The European approach combines scientific objectives with common political, 
social, economic and environmental aims through a form of partnership based 
on dynamism, collective decision-making and the distribution of research 
responsibility.”112 
The most important EU activities in the field of S&T are the so-called multi-annual 
“Framework Programmes” (FP). Since the first FP in 1984, the areas covered, budget 
spent and participation, have somehow evolved dramatically. In the beginning S&T 
was not an integrated policy area in the EU, but it soon became a central topic in the 
overall innovation policy. Since 1952 policymaking, administration, and terms of 
application have continued to change. This Chapter presents a comprehensive historic 
overview of the STP of the EU. It covers the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty, 
including the entire process from the  beginning to the current FP7.  
An synopsis of the S&T Articles can be found on page 167. The current S&T Articles in 
the Consolidated Version of the Lisbon Treaty (2010) are to be found from page 170 
onwards. 
3.2. The Beginning 
Guzzetti, who authored a comprehensive history of the European Union´s science and 
technology policy described the first years of the EU´s STP as following: After the war, 
Europe still “physically and morally in ruins”, the European governments were not 
preoccupied with science and technology policy.113 Nevertheless, in the eyes of some 
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pro-Europeans and scientists, scientific cooperation could become a contributor to 
both reconstructing and uniting the continent. 
 
In 1949 the Council of Europe was created to focus not only on the cooperation of 
Member States (MS) in legal, social, and administrative affairs, but also in scientific 
affairs. This mentioning of scientific affairs was due to the presence of Raoul Dautry 
(French defense minister before the war) and some other scientists, such as Pierre 
Auger and Edoardo Amaldi. Not playing a major role in the field of S&T, the Council of 
Europe would serve as a first debating chamber of Europe and bring forward some 
ideas in this policy area such as CERN,114 the European Organization for Nuclear 
Research, located in Switzerland. American Vannevar Bush described this period in 
history by saying science is an “endless frontier”, which is a prerequisite for a 
prosperous future.115 
3.2.1. The Community Way: ECSC, ECC, EURATOM 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1951 in Paris, is usually 
seen as the beginning of the European integration process. In 1957, the “Treaties of 
Rome” established the basis for the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Although all three treaties 
somehow referred to a STP, these treaties in general gave no clear legitimation for a 
European STP. A legal basis of research was only established in the field of energy and 
agriculture.116 During that early stage of community research, the control of energy 
sources was seen as the “key to political stability and industrial development”.117 Two 
energy types were in focus: the traditional coal energy and the advanced atomic 
energy.  
In the next section, the three treaties will shortly be discussed in relevance to STP. 
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European Coal and Steel Community 
On 9 May 1950 the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman changed the history of 
the European countries significantly. He suggested placing both French and German 
coal and steel production under a single authority in addition to establishing a 
common market for coal and steel. Schuman´s German partner was the chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer. He, as Schuman, was a Christian Democrat. Opposed to the mistrust 
that existed between both countries that remained from the two World Wars, 
Adenauer and Schuman trusted each other.118 Schuman´s plan was also inspired by 
Jean Monnet, a French entrepreneur, who would also become one of the founding 
fathers of the European Union. More countries were invited and subsequently 
Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands joined. These countries then 
established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in Paris on 18 April 1951, 
which came into play on 23 July 1952.  
 
Science and technology in the ECSC: In this treaty the beginning of common research 
can be traced back to Article 44.119 Some limited research objectives were given. The 
High Authorities were assigned to encourage the “research into technological and 
economic aspects of production and growth in the consumption of coal and steel”. 
Research should also be done in matters of  “safety at work” in the coal industry.120  
The policy instruments used at that time were coordination and subvention, rather 
than organizing extra research programs.121 
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Spaak Report 
In April 1956 Paul-Henri Spaak took the next step. The Belgian Minister presented a 
paper commonly known as the “Spaak Report” which examined European cooperation 
in certain economic areas.122 This became the ground for further negotiations, 
resulting in the “Treaties of Rome” which were to lead Europe into further integration. 
In the Spaak report, cooperation was seen as essential in order to catch up with the 
great nuclear powers such as USA, former Soviet Union, and Great Britain. 
Treaties of Rome: European Economic Community and EURATOM 
The Treaties of Rome were signed and ratified on 25 March 1957 by the six Member 
States of the ECSC and established the European Economic Community and the 
European Atomic Energy Community.  
The goals of the European Economic Community (EEC) were, according to Article 2, 
“establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic 
policies of Member States”. This should lead to stability, rising of the standard of living, 
and a closer relationship among the members. The freedoms of movement for people, 
services, and capital find their origin in this Treaty, as well as a common policy for 
agriculture and transport. The Treaty also established Community competence in 
competition policy, tariff union, state aid, and the harmonization of national laws. On 
the institutional level an Assembly, a Council, a Commission, and a Court of Justice 
were to carry out the tasks of the Community and shall be advised by the Economic 
and Social Committee.123   
 
                                                 
122  Presented by the Belgian Minister Paul-Henri Spaak on 21 April 1956 as chair of the Inter-
governmental Committee set up by the Messina Conference. 
123 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957  
online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm [9 November 2008] 
The European Science and Technology Policy | 43 
 
Science and technology in the EEC: some experts argued, “that there were 
components of an industrial policy but no overall framework”,124 because Article 35 
would support research only in the area of agriculture.  
Further research was based on Article 235 - the so called “general (elastic) clause”125 
The original wording of Article 235 EEC Treaty was: 
“If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the 
functioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases 
where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the 
Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission 
and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate 
provisions.”126 
This Article was the most important tool for forming the S&T programs, yet spurred 
discussions about legitimation of its usage. These discussions were solved at the 
summit talk in Paris in 1972, but only for a short period of time. The general elastic 
clause was significant for S&T actions until the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. 
Undertakings were proposed under this Article, so Peterson/Sharp, were subject to 
complicated and long lasting negotiations.127  
 
In the historical context the Suez crisis of 1956 had stressed the risk that the “oil 
supply could be jeopardized by political factors.”128 Therefore, the established 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) became important for the energy 
policy. It was hoped the provision of low-cost atomic power might free Europe from 
“its heavy dependence on deep-mined coal and imported oil.”129 Civilian nuclear 
power was seen as the innovative technology, which would provide the people with 
affordable energy.130 In the context of this advanced energy type, Guzetti described 
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the “myth of the atom” where the atom symbolized “progress, power, and 
prestige”.131 
The objectives were outlined in the Treaty as: rising of the standard of living and the 
creation of “conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear 
industries”.132 
 
Science and technology in EURATOM: Guzzetti saw a change of goals in the first two 
years of the EURATOM: from an institution for energy policy toward a research 
institution. At first, atomic energy was seen as the “cornerstone of a new technological 
revolution”133 but then progressed as an institution where Member States installed 
vague projects: 
Developing nuclear research was central in the EURATOM Treaty. The Treaty was a 
“mirror of Europe’s hopes, and optimism for science and technology”.134 According to 
Articles 4-10135, EURATOM had tasks in the co-ordination, promotion, and 
complementation of national projects.  
Because of the cost-intensive atomic research, no single European country could meet 
its financial needs.  Therefore cooperation also meant sharing the cost.136 In one of the 
first documents the executive arm of the EURATOM, the Commission, pointed out the 
aims of the research and training programs:  
“to avoid duplication, to co-ordinate national contributions, to cover gaps in 
national Programmes, to standardise measures and equipment, to promote the 
exchange of ideas and methods”.137 
A broad area of research was outlined in the first annex to the EURATOM Treaty 
covering all facets of nuclear research; e.g. raw materials and the physics of nuclear 
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energy. Stubbs described this era when “atomic energy was perceived as one of the 
most dazzling and important frontiers of science”.138  
On the other hand, nuclear research was also vital to military development and 
therefore collides with national interests. Logically, research that involves military 
usage was a tension for the supra-national level.139 
 
The USA were great supporters of the EURATOM. Strengthening Western Europe 
politically and in economic matters could serve as an anti-Soviet measure and could 
also open markets for American industries.140 
Guzzetti raised one aspect: The idea of having a solid scientific and technological base 
for a European nuclear industry in the future would soon become less relevant. 
Nuclear power stations were built immediately by co-operating with the USA- e.g. 
EURATOM and the USA government signed a cooperation agreement on the 
production of electricity.141 
3.2.2. The technology gap and fear of American dominance 
In the mid 1960´s a debate about the “technology gap” emerged. It was perceived that 
this gap would separate the USA and Europe. While Europe was in the post-war stage 
and its economy was growing, the USA economy grew even faster and was growing 
qualitatively. In the 1960s, society and industry were revolutionized by technology: the 
organization of work was transformed, new sectors were created, and the speed of 
innovation was extraordinary.  
This debate142 about the technology gap was of fundamental importance for the 
development of STP at both national and European level. Great Britain as the most 
developed country in Europe, and not yet member of the Community, was even 
involved, according to Guzzetti. 
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Probably the most influential book opening the previously mentioned broad discussion 
was written by the French Jean-Jacques Servan–Schreiber and was titled “Le défi 
américain”. He described a war not fought with weapons and armies, but with 
organizational talent and imagination. It was to become a bitter confrontation, which 
required all of the European strength to win. At that moment, Europe seemed to move 
rather slowly. Although it was going in the right direction, it would not have changed 
much if Europe had not become aware of what was at stake.  
The Common Market in Europe - without the implementation of further political or 
economic institutions - would open the door for USA firms, according to Servan-
Schreiber. He described it:  
“Fifteen years from now it is quite possible that the world’s third greatest 
industrial power, just after the United States of America and Russia, will not be 
Europe, but American industry in Europe”.143  
Europeans were not aware of the potential, but Americans were and the author 
mentioned an anonymous “American industrialist from Frankfurt” who praised the 
Treaties of Rome, which almost invited the USA to do their business in commerce and 
industry with better prospects in Europe than in the USA. 
USA firms seemed to have substantial advantage compared with the European 
industry: a larger scale, substantial ability to raise finance, higher productivity, massive 
investment in research and development, and financial support for innovation from 
the Federal government.  
 
According to Guzzetti the technological gap existed in two areas: First, in well-
established industrial areas where investment on a large scale would be required. 
Second, in ground breaking technologies, so called “cutting-edge technologies”, with a 
stimulating intellectual atmosphere and flexible availability of capital so that small 
business can develop.144  
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He mentioned two factors that caused the “technology gap”: First, in the USA the 
“cross-fertilization” was quicker. This term refers to the fact that research on different 
levels like government initiatives, research in large companies, and at universities 
made inventions that contributed to technological innovations and soon became 
products on the market. 
Second, the importance of human capital was seen differently. In the USA there was a 
different attitude toward education and training and also toward adult education. 
Guzzetti described it as “an investment, (and) not a form of humanitarianism.”145 
According to him, this led to the so-called “brain-drain” from Europe to America in the 
1960´s. This problem was also considered by Servan-Schreiber: the technology gap was 
above of all a “management gap”, meaning the poor training programs which were 
restricted to a minority and the hierarchical structures at universities hindered young 
talents.146 
 
Multinational companies were seen as the “vanguard of a new technological 
imperialism” and Europe was perceived as “subservient.”147 To handle the commercial 
and technological offensive of the USA, individual European governments had 
proposed and tried out different policy approaches (or a combination of them) at 
national levels:  
 
• Encouraging those American companies that had European subsidiaries and 
had profited from the advantages offered by the Common Market to find 
new markets 
• Acquire the technological know-how from the USA and abandon research, 
innovation, and training  
• Rigid protectionist policy, which would exclude all American investment 
from Europe 
                                                 
145 ibid p.36 
146 Servan-Schreiber, Jean- Jacques 1968. p.3 
147 ibid p.4 
48 | The European Science and Technology Policy 
 
 
But all of those policy approaches had great disadvantages and the obvious solution 
was the Community option: Working together and “creating a whole which would be 
greater than the sum of their parts.”148 A response from the European governments 
and the Commission was to promote funds for collaboration. New programs were 
brought to live like ESPRIT, BRITE, RACE and EUREKA. These can be seen as the first 
steps to face the technological gap, but they were challenged by several problems: 
above of all, by the lack of legal justification. 
3.2.3. The first steps as a reaction to the technology gap 
3.2.3.1. Above - sectorial Programs 
Even though the creators of the Treaties of Rome did not explicitly mention STP from 
the mid 1960s to 1974, several conferences were held on this topic149 shaping the 
basis for a common STP significantly. In October 1972, at the summit talk in Paris, it 
was commonly agreed upon to use the described above Article 235 EEC, the so-called 
“general (elastic) clause” (Article 352 Lisbon Treaty). With this step, criticism toward 
the lack of a legal basis for STP was diminished for the time being, according to 
Sturm.150 In Schumacher´s view, this was a silent extension of the Community´s 
competences.151 
Finally, in the Council´s decision on 14 January 1974 a common policy in the field of 
S&T was developed. Two aims were identified:  
1. Coordination of Member State´s polices  
2. Implementation of research programs and projects of European Community´s 
interest 
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On the basis of Article 235 EEC, the Council approved eight separate research 
programs in May and June 1974.152 The allocated budget for these programs could by 
no means be compared to the budged spent by Member States on their own national 
research programs. It only ranged between 1% and 2% of the total EU budget, 
according to.153 
 
Ten years later, in the report “Research and Technology policy in the European 
Community: Developments until 1984”154 published by the Commission in, the new 
strategy was put into a broader perspective: The strategy integrated all activities at the 
national and European level. An international view was also presented. The report 
presented activities reaching over the boarders of Europe and international actions. 
Furthermore, the strategy was designed to prevent mistakes that were made in the 
past. It enabled bridges between basic research and applied research and addressed 
problems of mobility for scientists within Europe.155 
In that context, CREST, the Scientific and Technical Research Committee (French: 
Comité de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique), was brought to life. Up to now it is 
an important counseling body for EU´s STP, and a composed of national advisers.156 
 
In the late 1970s some of the key issues the Commission addressed concerning S&T. 
Stubbs formulated these as “tentative proposals for action”157. For the time period 
between 1977 and 1980, those guidelines addressed four prime objectives158: 
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1. Security of long-term supply of resources - namely, raw materials, energy, 
agriculture, and water; 
2. Promotion of internationally competitive economic developments; 
3. Improvement of living and working conditions; and  
4. Protection of the environment and nature. 
 
To understand the developments of the late 1970s, one needs to look over the Atlantic 
and consider the new context: In the USA deregulation “unleashed” two big firms: 
AT&T and IBM. Therefore, the biggest telecommunication firm on earth and the 
biggest computer firm were about to challenge the telecommunication market in 
Europe.159  
The Davignon initiatives were a reaction to those developments: 
The Davignon initiatives 
Etienne Davignon (Commissioner for Industry from 1977-1985 and Commissioner for 
Research from 1981-85) initiated something new in order to respond to the 
developments in the USA. 
In a document he criticized the Community´s fragmented effort in research and 
proposed an “explicit industrial strategy”.160 The outcome was the “Big 12 
Roundtable”: Representatives from the major European technology firms discussed 
the idea of collaboration in order to boost their performance. Davignon suggested 
Community actions to support the modernization process of knowledge and methods 
of the firms. In return, the firms had to resign from their focus on national market and 
counter the USA dominance by attacking foreign markets as European - based 
multinationals”161. That initiative was seen as an important “breakthrough” in 
European STP.162 
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New programs as part of technology policy: Davignon provided a strategy, of which 
ESPRIT was an offspring. It was followed by BRITE and RACE.163  
All of those programs shared common characteristics:164 
 
1. Collaborative: Participation of firms or research institutions from at least 
two EU countries 
2. Funding on a shared- cost basis: Industrial partners paid 50% 
3. Priorities: Commission set priorities with previous consultation with experts 
and user groups  
4. Election process: Technological or academic excellence were the basis for 
accepted application, judged by an independent expert group 
5. Pre-competitive: Support for purely basic and not applied research 
 
A model for the criteria described above was Japan´s Very-Large Scale Integration 
Program (VLSI).165 The Programs ESPRIT, BRITE, RACE and EUREKA, which are discussed 
below, became a full success. Large firms connected and verified their “collective 
problems and needs” and recruited further companies to join the Commission´s 
initiatives.166  
These initiatives reflected the new policy predominantly oriented on technology 
policy167:  
ESPRIT 
ESPRIT is the acronym for “European Strategic Programme for Information 
Technology”. It was a European Commission initiative established in 1984 for fostering 
the cooperation of the Member States in S&T and technological development. In the 
five-year program European Community´s (EC) resources in “information technology to 
                                                 
163  Jones, Robert A. 1996. p.204 
164  Peterson, John / Sharp, Margret 2007. p.7 
165  For further information see Peterson/Sharp. p.6 
166  Peterson, John / Bomberg, Elizabeth 1999. p.206 
167  Sturm, Roland 2004. p.296 
52 | The European Science and Technology Policy 
 
full-systems capability based on semiconductor technology“ were developed.168 
Within a strategic program the collaboration between major European companies, 
SMEs and universities, and research institutions was aspired.169 
Turek170 called ESPRIT even a qualitative bounce of the STP, because the program was 
developed jointly with the industry and science community and was approved at the 
research council although some Member States´ opposition to the program.  
Despite the skepticism of the firms (they feared bureaucratic delays) the success for 
ESPRIT was striking. As a consequence, a 10-year program (1984-1993) was 
established, extended for another five years in 1994, and finally in 1998 it became part 
of the new Framework Programme - the Information Society Technologies (IST) 
Programme.171 Sandholtz172 identified a change in patterns of cooperation: With 
ESPRIT, European firms looked for European partners, while formerly partnerships 
with American companies were the priority. 
BRITE 
BRITE means “Basic research in Industrial Technologies for Europe Programme” and 
was an important program for industrial innovation. Raising the technological level, 
and therefore the competitiveness, of European industry was the major aim. The 
funded projects were pre-competitive research.173 
RACE 
RACE stands for “Research and Development in Advanced Communications 
Technologies in Europe” and was launched in 1987. This major European Commission 
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initiative aimed toward the EC competitiveness in telecommunications and 
complemented ESPRIT.174  
The aim was the introduction of broadband communication with ISDN and the 
possibility for the population to use these technologies in a cheap way. RACE was 
therefore more market oriented than ESPRIT. 175 It was replaced by ACTS in 1994.176 
 EUREKA 
Soon after ESPRIT a different program was established: EUREKA. For Edler et al.177 this 
was the most important initiative in terms of innovation policy. It also had a much 
wider membership than the EC itself, including EFTA countries like Turkey and later 
Eastern Europe and Russia. It was launched to strengthen the competitiveness and 
productivity of European industry by stimulating cooperation between research 
institutes and companies in advanced civilian technologies. Therefore EUREKA has 
always been closer to the market than the upcoming FP will ever be. In other terms,178 
this “loose intergovernmental initiative”, which was not exclusively set up by and for 
EU Member States was established “to promote “near-market” research: that is R&D 
leading to “products, processes and services having a world-wide market potential.”  
 
The idea for the program came from the French president, François Mitterand and his 
counselor Jacques Attali. It was planned in order to have an alternative to the USA 
programme SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) involvement under the Reagan 
administration. The French argued that EUREKA was more focused on civilian aims and 
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not on military research, like SDI, and would assure European´s researchers not to be 
“´poached´ by the Pentagon”.179  
When it comes to the funding, a major part was contributed by the national 
governments and not the European Commission.180 EUREKA was more of an “umbrella 
mechanism” for little R&D projects and therefore was more of a “sponsor” to these 
projects. As a sponsor it covered part of the activities of COST (European Cooperation 
in the field of Scientific and Technical research).181 
 
After the setup of the programs described above, the “First Framework Programme” 
was installed. It is by no means comparable to the current FP7, because it was solely 
an umbrella term for the already existing single programs. 
3.2.4. The First Framework Programme 1984-1989 
Guzzetti described the situation at the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 
1980s as anything other than ideal: no general strategy in Community STP existed and 
consequently great disarray in the research activities followed.  
This was a result of the national government´s opposition to any extension of the 
Community´s responsibilities. As already described, every single program had to be 
unanimously approved in reference to Article 235 EEC or in reference to the EURATOM 
or ECSC Treaties. This resulted in long negotiations. On top of all that, the existing 
programs were truly fragmented and did not commonly support a strategic goal.  
 
That situation inspired Commissioner Davignon and Director-General Paolo Fasella in 
laying the “basis for a real policy” in S&T.182 As a result, the concept of the “Research 
Action Programme” (RAP, later named “Framework Programme”), comprised all of the 
distinct research programs, and was to become the cornerstone of the new policy. 
Davignon had in mind that the “Research Action Programme” would help to select and 
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arrange scientific and technological goals, coordinate and plan the interaction of 
Community and national programs, and help create a way of financial planning.183 
The RAP lasted four years and underwent a mid-term check-up. Scientific and 
technological aims guided actions in different fields.184  
Three actions were used: 185 
1. Direct actions: decisions regarding the research of the Joint Research 
Center (JRC) 
2. Concentrated actions: coordination of national activities 
3. Contract research: financial involvement in public or private research 
activities 
Decision process, objectives and budget 
In terms of financing and planning the “FP1” the decision process was to a great extent 
a “dress rehearsal”. The existing legal basis did not provide the funding for research in 
general. The total budget of 3750 ECU was equivalent to the budgets of the projects 
approved already by the Council.186A detailed chart of the decision-making process in 
the field of science and technology policy after 1 January 1985 can be found in the 
publication of the Commission.187 
 
On 25 July 1983 the Council approved the “FP1”.188 Seven scientific and technological 
aims were selected while the “improvement of energy” was awarded the highest 
financial provision. Further aims were: promotion of competition in agriculture and in 
industry, improvement of management of raw materials and energy sources, 
improvement of living and working conditions, improvement of effectiveness of 
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Community´s scientific and technological potential. The following table shows the 
specified budget: 
 
Aims ECU (mil) % 
1. Promotion of agricultural competition 
- Improvement of agricultural productivity and of the quality of 
products in agriculture and fishery 
130 3,5 
2. Advancement of industrial competition 
- Abolishment and reducing of obstacles 
- New methods and products for traditional industry 
- New technologies (ESPRIT, biotechnology, telecommunication) 
1060 28,2 
3. Improvement of raw materials management 80 2,1 
4. Improvement of energy management 1770 47,2 
5. Strengthening of development aid 150 4,0 
6. Improvement of living and working conditions 385 10,3 
7. Improvement of Community´s scientific and technical potential 
effectiveness 
- Horizontal actions 
85 2,3 
Total 3750 100,0 
Table 1 Budget distribution of FP1 189, 190   
Rationales 
In 1985, in the already mentioned report by the Commission the rationales of EU’s STP 
were outlined. Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes, Vice President of the Commission at that time, 
spoke in the foreword about the necessity of a European STP on the brink of the third 
industrial revolution. His major argument was the avoidance of “scientific double 
work” by intensive cross boarder exchange of personnel and information.191 
In the report itself, further arguments for the European STP were given: the socio-
economic orientation of the EEC where research was stated as crucial for future 
economic growth, and therefore essential to the well-being of the 300 million 
inhabitants of the Community and further on, the sharing of costs and risks by 
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collaborating. The ultimate argument was the importance of STP for the building of 
“Europe” in that difficult time of an economic crisis.192  
Justification for RAP- Reisenhuber criteria 
In relation to the national research activities, special criteria had to be considered. If a 
“European value” was resumed by collaboration, the Community was able to take the 
overall responsibility in acceptance with the Council. Hereby short-, medium-, or long-
term advantages resulted from actions on the Community level rather than actions by 
single Member States.193  
The following four original criteria were commonly known as the “Reisenhuber 
criteria” and are named after the German minister of research Heinz Reisenhuber, 
who was in charge of the composition. Community involvement in research was 
justified if:194,195 
• Single Member States alone could not bear the financial means and personnel 
for big research projects 
• Financial benefits would resolve from cooperation 
• Significant research were achieved (e.g. cross-border problems) or 
• Cohesion of the common market and unification of European science and 
technology was promoted. 
 
To these original measures, two more were added after some time and Community 
involvement in research is further justified if:  
• Research contributes to the social cohesion (added in 1987) or 
• Mobility of researchers and the coordination of national policies are supported 
(added in 1994). 
All of these criteria are to influence the principle of subsidiarity, which would become 
a cornerstone of the Maastricht Treaty. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.4. 
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The importance of the RAP is what Guzzetti compared with a “multi-dimensional 
matrix”: First, the different programs aimed at a common STP by being approved at 
the same time. Secondly, the programs interacted with other Community policies like 
agriculture, industry, and communications and so on.196 Since the legal basis was not 
strong enough, further actions had to be taken: 
3.3. S&T as a policy field of the EC 
In this chapter, the following issues are described: first, the general development 
toward the Single European Act (SEA), secondly the impact on STP, and thirdly the SEA 
in relevance to the EU-USA relation. 
3.3.1. Need for legitimation of European STP 
With the extension of the EC´s actions in S&T, the use of the “general (elastic) clause” 
(Article 235 EEC Treaty) for Europe´s STP was once more highly discussed. This legal 
justification was no longer sufficient. The Commission and the European Parliament 
(EP) urgently needed a strong legal basis. Both were motivated to “break out of the 
stop - start cycle of ad hoc decision-taking and wrangling over funding of research 
proposals”, according to Stubbs.197 The discussions over the formulation were 
stopped, by including STP in the Single European Act in 1987. This was about to change 
the basis for STP entirely. 
3.3.2. Developments leading to SEA 
In the beginning and the middle of the 1980s the situation of the Community, which by 
then had twelve Member States, was far from solid. It was a time of a „tiredness of 
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Europe“ as Weindl/Woyke198 discussed it or a time of „Europessimism or 
Eurosclerosis“, according to Guzzetti.199 In the focus of the dissatisfaction were three 
issues: First, the common agricultural policy (CAP) and the industrial policy. The CAP 
was criticized because of its high costs and low results. Second, the inflexibility of the 
Treaties establishing the Communities along with the „lack of economic resources at 
the Community´s autonomous disposal“.200 The establishment of new common 
policies was not an easy task, because of the strong interference of national 
interests.201 All of these were major obstacles for a further integration and the 
situation was not satisfying at all.  
 
The first response came from the EP in 1984 with the “Spinelli Report” and had a great 
impact. The EP had been directly elected for the first time only five years earlier. The 
official name of the report by the member of European Parliament (MEP), Italian 
Antonio Spinelli, was: „Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union“. It was „Pre-
federal in nature“, and not only urged for an institutional balancing within the 
Community but suggested a significant extension of the Community´s powers and 
involvement in diverse policy fields.202 Science and education are also mentioned in 
the report.  
 
Therefore, the “Spinelli Report” was significant to STP and to education policy. It could 
even be said that it was the first time that STP and education were officially mentioned 
as a policy field of the Community. In part IV of the report, several policy fields were 
outlined: economic policy, policy for society, and international relations. In Title II, the 
policy for society, Article 60 was dedicated to research and education: 
„In order to create a context which will help inculcate in the public an 
awareness of the Union's own identity and to ensure a minimum standard of 
training creating the opportunity for free choice of career, job or training 
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establishment anywhere in the Union, the Union shall take measures 
concerning: 
- the definition of objectives for common or comparable training 
Programmes, 
- the Union-wide validity and equivalence of diplomas and school, 
study and training periods, 
- the promotion of scientific research.“ 203 
 
To highlight Spinelli´s argument: Scientific research and education were important to 
the „Union´s own identity“ and for the „minimum standard of training“. In other 
words, research and education were not intended by Spintelli to improve competition 
or economic competitiveness. Although the Spinelli report was not one–to–one 
adopted by the governments of the Member States, it was vital to the SEA and later to 
the Maastricht Treaty.204 
 
Not even six months later, in January 1985, the new President of the Commission, 
Jacques Delors, informed the Parliament about the Commission´s major task of 
eliminating „all of Europe´s internal borders by 1992“: the creation of a single 
European market. On the way to achieve this goal, three types of barriers were 
identified, which hindered the freedom of movement within the boarders: physical, 
fiscal, and technical. The most „pervasive“ were the technical barriers, according to 
Guzzetti.205 The barriers resulted from each country´s technical regulations and 
standards aiming at quality and safety- especially in high-technology sector. These 
regulations and standards were incompatible between the countries and subsequently 
intra - European trade was highly uneconomic.206  
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In the same year at the Council meeting in June 1985 in Milan, another advancement 
toward a European STP was made: The Commission proposed the Memorandum 
“Towards a European Technology Community”. The reasons for this Technology 
Community were the challenges Europe had to face in the mid-1980s. These were 
expressed by statements like: 
“It (technology) is increasingly becoming a strategic factor (…) the Community 
must turn to account in order to regain its competitiveness” and further on it 
“plays a central role in our societies because of its impact on economic growth 
and job creation, social and cultural progress, environment and security”.207 
In conclusion, the “Community will ensure that the technology effort is closely linked 
to common policies and in particular with trade and competition policies”208 in order 
“to strengthen the technological base of European industry and to develop its 
international competitiveness.”209  
This Memorandum became later the basis for Article 130 f-q EEC Treaty and was 
included in the SEA.210  
3.3.3. The Single European Act 1986 
The SEA reformed the three Treaties of the European Communities.211 It was approved 
in February 1986 and was enforced in July 1987. Consequently it represented a new 
dynamic and dimension of the European political integration. Observing the preamble, 
Europe will  
“aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and (to) act with consistency 
and solidarity in order more effectively (to) protect its common interests and 
independence”.212  
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In the preamble the extension of the Community´s competencies was also written in 
order to “improve the economic and social situation (…) and to ensure a smoother 
functioning of the Communities.”213 Hereby “economic and social cohesion” should 
ensure a homogenous development of the different regions of Europe214 and a 
technical basis for the international competitiveness of European industry was built.215 
 
Pfetsch216 described the importance of the SEA to the overall European integration 
process on three levels: economy policy, institution, and foreign policy. Guzzetti and 
Weindl/Woyke also contributed to this analysis: 
 
First, a new economic dynamic was achieved. The SEA represented the commitment 
of the Member States to the Single Market217 and it was to be finished in 1992. 
Guzzetti even described the objectives of the SEA as “primarily economic”.218 
Secondly, higher institutional efficiency was pursued. The Council became the 
“highest political body”, according to Guzzetti.219 In order to ensure the Single Market 
project, the Council could act by a qualified majority rather than on unanimity, 
according to Weindl/Woyke. In the field of STP, unanimity was still obliged.220  
Thirdly, further steps in a common foreign policy were taken. Guzzetti described the 
foreign policy as standing “on a rather uncertain footing”.221 Regarding to foreign 
policy, questions of defense were for the first time officially mentioned, according to 
Pfetsch.222  
                                                 
213  ibid Preamble 
214  Guzzetti, Luca 1995. p.112 
215  Weindl, Josef / Woyke, Wichard 1999. p.10 
216  Pfetsch, Frank R. 2005. Die Europäische Union [The European Union].3rd edition. Wilhelm Fink 
GmbH&Co. p.57 
217  ibid p.57 
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3.3.3.1. SEA and the USA 
During that time, the USA indirectly played a significant role in the realization of the 
European project: 
Pfetsch223 discussed the “cost of non-Europe” as relevant to the new dynamic 
European development. The fear of lagging behind the USA and Japan gave stimulus to 
a closer Community. The Ceccini-Report of 1988, authorized by the Commission 
influenced that development. The essence was that the costs of not taking steps 
toward the Single European Market would be on a broad scale: low economic growth, 
high unemployment and an even higher inflation. 
 
Weindl/Woyke224 argued that with the development of the SEA, the USA became more 
of a competitor than a driving source for European integration and that the EC had to 
find its place in foreign policy and in the global economy. The SEA is an international 
treaty,225 therefore laying the basis for the economic treaties between the EU and the 
USA in the 1990s.  
These treaties will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
3.3.3.2. Science and Technology in the SEA 
The SEA is significantly important, because “for the first time, the Community was 
given competence in research and technology.”226 S&T was covered by Article 130f-q 
by the newly established Title VI 227 . It was added to part three of the EEC Treaty.  
 
The main objectives of this legal step were evident, according to Peterson/Sharp228: 
• First, the strengthening of Europe´s S&T competence and 
• Second, the promotion of Europe´s competitiveness on an international level. 
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Jones even argued that “the need to address the Union´s technology gap was 
reflected” in the SEA.229 
 
Kneucker230, an Austrian legal expert, compared the Articles 130f-q EEC to a “business 
plan”. Those Articles were somehow a “business plan” on a macroeconomic and 
political level. (Although he referred in his comparison to the later Articles of the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the analogy can also be drawn to the Artices EEC.) The 
ultimate goal was a competitive European S&T in the global arena. 
Kneucker described the uniqueness of this approach in the common planning, 
execution, and funding of the FP by exploiting the resources efficiently. This was 
especially seen in contrast to other RTD Programs (e.g. CERN or EUREKA), which did 
not have the legal basis or the broadness of areas eligible to be funded such as the 
FP.231 
 
The changes with the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty 
are discussed later in the thesis. As already mentioned, on page 167 synopsis of the 
S&T Articles is given. 
At this point, the relevant Articles for the thesis are discussed: 
 
In this part of the thesis the referred Articles are presented in its original wording 
published on 29 June 1987 in the Official Journal of the European Communities.232  
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ARTICLES FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
Art EEC Description 
Art 130f 
 
Objectives and visions 
Art 130g 
 
Activities for reaching the objectives 
Art 130h Specific activities for coordination of the policies of 
European and national level 
Art 130i, 
130k 
Common instruments for execution of “indirect” activities 
/ Framework Programme 
Art 130l, 
130m 
Additional multilateral instruments with or without the 
Community 
Art 130n Cooperation with Third Countries and international 
Organizations 
Art 130o Joint undertakings or other structures for the efficient 
execution (“direct” activities) 
Art 130p Financing 
Art 130q Decision making procedures 
Table 2 Schematic overview of Title VI233  
Objectives 
In Article 130f/1, the close relation between STP on the one hand, industry and 
competitiveness on the other hand can be identified: 
“The Community´s aim shall be to strengthen the scientific and technological 
basis of European industry and to encourage it to become more competitive at 
international level.”234 
Jones even suggested looking at investigating technology, industry, and competition 
policy as a whole. He reasoned that all of them were vital to the “European business 
environment”235 and any progress in one of these fields had consequences for the 
others. Therefore economic growth, competitiveness, and employment depend on 
scientific and technological progress.236 
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66 | The European Science and Technology Policy 
 
 
But first and foremost, the SEA aimed at the completion of the Single Market. Article 
130f/3 stood in close connection to this overall goal: 
 “(…) special account shall be taken of the connection between the common 
research and technological development effort, the establishment of the 
internal market and the implementation of common policies, particularly as 
regards competition and trade.”237 
By identifying the objectives of Community research outlined in the Single Act as 
“primarily economic” Guzzetti238 pointed out the the linkage between research and 
completing the Single Market. This is to be done by the Community´s encouragement 
of cooperation between companies, SMEs, research centers, and universities. By 
establishing the FP, companies learned to “treat the single market as a `home` 
market”, according to Peterson/Bomberg.239 
Activities 
The types of activities were outlined in Article 130g (a-d). The Community was in 
charge of the implementation of research, development, and demonstration 
programmes where industry, research centers, and universities shall cooperate.  
But also the cooperation with third countries and international organizations was 
mentioned in Article 130g(b): 
“promotion of co-operation in the field of Community research, technological 
development, and demonstration with third countries and international 
organizations”240 
The dissemination and usage of results, the training and mobility of researchers were 
targets. 
Although, according to Kneucker, EUREKA had already been open for East European 
countries and the Russian Federation241 this Article was mainly used as a means of 
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integration toward the candidate countries. Most of these countries are by now 
members of the European Union.242 
Subsequently, within the association contracts, Articles concerned with S&T 
established a broad framework for cooperation. In the following years, this 
cooperation is to be interlinked with the foreign policy of the Union. Kneucker further 
analyzed that the Commission took only undertakings beneficial to the Union´s 
objectives until the FP4. In the later programmes, it is  divided between interests from 
the Union or from third countries: “Mutual benefits” were the key concepts for 
cooperation undertakings.243 
 
From the beginning of the European STP, mobility of the human resources was 
implemented. Education and training are therefore seen as key priorities. Article 
130g(d) focused at the  
“stimulation of the training and mobility of researchers in the Community” 244 
From a historical perspective, Kneucker saw a change from the just training of 
scientific personnel toward a broader support for promoting scientific careers within a 
unified Europe.245 
Coordination 
On the basis of Article 130h, the Member States and the Commission shall coordinate 
their policies. For the coordination of the policies, a centralized Community Research 
and Development Information Service (CORDIS) was installed. The Commission´s task 
was the improvement of coordination of member state´s research and technological 
development (RTD) programs, according to Jones.246 
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Instruments 
In Article 130i, the overall instrument of the Community was introduced: the 
multiannual Framework Programme (FP). 
“The Community shall adopt a multiannual framework programme setting out 
all its activities. The framework programme shall lay down the scientific and 
technical objectives, define their respective priorities, set out the main lines of 
the activities envisaged and fix the amount deemed necessary”247 
The FPs are to become the main instrument of the European STP. Stubbs called them 
“the key provision” and they were set out for five years.248 The main lines of activities 
shall then be “implemented through specific Programmes developed within each 
activity”, so Article 130k.  
As described previously, within the FP1, the already existing programs were pooled 
together. After the SEA, from the FP2 onwards a pooling was not necessary, because 
the FPs were legally justified.  
International Cooperation 
In accordance with Article 228, Article 130n justified Agreements and third - party 
negotiations: 
“In implementing the multiannual framework programme, the Community may 
make provision for co-operation in Community research, technological 
development and demonstration with third countries or international 
organizations.”249 
Guzzetti added that arrangements were made so that not all Member States have to 
participate in theses specific international organization programs.250  
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Decision - making procedure 
The decision-making procedure of the FP was laid down in Article 130q.251 In general 
the Commission had the right to propose. In a further step, the Economic and Social 
Committee was to be consulted. Then two different procedures had to be considered, 
depending on the relevant issue: Regarding the FP (activities, objectives, and budget) 
and the joint undertakings, after consulting the EP, the Council decided on the 
principle of the unanimous vote. 
Articles 130k, 130l, 130m, 130n and 130p(1) were to be decided by the Council in 
cooperation with the EP and by the qualified majority voting (QMV).  
Peterson/Bromberg252 identified the decision-making process as a “double legislative 
procedure” and criticized it because of its time and resource consuming nature. 
3.3.4. The Second Framework Programme 1987-1991 
From January 1985 until January 1989 the German Karl Heinz Narjes was 
Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, Information Technology, Research and Science, 
and the Joint Research Center. It fell into his responsibility to consolidate and to 
possibly increase the Community´s activities in the field of S&T.253 
 
With the FP2 two important topics were introduced: economic and social cohesion as 
well as the forerunner of the principle of subsidiarity. 
First, the principle of economic and social cohesion: Introduced by the SEA, social 
cohesion was consequently added to the “Reisenhuber criteria”, therefore becoming 
the fifth criteria, where the Community may become active in the field of STP: 
“research which contributes to the strengthening of the Community´s economic 
and social cohesion, as well as to the promotion of its harmonious and 
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widespread development, while maintaining its consistency with the objective 
of technical and scientific quality.”254  
Second, the forerunner of the principle of subsidiarity:  
“(The Commission) considers that where national or multilateral programmes 
and activities capable of meeting these objectives already exist, it is not 
necessary to develop new initiatives at Community level.”255 
The principle of subsidiarity will become a major topic of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
and will be discussed later. 
Budget 
As Commissioner Narjes made his first proposal in 1986 regarding the budget, he 
suggested ECU 10 billion. This would be equivalent to 5% of the Community´s annual 
budget. Although it was announced to reserve 6% of the budget for STP at the summit 
in Milan in 1985, several national governments did not agree in this major budget 
increase. Germany and especially Great Britain were the major opponents. After a year 
of proposals by the Commission, finally a budget was agreed upon. The final sum was 
ECU 5.4. Mil., equivalent to less than 3% of the total Community budget.256 In 
comparison, agriculture was the biggest budget item with 70% of the overall EU´s 
budget. 
The following table outlines the distribution of the budget: 
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Activity MECU = Million ECU % 
1. Quality of life 375 6,95 
2. Towards a single market and an information and 
communication society 
2275 42,16 
3. Modernization of industrial sectors 845 15,66 
4. Exploitation and optimization of biological resources 280 5,19 
5. Energy 1173 21,74 
6. Science and technology at the service of development 80 1,48 
7. Exploitation of the sea-bed and the optimization of marine 
resources 
80 1,48 
8. Improvement of European S&T cooperation: incentives, 
optimization and utilization of human resources, use of large-
scale facilities, forecasting and assessment of other support 
actions (including statistics), and the dissemination and use of 
S&T research results. 
288 5,34 
Total 5396 100 
Table 3 Budget distribution of FP2257 
 
The biggest financial resources were allocated to information technology and 
telecommunication. ESPRIT was carried on in the area of information technology and 
RACE was then a program within the area of communication.258  
3.3.5. The Third Framework Programme 1990-1994 
Filippo Maria Pandolfi, the new Commissioner (1989-1992) for Science, Research and 
Technology, Telecommunications, Information and Innovation Industries, and the Joint 
Research Centre decided to set up the new FP by 1990- a year before the end of the 
FP2. 
This decision was based on several reports of experts and led to the „rolling 
Programmes mechanism“, meaning the FP would overlap for one or two years. This 
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would provide appropriate financial planning and the continuation of the research 
activities. 
 
The approval of the FP3 had to undergo several difficulties mostly regarding the 
budget. The Council, the Parliament, and the Commission disagreed on the funding. 
The Commission proposed ECU 7.7 billion and the Parliament ECU 8.23, while the 
Council proposed ECU 5.7 billion. The Council finally approved the FP3 on 23 April 1990 
with some changes, for example the specific programs were reduced to 15 and only six 
action lines were given.259 
 
During the approval process, the Council stated six concerns, which influenced the 
main objectives of the FP3. Guzzetti260 called the first three objectives as “linked 
strictly to the project to complete the Single Market”. These were:  
1. “Improve industrial competitiveness while at the same time maintaining the 
precompetitive nature of Community actions; 
2. Cope with the challenges linked to the competition of the Single Market for 
standards, thus boosting pre-normative researchers; 
3. Modify the attitude of industrial operators, by orienting it towards 
transnational initiatives” 
The remaining goals were, according to Guzzetti, more of a “novel nature, signaling the 
expansion of the responsibilities of Community research and development policy”. 
These were: 
4. “Instill a European dimension in the training of staff engaged in scientific 
research and technological developments; 
5. Increase economic and social cohesion while ensuring the scientific and 
technical excellence of research projects; 
6. Take account of safeguarding the environment and the quality of life.” 
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Clearly, some of these directions or “guidelines” were quite close to the already 
discussed “Reisenhuber criteria”. 
The following table outlines the distribution of the budget: 
 
Activity MECU = Million ECU % 
Dissemination of technologies  
1. Information and communications technologies 2516 38,1 
2. Industrial and material technologies 1007 15,3 
Management of natural resources  
3. Environment 587 8,9 
4. Life Science and Technologies 840 12,7 
5. Energy 1063 16,1 
Management of intellectual resources  
6. Human and Capital Mobility 587 8,9 
Total 587 100 
Table 4 Budget distribution of FP3261 
 
By 1993 the Commission and Parliament had pointed out that the budged was too 
small, so an additional 900 million ECU were approved. This corresponded to an 
increase of 30,6% in the field of energy and 13,3% in the other areas.262 
 
Although the FP3 was “preponderantly pre-competitive”, a progression in technology 
urges for a “continuum of interlinked activities, ranging from basic research to the 
demonstration of the applications of new technologies”.263 Sturm identified in this 
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context, the trend to a market-oriented research with the FP3. This can be realized 
especially in the field of environmental research and biotechnology.264 
3.4.  STP application to other policies 
In the following sections the developments toward the establishment of the European 
Union, the Maastricht Treaty, and its relevance to the STP and the USA are described.  
3.4.1. The Maastricht Treaty 1992 
The Maastricht Treaty - the Treaty establishing the European Union - was a result of 
internal and external events. Internally, the Member States desired some reforms of 
the Community. Externally, the end of the communism in Eastern Europe neared the 
possibility of a united Germany. This event strengthened the necessity of an  
“international position” of the Community.265 
As a result, with the Maastricht Treaty the Community became a broader political 
institution: The European Union (EU). Three “pillars” became the basis for the Union. 
The first, and oldest, pillar was the European Communities (EC). Here, the co-decision 
procedure was introduced, thus making “the Parliament a legally and politically equal 
legislator to the Council of Ministers”.266  
The second pillar was the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The respective 
responsibility resided with the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs for the national 
governments, whereas the Commission could make proposals, but the EP was simply 
informed about the decisions.  
The third pillar was absolutely inter-governmental in character: justice and home 
affairs (JHA)267 including immigration, asylum, and criminal matters.268 
The following table demonstrates the three pillars: 
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The thr ee p i l lar s  o f  the  European Un ion  
Treaty on European Union 
Common provisions 
Task: Objectives, Single Institutional Framework, Principles 
 
2nd pillar 
1st pillar  
3rd pillar 
 
 
Common Foreign and 
Security Policy 
(CFSP) 
• European Community (EC) 
• European coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) 
• European Atomic energy 
Community (Euratom) 
 
 
Cooperation in the fields 
of justice and home 
affairs  
(JHA) 
Intergovernmental 
cooperation method 
Community integration  
method 
Intergovernmental 
cooperation method 
Final provisions 
Table 5 Three Pillars of European Union269 
 
The Treaty was ratified in November 1993 after facing “ratification battles”, according 
to Bomberg/Stubb.270 In Denmark, two referenda had to be held in order to achieve a 
positive result. The reason for the skepticism was the so-called perceived “democratic 
deficit” of the EU. 
 
It is important to mention that the EU did not replace the EC. The Community was still 
the legal entity. The EU rather represented the broadest possible institutional 
framework by drawing together the competences of the European Council, according 
to Guzzetti.271 
 
From the beginning onward the Community was clearly economic oriented. However, 
with the appearance of the Maastricht Treaty, the objectives of the Community went 
doubtlessly “beyond its original economic” origin.272 The EU became a political 
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institution in addition to the economic raison d'être. This was reflected in the following 
five objectives of the Maastricht Treaty: 273 
1. Strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the institutions;  
2. Improving the effectiveness of the institutions;  
3. Establishing economic and monetary union;  
4. Developing the Community social dimension;  
5. Establishing a common foreign and security policy.  
 
As a result, several new policy areas fell into the Community´s competences. Two of 
these had already been mentioned in the SEA, but were awarded a greater 
importance: economic and social cohesion and social affairs.  
In terms of cohesion policy, a specific fund was set up where environmental projects 
and trans-European transport networks were financed . By the first mentioned policy, 
the tightening of the wealth gap between the Union´s richest and poorest regions was 
tackled. Therefore the social needs of the European citizens became an objective.274 A 
fund for the social policy was created for the improvement of living and working 
conditions of European citizens.275 This included education, vocational training, and 
youth.   
Further on, “culture, health and consumer protection” were also included in the 
Union´s competences. Industry was covered as well, and at last, trans-European 
transport and telecommunications became a policy field.  Energy policy was not 
involved, because of reluctance of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and their 
protection over their natural gas and oil.276 
 
One of the major impacts of the Treaty was the introduced principle of “subsidiarity”. 
With this principle, the Union does not take action unless a higher effectiveness can be 
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ensured by it than by the actions taken on national, regional, or local level. This 
excludes those areas where the Community holds exclusive competences.277  
3.4.1.1. Science and Technology in the Treaty of Maastricht 
S&T application to other policies 
With the Maastricht Treaty, the competence in S&T was deepened. Several changes 
were made with the prominent change of Article 130f. In the original Article only the 
competitiveness of the Community´s industry and the S&T base were the objective, 
but now 
“promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of other 
Chapters of this Treaty.” 278 
With this addition the original idea was reemphasized, according to Guzzetti279:  
“the Community´s R&TD policy should be, first and foremost, at the service of 
other Community policies.”  
With this addition, more obvious legitimacy was given to those areas of research not 
directly linked to competitiveness, and previously acknowledged on the basis of Article 
235 EEC (general elastic clause). These fields were: environmental and medical 
research and protection against radiation, but also basic research. For the first time 
the area of social sciences was becoming part in the Union´s research policy. This will 
be reflected in the upcoming FP4.  
To sum it up, as Pelzer280 did, the EU could sponsor any scientific undertaking, either 
basic or applied research or within or outside of universities. 
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Decision-making 
It is widely published, that the topic last discussed at the Maastricht summit was the 
“Social Chapter”. Peterson/Sharp281  negated this, and identified research as the very 
last issue debated. The most controversy topic was the funding. The Commission 
wanted to change the unanimous vote to a QMV for all Council decisions related to 
EU-funded research. The British Prime Minister John Major was against this and was 
supported by the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In the end, the British and Germans 
carried through their claim and the decision-making on the budged was not changed.  
Peterson/Bomberg282 analyzed in detail the decision-making process after Maastricht 
and even call them “history-making” decisions, which were “highly politicized” in 
terms of budgetary issues. For an overview of the co-decision process, the following 
table is presented, however, not further discussed: 
 
1 Commission agrees proposal for the Framework Programme´s budget and general 
priorities (for four to five years). 
2 Submission of proposal to Council and EP. 
3 “First reading” of EP (amendments proposed). 
3 Development of Council´s “common position” (in light of EP´s proposed amendments 
by unanimous vote. 
4 “Second reading” by EP on Council common position (with amendments raised and 
voted upon). 
5 Convening of “conciliation committee” (unless Council accepts proposed EP 
amendments). 
6 Council - EP agreement on overall proposal (with Council acting by unanimity). 
7 Submission of Commission proposals for individual Programmes (i.e., ESPRIT, RACE). 
8 Council adopts individual Programmes (by qualified majority after “consulting” EP). 
9 Commission develops “work plans” for individual Programmes 
10 Commission submits “calls for tender”. 
11 Proposed projects scrutinized by independent experts and management committees. 
12 Lists of projects to be funded approved by the Commission. 
Table 6 The post-Maastricht decision-making process for RTD policy283 
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This lengthy procedure relied completely on the communication between the three 
institutions: the Council, Commission, and Parliament, also called the “trialogue”. The 
procedure was not very constructive284 and urged for changes. With the upcoming 
FP4, this procedure became highly unpractical, thus resulting in slight changes in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1992. 
Budget 
Looking at the financial issue, the FP now covered all of the Community’s research and 
development activities. Article 130i included “fix the amount deemed necessary”, with 
the Maastricht Treaty it was changed into “fix the maximum overall amount”.285 New 
as well was that the objectives and budget of the FP were set out for five years.286 
Further changes  
Co-ordination: Article 130h was slightly changed to:  
“The Community and the Member States shall co-ordinate their research and 
technological development activities so as to ensure that national policies and 
Community policy are mutually consistent.” 287 
Previously, the co-ordination had been complicated and “largely unfruitful”.288 The co-
ordination of national STP has to be seen in combination with the introduced principle 
of subsidiarity: This meant for the Community´s STP that the Commission could take 
power in coordination of national STPs, if this is beneficial to the whole Union. In terms 
of cohesion, the S&T programs would “become an essential component of the 
research efforts of poorer Member States.”289 
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3.4.1.2. Industrial Policy 
With the Maastricht Treaty, a chapter about industrial policy was included under Title 
XIII. This step reflected the great significance of industry, according to Jones.290 With 
regard to the evolvement of the industrial policy the German Martin Bangemann has 
to be mentioned. He was Commissioner for Industry during the 1990s and for him 
“competition and industrial policies are not opposites” while “the internal market itself 
is the best example of an industrial policy.”291 
Traditionally, this policy field covered actions toward the structure of industry, market, 
and competitiveness. Thus including the “modernization of capital stock”, according to 
Stubbs.292 In comparison, Peterson/Bomberg293 cited Johnson and his definition of 
industrial policy as a “summary term for the activities of governments that are 
intended to develop or relieve various industries in a national economy” preserving 
“global competitiveness”.  
The original text of Article 130(1) was: 
“The Community and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions 
necessary for the competitiveness of the Community's industry exist. For that 
purpose, in accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their 
action shall be aimed at” 
(shortened): structural changes, small and medium-sized undertakings, cooperation 
between these undertakings and  
“fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, 
research and technological development.”  
Peterson/Bomberg294 described the “idea of an EU industrial policy” as “quite novel”, 
because the EU is the only international organization concerned with it and has 
competence to do so. 
Linkage to research and technology policy 
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When we recapitulate that science, research, and technology policy became linked to 
other policy areas, written in Article 130f, industry policy is one example. This was 
described above. Other policies are competition, environment, and energy.295 Jones 
argued that this was important since STP and industry policy “share an uncertain 
border”, just as trade policy does.296 Competitiveness of the EC industry was then 
supported by research and technological development, according to Sturm.297 
3.4.1.3. Maastricht and USA 
With the inclusion of “social and economic cohesion” in the Maastricht Treaty, the two 
traditional concerns of the EU, competitiveness against USA and Japan and 
enhancement of “human and material resources” were less discussed. In the 
aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, the positions of the Commission became even 
more focused on competition. The EU, the USA and Japan are also referred to as the 
“Triad”. Still, the EU shall become a competitive part in the world economy opposing 
Japan and the USA. The Commission determined two reasons for the poor situation of 
the EU:  
First, there were decreasing patent applications that were partly caused by the low 
investment in RTD of European countries. European countries spent about 2.1% of the 
GDP on RTD, while the USA spent 2.8% of their gross domestic product (GDP). While in 
Europe funding for “academic research” was high, private funding probably resulting in 
competitiveness of industry, it was less than in the USA.  
Second, there was a shortage of educated personnel in key sectors like information 
technology or electronics.298 
Guzzetti concluded, that a “comprehensive” innovation policy was missing, which 
would turn research into inventions and consequently revert inventions into products.  
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The Commission appreciated “the market as the regulator and driving force of 
economic efficiency”. According to this conclusion, the business sector had to take the 
responsibility for the industrial field. 299 
 
Besides regulating the market and straight lining European norms and regulations, the 
EU´s tasks in that field were dyadic: 300 
1. Building trans-European networks in energy, telecommunications, and 
transport. 
2. Increasing support of RTD by the Community and also by the governments. 
3.4.2.  Fourth Framework Programme 1994- 1998 
With the new Commission installed in 1993, Jaques Delors was confirmed for another 
two years as President of the Commission. Martin Bangemann, Commissioner for 
industry, also became Commissioner for telecommunications, information market, and 
exploitation of research (as well for ESPRIT). Antonio Ruberti became Commissioner of 
DG XII for science, research, and development and therefore also responsible for the 
JRC, human resources, education, training, and youth. Having this position it was 
Ruberti´s task to formulate the Community’s STP and with it the FP4 as the main policy 
instrument.301 
First FP under Maastricht Treaty 
The FP4 was the first FP negotiated under the Maastricht Treaty, meaning the “co-
decision” procedure was applied, thus including not only the Commission and the 
Council, but also the European Parliament.302 Therefore, this was the first time the 
Parliament was entitled to take part in the decision-making process of a FP. The 
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decision was reached on 26 April 1994303, including the implications of the principle of 
economic and social cohesion and the principle of subsidiarity.  
As already mentioned, from the Maastricht Treaty onwards, science and technology 
applied to other chapters of the Treaty. This gave FP4 a vital importance for existence 
and subsequently, it was very strong supported by the Commission, so 
Peterson/Sharp.304 
Objectives  
The objectives that were stated resulted from the Commission´s Communication 
“Research after Maastricht: an assessment, a strategy”.305 Three objectives were in 
focus of the activities of the FP4:  
 
1. “Support to the competitiveness of European industry;  
2. Contribution of science and technology to the satisfaction of society´s needs, 
and,  
3. Support to the Community´s common policies”306 
 
The activities also had to meet other objectives, for instance the growth of “synergies 
between international cooperation” in S&T and the external activities of the 
Community.307 For this thesis, this point is of importance, because in the duration of 
the FP4, an important Agreement came into force: the EU - USA Agreement on 
Cooperation in S&T. This will be discussed in detail, with reference to the evaluation 
report by Horvat/Harrap in Chapter 5.2.3. 
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Activities and Budget 
The four activities of FP4 resulted from the Article 130g EEC Treaty (after 
Maastricht)308 and were: research, technological development and demonstration 
programmes, cooperation with third countries and international organizations, 
dissemination and optimization of results and training, and mobility of researchers. As 
previously, pre-competitive projects under “basic research, basic industrial research, 
applied research, technological development and demonstration projects” were 
funded.309Regarding the budget, 62% of the budget for internal policies was allocated. 
This decision was based on a suggestion by the European Council of spending between 
50 - 66.6% on research and development.310 This high investment was reasoned in the 
hope that S&T would help the EU coming out of recession and being competitive 
internationally, according to Guzzetti.311 
 
Activity Million ECU 
% 
Activity 1 
Research, technological development and demonstration Programmes 
Information technologies, industrial and material technologies, 
standards, measurements and testing, environment, live sciences and 
technologies, transport, targeted socio-economic research 
 
11496 86,9 
Activity 2 
Cooperation with third countries and international organizations (INCO) 
 
575  4,4 
Activity 3 
Dissemination and optimization of results (INNOVATION) 
 
352 2,7 
Activity 4 
Training and mobility of researchers (TMR) 
792 6,0 
Total 13215 100 
Table 7 Budget distribution of FP4 312 
 
                                                 
308  European Parliament and Council 1994 
309  Cordis information Service. Budget FP4  http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp4.html  [09 December 
2009] 
310 Guzzetti, Luca 1995. p.158 
311 ibid p.159 
312 Cordis information Service. Budget FP4  http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp4.html  [09 December 
2009] 
The European Science and Technology Policy | 85 
 
With the extension of the EU in 1995, (to Austria, Finland and Sweden) the budget for 
the FP4 was raised by ECU 833 Million. This happened through a common decision 
from the Council and the Parliament.313 The budget of the JRC was also included.314 
3.4.3.  Treaty of Amsterdam 
Shortly after the Maastricht Treaty was agreed upon a “Reflection Group” started their 
work in preparation for a further intergovernmental conference where “certain 
institutional issues” were to be discussed. The group reported a draft to the Madrid 
European Council in December of 1995. It took one and a half years of discussions to 
finally result in the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997. On 1 May 1999, 
after the ratification process in the Member States, the changes came into force.315 
The major outcome was the reform of the CFSP of the European Union and further 
institutional matters due to the enlargement of the Union.316 
3.4.3.1. Science and Technology in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
Two changes were made in STP: First, the Articles regarding STP were renumbered. 
Article 130f-q was changed into Articles 163-173. Pelzer317 called this change an “up 
evaluation” of STP. 
The second change concerned the decision-making procedure: the unanimity vote, 
regarding the budget, was substituted by a qualified majority voting (QMV).318 This 
was important after the long lasting and difficult negotiations of the budget of the FP4. 
Peterson/Bomberg319 saw in this change the chance of overruling Germany and Great 
Britain, which were especially skeptical on budgetary issues. 
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3.4.4.  Fifth Framework Programme 1998-2002 
In December 1998, the Council and the Parliament decided on FP5 with a budget of 
Mil. Euro 13000.320 The two signing parties were the President of the EP, J.M. Gil-
Robles, and the President of the Council, Caspar Einem, the Austrian minister for 
research (Austria held the Council Presidency at that time), while Commissioner for 
research at that time was the French Edith Cresson. 
This FP differed “considerably from its predecessors”, according to the Commission.321  
Objectives 
Two objectives were set by the FP5 and the major change was made in the second 
objective:  
• Increasing industrial competitiveness and 
• Increasing the quality of life for European citizens.322 
In comparison to the previous FP, this Programme was to “respond to major socio-
economic challenges facing Europe.” These challenges were to be met with research 
areas which combine technology, economy, social, and cultural aspects.323 
Critique on FP4 shaped FP5 
The dialogue about the FP5 opened officially in July 1996 when the Commission 
presented its first working paper “Inventing Tomorrow – Europe´s research at the 
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service of its people.”324 In the introduction, a strong announcement was made: 
“Europe needs research and research needs Europe.”325  
In the following months of the dialogue, every member state and other organizations, 
commented on the proposal, as well as on the ongoing FP4. The Commission took the 
comments and improved its proposal. Seven “lines of criticism”, where the most 
critique concerned the “over-bureaucratic and slow” management of the FP.326,327 
Consequently, the Commission drew the conclusion of the responses and decided on a 
simpler structure of the FP5: less “thematic programmes”, thus reducing the previous 
16 lines of action and implementing three “horizontal actions”.328 
Activities and Budget 
To reach the objectives four Community activities were outlined in accordance with 
Article 130g Maastricht Treaty, these were “Thematic Programmes” and “Horizontal 
Programmes”. The “Thematic Programmes” were: implementation of research, 
technological development and demonstration Programmes. The “Horizontal 
Programmes” were: promotion of cooperation in the field of Community research, 
technological development and demonstration with third countries and international 
organizations, dissemination and optimization of the results of activities of the EC, and 
stimulation of the training and mobility of researchers in the Union.329  
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Activity Million euro 
(current 
prices) 
% 
Thematic Programmes   
 1. Research, technological development and demonstration 
Programmes 
1.1. Quality of life and management of living resources 
1.2. User-friendly information society 
1.3. Competitive and sustainable growth 
1.4. Energy, environment and sustainable development 
10843 83,6 
Horizontal Programmes   
 2. Promotion of cooperation in the field of Community RTD with third 
countries and international organizations: Confirming the 
international role of Community research  
475 3,7 
3. Dissemination and optimization of the results of activities in 
Community RTD: Promotion of innovation and encouragement of 
participation of small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs) 
363 2,8 
4. Stimulation of the training and mobility of researchers in the 
Community: Improving human research potential and the socio-
economic knowledge base 
1280 9,9 
 Total 2118 16,4 
Table 8 Budget distribution of FP5330 
Further changes 
With FP5, applicants for project funding had to hand in a “plan for dissemination of 
results”. This resulted from a new idea where research results should benefit the 
citizens and the society as a whole. It was expected that these research results are to 
solve problems for economy and society.331 Another novum has to be mentioned: It 
was now possible for scientists from EU candidate countries to participate in the EU 
FP. The condition for doing so, was the respective countries´ contribution to the 
common budget.332  
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3.5.  The European Research Area 
3.5.1. Towards a European Research Area 
In 1999, the Belgian Philippe Busquin followed Edith Cresson as Commissioner for 
Science and Technology in the Romano Prodi Commission. Busquin, rooted in “left-
wing politics”,333 had a dream of creating a “European scientific community” or a 
“scientific espace”.334 The universal goal, according to Busquin, was to create a 
European Research Area (ERA) “in the research sector what the single market has been 
for commercial exchanges.”335 
Gago, at that time Portugal´s science minister and President of the European council of 
research ministers, supported the plan.336 He was helped by an atmosphere for 
research which hadn´t been better for some time.337  
 
The plan was put into practice at “exactly (the) right moment”.338 In January 2000, the 
Commission proposed the Communication “Towards a European research area”, 
where S&T were seen in the center of the 21st century and promising a flourishing 
future.339  
The weaknesses of the European research system - foremost hindering prosperity -
were identified by the Commission: first, insufficient funding, second, a lack of an 
environment to stimulate research and exploit results and third, a fragmented area of 
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activities.340 All in all it was a picture, where only 5,4% of the total public spending on 
STP were within the FPs and therefore subject to the Union.341 
 
In a later ERA report of 2008, the “fragmented area of activities” was outlined. All five 
characteristics addressed a “system-level failure”: Including the hindrance of a 
researcher´s mobility, cross-border academic industrial cooperation is complicated, 
double funding of research on different levels is existing, reforms on state level lacks of 
European value, and lastly business is not interested in R&D funding.342  
 
Perceiving the problems could not be solved by the FPs alone, a broader STP was 
urgently needed.343 Busquin said that the ERA was “the birth of a true internal market 
for science and technology” and it comprised not only the coordination of national 
policies, but an area where the attraction of global scientific human resources were to 
achieve the goals.344 
Aims 
For achieving the European Research Area,  three concepts were developed:345 
• an “internal market” for research: intensive cooperation and better allocation 
of resources through competition, 
• an enhanced coordination of national research policies and national funding, 
• a European research policy in charge of funding and all linked features of EU 
and Member State´s policies. 
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For achieving these aims, a multi-policy-level approach became of prime importance: 
where Member States, European Union level (with the FPs), and intergovernmental 
cooperation organizations cooperate on their activities.346 The Commission suggested 
taking diverse actions, such as practical instruments, exchange of information and 
experience, financial, legal and policy coordination instruments.347 
 
Change of the organization of European research 
Caswill called the rapid timetable of the establishment of the ERA “extraordinary” 
especially since the ERA gave “several radical proposals for the funding and 
organization of European research”.348 
In organizational terms, a new partnership between the European Commission and the 
Member States was stated: European STP would be a long-term multi-layered process 
where the Directorate General for research would only contribute partially. Whereas 
in the past the European Commission was seen as the “guardian” and the “only 
effective European actor” within the EU´s science policy, from this point onwards, the 
partnership between the Member States and the European level became important.349 
This organization became known as a policy “operating at different levels of 
governance”.350  
With two new large-scale instruments, which are described in the next chapter, the FP 
was not only reformed but it also was to go beyond the existing structures. The aim 
was the creation of an “European Added value”.351  
 
                                                 
346  European Commission. 2000a. p.7 
347  European Commission. 2000a. p.22 
348  Caswill, Chris 2001. Old Games, Old Players- New Rules, New Results. Influence and Agency in the 
European Research ERA (ERA) In: Edler, Jakob, Kuhlmann, Stefan, Behrens, Maria 2001 Changing 
Governance of Research and Technology Policy. p.65 
349  ibid pp.66 
350  ibid pp.66  
351  Banchoff, Thomas 2001. “Political Dynamics of the ERA” In: Edler, Jakob, Kuhlmann, Stefan, 
Behrens, Maria eds.Changing Governance of Research and Technology Policy. Cheltenham: Elgar 
p.82 
92 | The European Science and Technology Policy 
 
Only two months later, in March 2000, at the European Council in Lisbon, the Heads of 
State and Government of the Member States recognized the ERA as one essential part 
of a greater vision: turning the EU into the “most competitive economy in the world 
and achieving full employment by 2010”.352 This aim became known as the Lisbon 
Strategy or Lisbon Process.  
The ERA has to be seen in the setting of the Lisbon Strategy. Therefore it shall be 
shortly discussed described shortly at this point of the thesis: 
 
3.5.1.1. ERA in context of the Lisbon Strategy  
In general, the Lisbon Strategy was to have a great impact on research at national and 
European level. Caswill identified the role of some of the national governments in the 
process of which many were social democrats. Therefore, topics like “social cohesion” 
were brought on the European agenda.353  
 
The goals of the Lisbon Strategy were clearly outlined: The EU shall be competitive by 
2010 and meet the goal of full employment in order to sustain the quality of life in 
Europe. In that picture competitiveness of European industry played a major role. The 
phrase that is often cited is that the EU shall become “the world´s most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge economy“ by 2010.354  
The EU must “outperform” in policy areas connected to industrial competitiveness 
such as “research and innovation, information and communication technologies, 
entrepreneurship, competition, education and training”.355  
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Three pillars 
The Lisbon Strategy was built of an economic, social, and environmental pillar: 356 
1. The economic pillar provided the basis for the “transition to a competitive, 
dynamic, knowledge-based economy”. Research and development shall be 
given a boost.  
2. The social pillar shall push the modernization of a European social model. 
Important was the combat against social exclusion and investment in human 
resources. Subsequently, investment in education and training as well as an 
“active policy for employment” were necessary. 
3. The environmental pillar (added in June 2001 at the Council meeting in 
Gothenburg, Sweden) shall assure economic growth while having the 
environment in mind.  
 A critical view on the Lisbon Strategy 
In 2010, ten years after the Lisbon summit, conclusions were drawn by Fritz-Vannahme 
et al.357 They stated that events externally and internally caused the failure of the 
Strategy. Becoming the “most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” 
was an ambitious goal in an era of the “IT bubble” and the “New Economy”.  
One of the external causes was the economy slowing down, caused by the burst of 
that IT bubble and coinciding with the end of the New Economy and the events of 
9/11. Another event was the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, as the new Member 
State had to hold up with a strategy originally only designed for the EU-15. Finally, in 
2008 the “global economic and financial crisis” hit the European Union.358 Fritz-
Vannahme et al. criticized that the Union was more concerned with the enlargement 
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procedure and the discussions around the constitution than focused on reaching the 
Lisbon goals.  
 
Internal causes were that the Strategy itself was totally overburdened. Already in 
2004, as a result by the half-time report (the so called “Kok report” named after 
Willem “Wim” Kok, a former Dutch prime minister), the creation of jobs and growth 
became the priorities and the social dimension was left behind. “Jobs and Growth” 
was then praised. On top of all, the implementation method of the Strategy- the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) - was not clear and the support or even knowledge of 
it among the citizens was almost non - existent. For the follow-up policy, the so called 
“Europe 2020”, the authors suggested keeping the OMC but leaving the “shaming” out 
and rather suggested a “naming and praising” mechanism. 
The most important facts about the ten years of the Strategy were summarized in the 
following table: 
 
 
Figure 5 Ten years of Lisbon Strategy359 
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3.5.1.2.  ERA and Lisbon Strategy to compete with the USA 
Raising funding in research 
The importance of S&T in the Lisbon Strategy became obvious in the 2002 Barcelona 
conclusions360 where the so called “frontier technologies” were emphasized. 3% of the 
GDP should be forth on invested in S&T so “the gap between the EU and its major 
competitors” (USA and Japan) is to be closed. The financing should be distributed 
between the private sector (two - thirds) and the public sector. Busquin stood fully 
behind this proposal of 3%.361 
Organizing research and critique 
Busquin held the view that European research was disadvantaged by contrast with the 
USA and Japan. The underlying idea was that the political structures were 
unfavorable:362 The fragmented European research system should be turned into a 
“single innovative system comparable to that in America or Japan”.363 As a solution, 
regional and national funding elements should therefore be integrated into the 
broader European policy. 364  
This comparison with the USA can be also found in almost each “high level European 
policy document”.365 For example “Towards an European Research Area”366, made 18 
times a comparison with the USA. A daring thesis could be that without the 
comparison to the USA, the ERA would not have been born.  
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In 2008, the ERA Expert Group367 raised a critical view on the ongoing comparison to 
the USA. The group laid down the often discussed hypothesis that the USA did not 
have the negative effects of research fragmentation as the European Union had: The 
USA could use the resources effectively, sidestep doubling of research, had no barriers 
for personal in S&T, and a freely and prosperous academic- industrial partnership was 
in favor of a “common and legal framework at national level”.  
But the Expert Group countered that the USA would be proud of the diversity of their 
funding possibilities. This is because of the diversity of funding possibilities, more 
projects were selected for funding, and second the competition between researchers 
would be stimulating participation. Further on, in contrast to the FPs, the funding was 
provided by “mission-oriented agencies” as for example for security, health, energy, 
defense, and so on.  
As a final conclusion, the Expert Group recognized the advantages of the USA funding 
system and admitted the example-status in some areas, but suggested caution when it 
comes to copying other systems.368 
3.5.2. Sixth Framework Programme 2002-2006 
The Sixth Framework Programme was the first FP launched within the above described 
ERA. The objectives of the FP6 were clearly outlined: It shall contribute to the 
“creation of the European Research Area and to innovation”.369 Till then, so 
Archibugie/Alberto, European integration was “not (…) driven by a science and 
technology policy.”370  
The shaping of a European STP, innovation and competitiveness, were fundamental 
targets in the FP6: 
ERA for a European science and technology identity  
                                                 
367  ibid p.13 
368  ibid p.14 
369  European Parliament and Council.2002 
370  Archibugie, Daniele/ Coco, Alberto 2005. p.438 
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The FP6 represented the aims of the ERA and it was indeed a significant move forward 
toward a Community research policy, so it was commonly perceived.371,372 The 
activities should contribute to the structuring of research and technology in Europe373 
by linking programs and supporting partnerships between different institutions and 
levels of governance.374 Some authors argued that those activities were to produce a 
“European Research Identity”375, whereas Sturm described the activities mentioned 
above as a "catalyzer“ effect.376 
Innovation for Competitiveness 
Through that coherent research policy and the newly discussed innovation policy, 
industrial competitiveness shall be reached377, with legal basis of the FPs. A reference 
to the Lisbon Strategy was also made378 according to which the EU was to become “the 
world´s most competitive and dynamic knowledge economy“ by 2010. Although 
competitiveness was important to assure “Europe´s economic independence”, social 
cohesion was perceived essential for the well being of the citizens.379 The attitude of 
the citizens toward the FP was to become more positive, since science is considered a 
necessity for advancement of the whole society, according to Busquin.380 
                                                 
371  European Parliament. 2006 Policy for Research and Technological Development EN 4.14.0 edited 
by M. Györffi  
372  Stampfer, Michael 2001. European Research Area: New Roles for National and European RTDI 
Funding Programmes?  In: Edler, Jakob, Kuhlmann, Stefan, Behrens, Maria 2001 Changing 
Governance of Research and Technology Policy p.155 
373  European Parliament and Council 2002 
374 Turek, Jürgen 2007. Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik [Research and technology policy]. In: 
Weidenfeld, Werner; Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): Europa von A bis Z. Taschenbuch der europäischen 
Integration. 10th edition, Nomos  p.263 
375 Caracostas, Paraskevas 2001. Shared Governance through Mutual Policy Learning In: Edler, Jakob, 
Kuhlmann, Stefan, Behrens, Maria Changing Governance of Research and Technology Policy. p.41 
376 Sturm, Roland 2002. p.500 
377  Bieber, Roland / Epiney, Astrid / Haag, Marcel 2005. §28. Forschung und Technologie [Research 
and Technology]. In: Die Europäische Union. Europarecht und Politik. 6. Auflage. Nomos. Baden-
Baden. p.555 
378 European Parliament and Council 2002 
379  European Parliament online 2006 
380  Dickson, David 1999. p.837 
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Activities and budget 
The concentration on few key priorities was to enhance the attractiveness of the 
ERA:381  
1. Integrating community research and strengthening of basic research: Actions 
toward excellence initiatives were integrated. Seven thematic areas were 
chosen. 
2. Structuring the ERA: A connection between theoretic research and 
entrepreneurial practice shall be established as well as enlargement of the 
scientific workforce in Europe. 
3. Governance and concentration on few areas like genome and health, 
nanotechnology and space.382 
Activity Million Euro 
% 
1. Focusing and integrating Community research   
 Thematic priorities  
Life sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health, Information society 
technologies, nanotechnologies and nanosciences, knowledge-based 
multifunctional materials and new production processes and devices, 
Aeronautics and space, food quality and safety, sustainable development, 
global change and ecosystems, citizens and governance in a knowledge-
based society 
12438 69,6 
Specific activities covering a wider field of research  
Policy support and anticipating scientific and technological needs, horizontal 
research activities involving SMEs, specific measures in support of 
international cooperation (developing countries, Mediterranean countries 
and western Balkan, Russia and NIS) 
1409 7,9 
Non- nuclear activities of the Joint Research Centre 835 4,6 
2. Structuring the European Research Area  
Research and Innovation, Human resources, Research infrastructures, 
science and society 
2854 16 
3. Strengthening the foundation of the European Research Area  
Support for the coordination of activities, support for the coherent 
development of policies 
347 1,9 
Total 17883 100 
Table 9 Budget distribution of FP6383,384 
 
                                                 
381 Caracostas, Paraskevas 2001. p.41 
382 Turek, Jürgen 2007. p.263 
383 Cordis Information Service on research. FP6 Budget http://cordis.europa.eu/fp6/budget.htm  [20 
March 2009] 
384  European Parliament and Council 2002 
The European Science and Technology Policy | 99 
 
In the design of the new FP the ERA clearly had some visible impact: For example 
financial support for projects, studies, mobility, infrastructure co-ordination 
activities.385 Some of the new elements will be discussed: 
New elements in FP6 
Regarding the funding, new possibilities were provided: So-called “Networks of 
Excellence and Integrated Projects” were installed. Though previously three or more 
countries took part in “shared-cost” research projects, now those integrated projects 
were to include more research teams in more countries. These projects might differ 
from subject to subject, but they certainly were bigger in ambition and scale than 
previous projects, according to Caswill. 386 
With the network of excellence, public and private sector centers with corporate work 
programs may receive provision. This could be for exchange of staff and usage of 
advanced electronic methods of work.  
Caswill also outlined the “radical break with the past”: a long-term funding of 
eventually five years is now possible as well as annual payments and mostly budget 
management by the network.387 
 
Caswill raised some criticism388: While bringing benefits to some actors, those new 
large-scale instruments might as well be disadvantageous for others. Scientists in large 
centers with high prestige research might be able to move between centers and 
countries and therefore improving knowledge transfer. But with the shift toward the 
larger-scale activities, small research groups in small countries relying on cost-shared 
projects might be the losers of this game. This could apply for social sciences.389 
                                                 
385 Stampfer, Michael 2001. European Research Area: New Roles for National and European RTDI 
Funding Programmes?  In: Edler, Jakob, Kuhlmann, Stefan, Behrens, Maria 2001 Changing 
Governance of Research and Technology Policy p.155 
386 Caswill, Chris 2001. Old Games, Old Players- New Rules, New Results. Influence and Agency in the 
European Research ERA (ERA) In: Edler, Jakob, Kuhlmann, Stefan, Behrens, Maria 2001 Changing 
Governance of Research and Technology Policy p.70 
387 ibid p.70  
388 ibid pp.70 
389 ibid p.70 
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3.5.3.  Seventh Framework Programme 2007-2013 
On 6 April 2006 the Commission accepted the proposal from the Parliament and the 
Council for the FP7. The Programme will be running from 2007 until 2013. Janez 
Potocnic390, Commissioner for Research 2004-2009, spoke about the FP7 as a “new 
type”: First, it has a higher budget than previous Programmes with an amount of 50 
billion Euros. Second, the duration of the FP7 was extended from four to seven years. 
This seven year period has to be seen in the context of the Lisbon Strategy and 
because of this longer period and the possibility of research continuity better results 
may be possible. Third, it might lead to real innovation by a greater business and risk-
friendly approach. And last, the introduction of major new instruments, like the 
European Research Council (ERC). 
Activities 
The largest activity “Cooperation” is aimed for transnational cooperation in S&T and 
inherits ten strategic areas. These areas, according to Potocnik, “have been decided in 
close collaboration with the private sector” and “shall maintain EU leadership in these 
areas.”391 More research breakthroughs are expected by this pooling of competences 
and resources. 
The second area is “Ideas”. This activity is managed by the European Research Council 
(ERC), which will, without the EC, define the emphasis.392 
As Potocnik mentioned, this activity “will allow researchers to focus on riskier projects” 
and the elected projects will be supported by “starter grants”. 
In the Activity “People”, the conditions for researchers shall be improved: Career 
development, mobility, improvement of working conditions, and opportunities for 
knowledge sharing. The Marie Curie Actions is the main instrument. Potocnik said that 
                                                 
390 Potocnik, Janez 2009. Speech in Nicosia, Cyprus „FP7- a new approach to European research“ 30 
May 2007  [13 January 2009] 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/potocnik/news/docs/20070530_speech_Cyprus_en.pdf  
391 ibid 
392  Turek, Jürgen 2008. Forschungs-, Technologie- und Telekommunikationspolitik. [Research, 
technology and telecommunication policy]. In: Weidenfeld, Werner/ Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): 
Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2007. Nomos. p.165 
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“Research is a people business and if we don’t treat researchers with respect, they will 
leave for other countries or jobs.”393  
“Capacities” as the fourth activity supports the research infrastructures as well as 
small and medium sized enterprises. 
Budget 
This FP has an overall budget of 50 billion Euro. This means 60% more than the 
previous one and meets the goal of the Lisbon Strategy where it was proposed of 
increasing the 2% of the GDP to 3% of the GDP.394 
 
Activity Million Euro % 
Cooperation 
Health, Food, Agriculture and Fisheries and Biotechnology, Nanosciences, 
Nanotechnologies, Materials and new Production Technologies, Energy, 
Environment (including climate change), transport (including aeronautics),  
socio-economic sciences and the humanities, security and space 
32413 64,1 
Ideas 
European Research Council 
7510 14,9 
People  
Marie Curie Actions 
4750 9,4 
Capacities 
Research Infrastructures, research for the benefit of SMEs, Regions of 
Knowledge, Research Potential, Science in Society, Coherent development 
of research policies, activities of international Co-operation.  
4097 8,1 
Non- nuclear actions of the Joint Research Centre 1751 3,5 
Total 50521 100 
Table 10 Budget distribution of FP7395 
 
                                                 
393 ibid p.165 
394 European Parliament and Council 2006. Decision NO1982/2006/EC concerning the Seventh 
Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities (2007-2013) Official Journal of the European Union L412/5 30 December 
2006 
395 European Parliament and Council 2006 
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EU in the offensive 
Turek396 argued that with the FP7 and some other activities in the research area, the 
Commission followed the aims of the Lisbon Strategy. These aims shall be reached by 
not only increasing the budget, but also concentration to cross-sectional technology 
(information-, bio-, nanotechnology, and health research). He also argued, that in view 
of the still existing technology-gap between the EU and the USA and the increasing 
global high technology challenge, knowledge - based innovation plays a major role for 
the EU. 
European Research Council and European Institute of Technology 
These are two newly established institutions that, according to Turek, can be seen as a 
structural innovation. The ERC will focus on basic research and the European Institute 
of Technology (EIT) shall become a “magnet for the best brains, ideas and enterprises 
of the world” (translation by the author).397 
The ERC will manage the “ideas” part of the FP7 on its own. The EIT with the American 
“Massachusetts Institute of Technology” (MIT) as a model has the same intentions. 
The best brains and actors in the knowledge triangle “higher education”, “research”, 
and “industrial innovation” shall be mingled. This idea, according to Turek, origins from 
José Manuel Barroso and aims to close the “innovation gap”.398  
Praising the FP7  
In the European context, it is still very important to entangle basic research, applied 
research and industrial innovation, according to Turek.399 Furtheron, Turek pointed 
out, that the main objective of all of those actions is to boost scientific excellence and 
then technological innovation in order to strengthen the European position. The 
concentration to main problems and specific programs may lead to breakthroughs in 
                                                 
396 Turek, Jürgen 2008. p.141 
397 ibid p.141 
398 ibid p.143 
399 ibid p.144 
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important scientific questions like energy, climate, environment protection, migration 
or nuclear proliferation. 
The international dimension 
A further improvement in the FP7 is in the section of international cooperation.400 Two 
types of cooperation are outlined: EU and associated states as well as EU and third 
countries. The big difference to the FP6 is that now in each section of FP7 international 
cooperation is included. While the “Cooperation” Programme is also open to third 
countries, the “Ideas” Programme is funding individual researchers from third 
countries. “People” supports international mobility and “Capacities” has a general 
supportive role.  
FP7 and the USA  
As described above, the FP7 is designed more openly toward international cooperation 
than earlier Programmes.401 Since two main new research fields were added in the FP7 
(space and security research) these will also be included in the second extension of the 
Science and Technology Agreement (STA) between the EC and the USA. This was a 
result of the March 2009 review of the EU-USA cooperation.402 This Agreement is the 
core of the EU-USA scientific cooperation and will be discussed in Chapter 5.2. 
                                                 
400  European Commission DG Research 2008. Opening to the world: International cooperation in 
Science and Technology. Report of the ERA Expert Group. Group 6 chaired by Daniele Archibugi 
Brussels. Brussels p.38-39 
401 European Commission 2007. EC-U.S. Scientific and Technological Cooperation: Reaching New 
Frontiers p.1 
402 Horvat, Manfred 2009. Across the Atlantic: A Review of US-EU Cooperation in Science & 
Technology. Article based on the S&T Agreement Review of 2009. Bridges vol. 21, April 2009 
online: http://www.ostina.org [14 April 2009] p. 9 
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3.5.4. The Treaty of Lisbon 
The discussions over the new Treaty lasted eight years, putting the EU in a 
considerable struggle over institutional changes and power. It was signed on 13 
December 2007 in Lisbon/Portugal, but underwent a certain consolidation period. In 
December 2009 it came into force and merges the two existing treaties (Treaty on 
European Union and Treaty establishing the European Community). The key issues 
were:403 institutional innovations as well as some policy changes.  
The major institutional innovation included the reduction of the number of members 
of Parliament, a “double majority rule for Council decisions”, a “permanent Council 
president” and a “High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy”. In the position of the High Representative a lot of hope was provided enabling 
the EU to “speak with one voice”. In addition, an “exit clause” was introduced, thus 
giving the possibility of leaving the EU. From now on the EU shall have a “single legal 
personality”. 
The relevant Articles for this thesis are to be found from page 170 onwards. 
3.5.4.1. Science and Technology in Treaty of Lisbon404 
With regard to STP, one of the most important changes is, that the ERA became an 
objective. Earlier, referring to international competitiveness, now the first paragraph 
of Article 163 Lisbon Treaty points this out:  
 “The Union shall have the objective of strengthening its scientific and 
technological bases by achieving a European research area”  
                                                 
403  Euractive. The Treaty of Lisbon http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/treaty-lisbon-linksdossier-
188421 [11 February 2011] 
404  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community 13 December 2007. Lisbon online: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML [17 January 2012] 
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Further on it says that science and technology policy shall ensure that:   
“researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely, and 
encouraging it to become more competitive, including in its industry, while 
promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of other 
Chapters of the Treaties.” 
One should pay attention to the other “freedom”, as it is now scientific knowledge and 
technology. 
 
Some amendments were made: In Article 182 Lisbon Treaty (ex Article 166 TEC), the 
decision-making process was slightly changed.405 And the newly established Article 189 
Lisbon Treaty considers space as a policy field of the Union: an extensive EU´s role in 
space, and the Commission has to set up a “specific policy for the EU´s activities in 
space.” 406 
 
The following table gives a comprehensive overview of the development of the 
Framework Programmes: 407 
                                                 
405 ibid  
406  Abbott, Alison 2009. “Lisbon Treaty could give research a boost” Nature online. 
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091105/full/news.2009.1064.html [11 February 2011] 
407  Evaluation of the Sixth Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development 
2002-2006 2009. Report of the Expert Group. Chairman: Ernst Th. Rietschel 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/reports/2009/pdf/fp6_evaluation_final_report_en.pdf  [17 January 
2012] NOTE: The very right column does not refer to FP6 but to FP7 instead. 
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Figure 6 Concordance between Framework Programmes and Thematic Areas (citation see prev.page) 
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4. TRANSATLANTIC AGREEMENTS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO 
SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 
4.1. Overview 
As described in the previous chapter, the EU’s research policy is highly interlinked with 
economic competition. Competition and competitiveness are also the goal of the so-
called “cooperation agreements”, which “aim to promote intensive economic 
cooperation”.408  The EU has concluded such agreements with countries outside of 
Europe since the early 1970s and since 1990 also with the USA.  
 
The legal basis for concluding the following transatlantic agreements is Article 207 
Lisbon Treaty (ex Article 133 TEC). The Common Commercial Policy is part of “The 
Union’s External Action”: 
“1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and 
trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial 
aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect 
trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies (…).”409 
In accordance with Article 218 Lisbon Treaty (ex Article 300 TEC), the agreements with 
third countries are therefore signed by the President of the Council, the President of 
the European Commission and in this specific case, the President of the United States 
of America. 
 
                                                 
408 The Europa Publications EU Information Series 2008. p.42 
409  Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. Official Journal C83. 2010/C 83/01 Vol.53. 30 March 2010 
online: http://www.ena.lu/treaty_establishing_european_economic_community_rome_25_march
_1957-2-18771 [17 January 2012] 
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In this part of the thesis, first, the context and actual data of the EU-USA economic 
relation will be outlined and strong interaction between the two powers will be 
identified. Secondly, the economic agreements between the EU and the USA since the 
first one in 1990 will be examined. The main question is, whether science and 
technology played a role in these agreements.  
4.1.1. Transatlantic economy and actual data 
“No other commercial artery in the world is as integrated and fused together as the 
transatlantic economy”, so Hamilton/Quinlan410 in the 2010 survey of the current 
status of the transatlantic economy. This picture can even be drawn against the 
background of the economic slowdown. 
 
This economic interdependence/ interconnectedness has always been “at the core of 
the EU-US relationship”411 and probably will last in the future. Thomas L. Ilgen even 
called it the “most manageable and most consistent” relationship, which is highly 
fruitful to both partners.412 The officials also recognized this as they stated at the EU-
USA summit of 2010: “Our shared values and political experience and our deep 
economic interdependence constitute an extraordinary resource.”413 In the set of 
cooperation between the EU and the USA, the external trade policy has been the most 
important of the EU’s external relations.414 
                                                 
410  Hamilton, Daniel S. / Quinlan, Joseph P. 2011. The Transatlantic Economy. Annual Survey of Jobs, 
Trade and Investment between the United States and Europe. The Johns Hopkins University. 
Center for Transatlantic Relations, EU Center of Excellence Washington DC. p.v 
411  Smith, Michael / Steffenson, Rebecca 2005. The EU and the United States. In Hill, Christopher; 
Smith, Michael: International Relations and the European Union. The new European Union Series. 
Oxford University Press. Oxford. p.344 
412  Ilgen, Thomas L. 2006. The Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe. In: Thomas L.Ilgen.: 
Hard power, soft power and the future of transatlantic relations. Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Hampshire. England p.16 
413 Council of the European Union 2010 EU-US summit. Joint Statement.  20 December 2010 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/117897.pdf   [5 
November 2011] 
414  Monar, Jörg 2007. Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen [Foreign trade relations]. In: Wessels, Wolfgang; 
Weidenfeld, Werner (eds). Europa von A-Z Taschenbuch der europäischen Integration.10th edition. 
Nomos. Berlin p.81 
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Actual Data 
The EU and the USA are the largest trade partners in the world, since “no other 
economic relationship in the world is as integrated as the transatlantic economy”.415 
To measure the transatlantic economy and its competitiveness, traditionally, trade 
flow data is used.416 According to the European Commission Directorate General 
Trade417, the total amount of traded goods in 2010 was € 242,1 billion and the amount 
of services was € 125,2 billion. The USA is the number one export country of the EU 
(while China is the number one import country). The USA is also the largest investment 
partner, reaching around € 2,1 trillion of mutual investment, which is the “real driver” 
behind the EU-USA economic partnership. Consequently, this high trade flow and the 
strong economic ties influence the economies in both countries, as around 15 million 
jobs are created. This data reflects the highly interlinked economies, which create jobs, 
enhance new technologies and “provide healthy competition that fosters innovation, 
productivity gains, lower prices, and greater variety for consumers.”418 
 
Seen from the USA standpoint, the data on the transatlantic economic partnership is 
more differentiated. Hamilton/Quinlan419 from the Center for Transatlantic Relations 
in Washington D.C. annually analyze U.S – European relations in terms of jobs, trade as 
well as investment. In their most recent analysis, the transatlantic economy 
constituted around 54% of the world’s GDP in terms of value. Further on, the bond in 
“mutual R&D investment, patent cooperation, technology flows and sales of 
knowledge-intense services” 420 was especially strong. 
 
                                                 
415  European Commission. DG Trade. Global Partners: EU-USATrade and Investment. 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-
states/#_links [18 October 2011] 
416  Peterson, John / Margret Sharp. 2007. p.13 
417  European Commission. DG Trade: Global Partners: EU-USATrade and Investment. Online. 
418  ibid  
419  Hamilton, Daniel S. / Quinlan, Joseph P. 2011 
420  ibid p.5 
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Hamilton/Quinlan came to the conclusion, that although the recession had a great 
impact, the USA and Europe are still the strongest and most important economic 
partners in the world.  
 
The economic relations between the transatlantic partners are quite institutionalized, 
for example in the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). Its mission is outlined as 
follows: “We seek to strengthen transatlantic economic integration, with the goal of 
improving competitiveness and the lives of our people.”421 
4.1.2. Disputes in economic relations 
With such a high amount of trade flow, it is not surprising that disputes emerge.422 In 
fact, the transatlantic economic relations have always been torn between cooperation 
and rivalry.423 S. Linn Williams even described them as a “paradox”: even though trade 
disputes emerge, the transatlantic market is more than steady - it even is growing.424 
 
In total, only 2% of the EU-USA trade is actually seen as disputed.425 Taking into 
consideration the vastness of the transatlantic economy, this is a rather small piece of 
the cake.  Nevertheless, with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the raison d’être 
(alliance against the Soviet Union) of the partnership became increasingly less 
important and disputes in economic issues gained more attention.  
 
                                                 
421  Transatlantic Economic Council http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/eu/tec/index.htm [20 October 
2011] 
422  Williams, S. Linn 2006. Trade Relations Between the US and the EU. In: Thomas L.Ilgen.: Hard 
power, soft power and the future of transatlantic relations. Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Hampshire. England p.91 
423  Bücherl, Wolfgang 2007. Europäisch- amerikanische Beziehungen [European-american relations]. 
In: Weidenfeld, Werner; Wessels, Wolfgang (edts.): Europa von A bis Z. Taschenbuch der 
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Bierling426 identified two reasons: first, with the highly interwoven markets problems 
emerged, which touched the cultural identity on both sides. The growing integration of 
the EC economy gave impetus to conflicts, which became very evident during the 
Uruguay Round of the WTO.427 
Secondly, the long period of working together when security cooperation had the 
higher priority and economic disputes were at second importance, slowly came to an 
end. Thus, economic disputes became more evident. 
 
Bierling428 also stated that disputes in trade were part of the game since the 1970s. 
While most of the ongoing trade flow functions without any problems, some issues 
have a deep impact. The core of the disputes is the agricultural sector. The import of 
bananas and poultry into the EU and the high agriculture subventions of the EU were 
the main disputes in the last years. Furthermore, the protection of personal data is 
stricter in the EU than in the USA, which has led to disagreements especially in the 
flight sector. The conflict over poultry treated with hormones and the import of 
bananas were brought in front of the WTO, where in both cases the USA was granted 
the right to install high customs as a punishment. 
 
A further area of disagreement, so Bierling, 429 is cartels. With the fear of a dominance 
of American firms on European markets and consequently the possible negative 
influence on competition, the EU is very skeptical about company fusions. Fusions 
must be presented to the Commission and several proposals have already been 
denied. (WorldCom&Sprint, Microsoft&Telewest, AOL&TimeWarner) 
 
Williams430 examined the bilateral disagreements concerning steel, aircraft, Genetically 
Modified Organisms, Microsoft and others. But why is it then, that these trade disputes 
                                                 
426  Bierling, Stephan 2002. Die Europäische Union und die USA [The European Union and the US]. In: 
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do not seriously endanger EU-USA trade relations? He suggested three reasons: “the 
globalization of business, the WTO and, most importantly, effective diplomacy.”  
He furthermore explained the reasons in detail: firms often work on both sides of the 
Atlantic, thus are highly interested in solving any disputes. The WTO was successful in 
managing trade disputes by its “expertise and credibility”. The most important tool, 
however, was diplomacy, which contributed to the resolution of most trade disputes. 
 
Even though, the transatlantic collaboration in security issues is still difficult, economic 
relations remain stable, because security and economic relations “have different 
histories and different drivers.”431 
4.1.3. Beginning of cooperation 
With the end of the Cold War, the preconditions for world politics changed. Varwick432 
identified several aspects of the new situation: economic competition grew as other 
world regions, such as Asia and the Pacific, appeared more prominently on the scene. 
Additionally, a so-called “generational change” took place, as on both sides the “pro 
Atlantic” leaders left the political arena. In order to prevent the two powers from 
drifting apart, political initiatives were undertaken in 1990. From that time on, several 
political and economic oriented agreements between the EU and the USA were signed. 
These agreements are the subject of the following chapters, in which they are discussed 
in detail if relevant to transatlantic cooperation in science and technology. On page 169 
of the thesis an overview is provided. 
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4.2. Transatlantic Declaration 1990 
The end of the Cold War and consequently the end of the east-west conflict in 1989 
was the beginning of an intensive EU-USA relationship: the political cooperation began 
with the Transatlantic Declaration (TD). The principles for greater cooperation and 
consultation were laid down when the officials of both sides agreed to work together 
not only in economic but also political and security issues. EU Commission President 
Jacques Delors and USA President H.W. Bush signed the Declaration on 27 February 
1990, pursuant to which the USA and EC agreed to establish an institutional framework 
for “regular and intensive consultation”.433  
 
To facilitate such cooperation, biannual EU-USA summit meetings (since 2001 held 
annually) were installed. Since then, the Presidents of the USA, the European 
Commission, and the European Council meet. In addition, regular meetings between 
the USA Secretary of State, the European Commission and the U.S. Cabinet were 
established. Both meetings lead to consultation between the parties “on issues of 
mutual concern and common interests”.434  
 
Mark A. Pollack pointed out the hope, which was put into these meetings: that they 
“would open lines of communication, create networks, facilitate information sharing, 
and reduce the impact of disputes in transatlantic relations“.435  
Objectives 
The preamble contained a reference to the common heritage, the close historical, 
political, economic and cultural ties as well as to human dignity, intellectual freedom 
and civil liberties. The new political context, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
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future unity of Germany and Europe, was regarded as a window of opportunity for 
transatlantic solidarity. This was essential for the preservation of peace and freedom 
and for development of free and prosperous economies.436 
 
The three major goals of the TD were: 
• Economic liberalization 
• cooperation in trans-national challenges for example fighting international 
crime, terrorism and environmental degradation 
• educational, scientific and cultural affairs 
The paragraph “economic cooperation” emphasized the  
“support  (of) further steps towards liberalization, transparency, and the 
implementation of GATT and OECD principles concerning both trade in goods 
and services and investment”.437 
Hence, it is supposed to lead to advanced economic growth. 
 
Furthermore, transnational challenges such as terrorism, illegal production, trafficking 
and money laundering as well as proliferation of nuclear armaments, chemical and 
biological weapons, and missile technology were mentioned. It is also stated that the 
two legislative bodies, the EP and the U.S. Congress, are “welcome”438 to participate in 
this progress, thereby bringing the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic closer 
together. 
Science and technology 
The paragraph ”Education, scientific and cultural cooperation“ of the TD was of mayor 
significance for the establishment of transatlantic relations in this area. The “mutual 
cooperation” in many fields should lead to the “well-being” of the inhabitants on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The following actions shall contribute to this: 
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“exchanges and joint projects in science and technology, including inter alia 
research in medicine, environment protection, pollution prevention, energy, 
space, high-energy physics, and the safety of nuclear and other installations, as 
well as in education and culture, including academic and youth exchanges.”439 
Hence, two methods namely exchange and projects were mentioned and the key fields 
for cooperation were already defined. Most of the cooperation fields were, what 
would later be called, “global challenges”. 
Aftermath and critics 
As ambitious as the declaration was, no major steps followed and it was described as 
”cosmetic, minimalist and lacking in substantive innovation“440 and would soon be 
supplemented. While the policy areas were identified, according to Pollack the 
agreement lacked a more detailed agenda.441  
 
Five years later the New Transatlantic Agenda would extend the TD. Having 
experienced the low impact of the TD, possibly as a result of an absent working plan, 
this time a detailed Joint Action Plan was negotiated.  
4.3. The New Transatlantic Agenda 1995 
On 3 December 1995, during the EU-USA summit in Madrid, the New Transatlantic 
Agenda (NTA) was signed by the European Commission’s President Jaques Santer, the 
Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González (at the time President of the European 
Council), and USA President Bill Clinton. As already mentioned, this document can be 
seen as the extension of the TD. With cooperation in a quantitatively high amount of 
activities it’s aim was to “provide a framework for European Union (EU)-US 
partnership.”442 
 
                                                 
439 ibid p.2 
440 Pollack, Mark A. 2003. p.7 cited Featherstone and Ginsburg 1996, Peterson 1996 
441 ibid p.7 
442  The Europa Publications EU Information Series 2008. p.175 
116 | Transatlantic Agreements 
 
In the first paragraphs of the NTA, the signing parties pointed out the unity of EC-USA, 
which “for over fifty years […] has been the leading force for peace and prosperity for 
ourselves and for the world.” Past accomplishments were considered as “epic 
achievements”.443 
Objectives 
Four target points of cooperation were outlined. Subsequently, the Joint Action Plan 
(JAP) described later in more detail, corresponded to the following points:  
• “Peace and stability”: promoting democracy, development and 
humanitarian assistance around the world. 
• Global challenges: responding to global challenges such as to combat 
international crime and communicable diseases by setting up an early 
warning system. 
• “World trade”: contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer 
economic relations. This has to be seen in relation to the WTO, a New 
Transatlantic Marketplace and a further liberalization of the global 
market. 
• “Building bridges across the Atlantic”: several actions shall bring the 
people across the Atlantic together. S&T is one of these actions. 
Science and technology 
The fourth point, “Building bridges across the Atlantic”, was of major significance for 
S&T. The exact wording was as follows (highlighted by the author): 
“the Agenda seeks to expand commercial, cultural, educational and scientific 
exchanges to ensure public understanding of and support for the transatlantic 
relationship.”444 
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S&T was therefore supposed to bring the people of the EU and the USA closer together 
and thus to enhance cooperation. 
Establishment of new institutions 
On the institutional level, through the NTA, new transatlantic governance mechanisms 
were established for a productive working environment and to ensure steady 
progress.445 These mechanisms were: 
• Senior Level Group (SLG), 
• Reports of SLG, 
• Lower-level NTA Task Force, and 
• EU-USA summits.  
 
The SLG had to “oversee work on this Agenda and particularly the priority actions we 
have identified”446, while the lower-level NTA Task Force was in charge of coordinating 
and implementing the NTA’s conclusions in-between regular EU-USA summits. 
 
For a better understanding of the working procedures, Horvat/Karrap provided the 
following graph: 
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Figure 7 Working Procedures: Transatlantic Agenda447 
 
For the realization of the agreement, a joint EU-USA Action Plan was supposed to help 
achieving the four goals. The 150 points long working plan should enhance the 
commitment of the parties. It is described in the next Chapter. 
Critics 
For coordination of EU and USA responses to economic and security issues, the NTA’s 
institutional framework has proven useful, although critics have called it bureaucratic 
and focused on summit driven “deliverables”. Nevertheless, it has been an overarching 
framework for transatlantic relations ever since.448 
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4.3.1. The joint EU-USA Action Plan 1995 
As a result fo the criticism in the aftermath of the TD, saying that only few major 
actions were actually implemented, a detailed JAP was planned during the NTA. It 
outlined specific policy areas, in which deeper cooperation could be pursued. Pollack 
said that “the economic chapter of the JAP was arguably the most ambitious of the 
four“ since the aim was the creation of a liberal marketplace as well as the 
strengthening of the multilateral trading system.449  
 
Although the NTA was mainly tailored to an economic partnership, additionally it had 
major significance for the policy areas research, science and education.  
Science and technology 
In the fourth chapter of the JAP the goal was outlined: 
“We are committed to fostering an active and vibrant transatlantic community 
by deepening and broadening the commercial, social, cultural, scientific, and 
educational ties that bind us.”450  
In the section “Building bridges across the Atlantic” actions in the following areas were 
outlined:451 
1) “Broadeninge Science and technology cooperation, 
2) “People to people links”, 
3) “Information and Culture”, and the 
4) “Transatlantic Business Dialogue” 
 
1) Science and technology: a clear commitment towards establishing a formal basis 
was made. This ambition should bear fruit within the following two years:  
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“We will actively work to reach a new comprehensive EC-U.S. science and 
technology cooperation agreement by 1997.”452 
And indeed, after two years of rather complicated negotiations, the Science and 
Technology Agreement was concluded. It became the core of the EU-USA cooperation 
in S&T and was strongly interlinked with the EU’s FPs. In 2009, it once more was 
extended until 2013; for an in-depth discussion of this Agreement, see Chapter 5.2. 
 
In addition, in order to meet the global challenges and foster economic growth, the 
STA provided for cooperative S&T projects. Therefore, the parties were supposed to 
“identify collaborative projects and exchange information to address crossborder 
issues” in the areas transportation, health and global climate change.453 
 
2) People to people links: in order to “strengthen and broaden public support for our 
partnership” the EU-USA want to strengthen the commercial, social, cultural, scientific 
and educational ties among their citizens.454 
For this purpose, the EC-USA Agreement on Cooperation in Education and Vocational 
Training was meant to be a “catalyst”. Students and teachers were supposed to 
benefit, as the ground for cooperative activities was laid and ways towards the 
increase of private financial support for educational exchanges such as scholarships or 
internships were found. Furthermore, the teaching of each other’s history, languages 
and culture was fostered. Direct people to people links in diverse fora such as youth 
groups or think tanks were meant to enhance solutions for common problems on 
ground the basis of the “flow of ideas”.455 
 
3) Information and culture: ways of cooperative cultural projects were to be 
examined, for example in the fields of visual arts, theatre, ballet or co-productions of 
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films. Information about the NTA and the JAP was to be published on the Internet and 
therefore made accessible for the broader public on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
4) Transatlantic Business Dialogue: it was recognized as a major part of the 
transatlantic business relationship: “since a transatlantic business relationship is an 
integral part of our wider efforts to strengthen our bilateral dialogue”.456 This civil 
society dialogue has been an important forum also for the “flow of trade, investment 
capital and technology” in the transatlantic relation.457 
4.3.2. Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) is one of “the oldest, best organized, and 
most influential dialogues in the transatlantic economic relationship”.458 It could be 
regarded as the basis for “a transnational civil society”, so Cowles.459 However, 
contrary to other civil society groups, she argued, it would cooperate with  
“government officials to provide them with information to craft creative 
solutions to potential regulatory disputes and to shape the US-EU (as well as 
global) regulatory agenda.” 460   
The main objective, as stated on the TABD website, 461   “is to help establish a Barrier-
Free Transatlantic Market which will serve as a catalyst for global trade liberalisation 
and prosperity.” This free market is to enhance “innovation and economic growth, 
increase investment and further create new jobs”.  
 
The TABD has redefined itself in the last couple of years. At the beginning, it was based 
on an “informal process” for discussing regulatory issues between firms on both sides, 
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then it was transformed into an institution with full-time administrative directors and 
offices with sufficient financial means on both sides of the Atlantic.462  
 
Cowles argued, that the TABD played a crucial role in the NTA in different ways, for 
example through the collaboration of private and public or business and government in 
matters the officials previously have not taken notice of.463 The TABD has been 
different than other groups, as it helped setting the agenda by recommending 
policies.464  
The TABD has been criticized by USA and EU officials, because some proposals were 
regarded as “unacceptable given existing government practices” and because it 
focused on areas where no disputes occurred rather than “seeking to tackle and find 
consensus on more contentious issues that continue to hinder transatlantic trade and 
regulatory discussion”.465 
 
Furthermore, the TABD became a forerunner for other transatlantic dialogues such as 
the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD), the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD), 
the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) and the Transatlantic Legislator 
Dialogue (TALD). With these dialogues more people to people links could be 
established.466  
4.3.3. Transatlantic Legislator Dialogue 
The Transatlantic Legislator Dialogue (TALD) originated from the NTA “building 
bridges” chapter and is interesting for the purpose of this thesis. It brings together 
members of the U.S. Congress and the EP.467 Although parliamentary relations date 
back to 1972, it was not until 1999 when the TALD was established by the 50th 
interparliamentary meeting, held in Strasbourg. A joint statement announced the 
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“scope and resources for the development” of the TALD. Two annual meetings are 
planned and in addition teleconferences, appointments of committee liaison persons, 
a website was supposed to be created and twice a year, contacts on each side with 
members of the SLG were meant to enhance a positive outcome of the annual 
meeting.468  
 
Looking ahead in time, the TALD was to be included in the consultations of the 
Transatlantic Economic Council, which was set up in 2007. According to 
Mildner/Ziegler, this inclusion was an important step469 and could indeed function as 
“an early warning system” for legislation on the effects of new laws concerning the EU-
USA relationship. Pollack however, criticized the “insufficient contact between the 
TALD and other parts of the transatlantic dialogue, for example the SLG.”470 
 
The NTA has not been able to solve all of the ongoing disputes between the 
transatlantic powers. Disagreement over environmental issues, the structure of labor 
markets and the economic protection of the U.S. steel industry persisted.  
In order to have an arena for solving those ongoing trade issues, the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership was brought to life. It stressed that the EU-USA relationship was 
highly strategic.471 
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4.4. Transatlantic Economic Partnership 1998 
A new agreement was launched at the London summit in May 2008: the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership (TEP). Pollack described it as “a somewhat less ambitious” 
agreement, “which aimed to tackle bilateral regulatory barriers to trade and to identify 
common positions within multilateral trade negotiations”.472  
Science and technology 
The pertinent Action Plan was to focus on regulatory cooperation and the possible 
harmonization of standards as a means of removing technical barriers to trade.  With 
regard to cooperation in S&T, the second paragraph of the agreement is relevant. 
Cooperation was persuaded in areas such as: 
“improved regulatory cooperation, cooperation among scientists, identification 
of priority sectors for the removal of obstacles, coordination of EU and US 
positions in international organizations”.473 
Moreover, food safety, biotechnology and labor were part of the newly negotiated 
agreement.474 In addition, intellectual property rights were strengthened as they were 
seen in the context of the TRIPs agreement worked out by the WTO475. To fight all 
optical media piracy, the two most recent World Intellectual Property Organization 
treaties were to be implemented.476 
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4.5. Transatlantic Economic Council 2007 
The latest deepening of the transatlantic economic cooperation was the establishment 
of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). It was defined as  
“a political body to oversee and accelerate government-to-government 
cooperation with the aim of advancing economic integration between the 
European Union and the United States of America.”477  
This step was taken under the EU presidency of Germany and signed at the EU-USA 
summit in April 2007 in Washington D.C. by Angela Merkel as President of the 
European Council, George W. Bush as President of the USA and José Manuel Barroso as 
President of the European Commission.  
A work program was elaborated. This so called “Framework for Advancing 
Transatlantic Economic Integration” was primarily supposed to “benefit the citizens 
and the competitiveness of our economies”478, as declared in the paper’s preamble. 
Objectives  
In the preamble of the TEC, the following objective was stated: to deepen 
“transatlantic economic integration and growth”. This should then lead to “global 
benefits”. Furthermore, the TEC 
“will facilitate market access for third countries and will encourage other 
countries to adopt the transatlantic economic model of respect for property 
rights, openness to investment, transparency and predictability in regulation, 
and the value of free markets.”479  
In addition, the effectiveness of existing economic cooperation should be improved 
and accelerated. The transatlantic economy should be recognized as at the “forefront 
of globalization, and the EU and the USA as each other’s most important economic 
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partners”. It is a partnership, which reflects “historical ties as well as a wide range of 
common fundamental values”.480 These values were mentioned as: importance of free 
enterprise, rule of law, property rights, free trade and competition, and the protection 
of health, safety and the environment for citizens and workers.  
Tasks and working procedures 
Through the TEC, those members of the European Commission and U.S. Cabinet are 
brought together, which are in charge of the policy areas covered by the framework. 
Permanent members of the TEC are: the European Commissioner for External 
Relations, for Trade and Internal Market and Services and for the USA the Trade 
Representative and the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce.481 
The TEC also has the task of reaching out to the broader stakeholder community. This 
is done through a group of advisers, consisting of the co-chairs of the three existing 
transatlantic dialogues. In this way, the group is provided with a public voice.482 
 
At the Summit Declaration of June 2008 in Brdo, the tasks of the TEC were further 
defined as: “to oversee the efforts outlined in the Framework, with the goal of 
acceleration progress and guiding work between EU-US Summits.”483 
Science and Technology 
No less than eight bodies of the European Commission are involved. Therefore, a broad 
range of topics was covered by this agreement. 
 
As for the area of “Intellectual Property Rights”, the DG for Internal Market and 
Services (Copyright Enforcement, Patents), the DG for Trade (Intellectual Property) and 
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the DG for Taxation and Customs (Counter fight and Piracy) are the coordinating 
bodies. 
In the area “Innovation and Technology” two DG were involved: the DG for 
Information Society and Media (eHealth, Radio Frequency Identification) and the DG 
for Research (Biotechnology Research).  
 
Some “Lighthouse Priority Projects”484 were identified in order to enhance 
transatlantic economic integration in the short term (by the end of 2008). These were 
the areas of intellectual property rights, secure trade, financial markets, innovation 
and technology and investments.  
The road to TEC  
In 2007 the TEC was established but its origins date back to the 2005 EU-USA Summit. 
During the summit, it was decided to foster “enhancing transatlantic economic 
integration and growth”485.  
 
Mildner/Ziegler argued, that the political engagement of Angela Merkel and her role as 
Chancellor of Germany were crucial to the establishment of the TEC. In her first speech 
as President of the EU Council she said:  
“At the EU-US Summit we want to discuss the intensification of the transatlantic 
economic partnership. The United States is the European Union's most 
important trading partner. We are each other's key investment partner. In the 
interests of our global competitiveness we have to continue removing trade 
barriers (...). I am firmly convinced that a common transatlantic market is in 
Europe's own best interests.“486 
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Furthermore, Merkel suggested using “patent law, industrial standards” and the 
“access to stock markets” for abolishing the barriers in trade. 487 
The future of TEC  
Although it is stated, that the USA and EU  
“affirm their strong commitment to ensure the continuity of the TEC process as 
the key joint governance mechanism for the transatlantic economy into the 
future”,  
changing political leaderships might not put such an emphasis on this project. 
Mildner/Ziegler argued, that the rotating EU Council presidency and the U.S. 
presidential elections in November 2008 had the potential of not finding an 
extension.488  
 
All of the above-discussed agreements are somehow linked to the regular EU-USA 
summits. With the TD in 1990, the EU-USA summit was created. Formerly held twice a 
year, since 2001 annually, it serves as an arena for consultations on transatlantic 
issues: 
4.6. EU-USA Summits 
To enhance transatlantic (economic) cooperation, the TD, NTA and TEP in stages 
introduced annual EU-USA summits as an intergovernmental platform for exchange.  
In these summits, the highest officials meet, namely the EU Presidency, EU 
Commission and the President of the United States.489 According to Pollack, “the 
transatlantic policy cycle begins and ends with these biannual summits,” in which the 
policy leaders make decisions related to the general range of cooperation and in which 
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new bilateral agreements are proclaimed. These summits enhance the coordination of 
policies, as guidelines are generated, which force officials in lower positions to produce 
results.490 
 
In 2008, the regular and close contact between the EC and the USA were declared as 
being fruitful and to “have allowed both sides to deepen their political dialogue”. The 
EU-USA summits became a platform for informal discussions of strategic issues and 
common interest.491 
 
Within these summits and the resulting written outcomes, The coverage of science and 
technology cooperation in these meetings as well as the resulting documents, could be 
also investigated, however, this would exceed the limits of this thesis. A detailed 
coverage of the summits between 2004 and 2008 can be found in Horvat/Harrap.492  
Innovation and technology 
Until mid-2011, the last EU-USA summit took place in Lisbon, Portugal, on 20 
November 2010. The three major issues discussed were: sustainable economic growth, 
global challenges and security of the citizens. In order to boost the economy and 
generate new job opportunities, it was agreed, that the best ways were to foster  
“innovation, streamline regulation, and eliminate barriers to trade and 
investment”. Due to this resolution, the TEC was assigned to work on ways to 
create new jobs especially in “key emerging sectors and technologies”.493 
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5. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
5.1. Overview 
In the last chapter of this thesis, three different aspects of international STP will be 
presented. First, the existing Science and Technology Agreement between the EU and 
USA is described. This agreement can be seen as the core of transatlantic scientific 
cooperation. Secondly, there will be a focus on the EU’s policy of opening its Research 
Area to third countries. Finally, the rationales of scientific and technological 
international cooperation will be presented according to the views of several authors, 
who analyzed them.  
5.2. EU-USA Agreement for Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation 1997 
5.2.1. Introduction 
The EU has bi-lateral Science and Technology Agreements (STA) with several 
countries.494 A STA can be seen as framework for opening a dialogue on policy, aims, 
concerns and common activities.495 In that sense, these agreements  
“represent the most appropriate instruments to create a political, legal and 
administrative framework for the visible and transparent organization of 
science and technology cooperation”496  
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between the parties. The signatories mutually open their research programs and 
institutions. However, this does not include the access to financial support.497 Since 
the STA only functions as an “umbrella” for “implementing arrangements”, which are 
meant to “better organize collaboration in specific areas of research.”498 Although 
several Member States of the EU also signed a STA with the USA, which makes the 
picture more complex, in this thesis, the focus is on the EU level. For a detailed 
overview of the agreements by the Member States, see the project Bilat-USA.499 
 
The legal basis for the STA is Article 186 Lisbon Treaty (ex Article 170 TEC). According 
to it, the following competences are crucial: 
“In implementing the multiannual framework programme the Community may 
make provision for cooperation in Community research, technological 
development and demonstration with third countries or international 
organizations.”500 
Furthermore, the details for the collaborative activities should be discussed in relation 
to Article 300 Lisbon Treaty, which defines the decision-making procedure of the 
advisory bodies. 
5.2.2. Initial Agreement 
On 5 December 1997, the EC and the USA signed the “Agreement for Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation”501, which came into force on 14 October 1998. It 
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represents the core of the S&T collaboration between the USA and the EU. It is unique, 
as it has been concluded with “one of the most successful S&T-based economies that 
the world has seen”. 502 Its importance has been recognized as a door opener for joint 
undertakings in “ground-breaking high caliber science”.503 The specific agreements 
were made between the European Commission and the USA government departments 
and funding agencies; for instance between the European Commission and the 
National Institutes of Health in the USA (NIH).504  
Difficulties in the two year negotiations 
Nevertheless, the negotiations toward the signing were by no means easy, as 
Kettunen/Harrap/Wolff retrospectively reflected in the first assessment report of 
2003; a view which was also held by Rainer Gerold, at the time Director General for 
Science, Research and Development, and thus a major actor of the negotiations. 
 
Kettunen/Harrap/Wolff505 called the two-year negotiations “laborious” since the 
research endeavors on both sides of the Atlantic differed substantially. Whereas in the 
EU the FP under the single authority of the European Commission are based on open 
competitive calls for proposals, in the USA the RTD System is highly de-centralized and 
based on various authorities.  
 
Gerold506 also stated that significant differences between the USA and EU 
management, funding and policy development system existed in the RDT sector. 
Moreover, Gerold reported three further difficulties: first, intellectual property rights 
(IPR), which finally found their way into the two-page annex of the Agreement. These 
IPR were especially important for the USA, as according to Kimble they were “an 
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essential means of encouraging research and technological innovation.”507 Secondly, 
according to Gerold, it was discussed whether the participation of foreign institutions 
and scientists was an asset or rather a liability for the EU RTD system. And thirdly, even 
the wording “foreign” was a matter of dispute and later solved by a side letter.508 
 
With regard to the big difference in the system, meaning centralized calls in the EU 
versus de-centralized activities in the USA, the STA gave impetus for a new era of 
cooperation across the Atlantic by ”creating a bridge” between the two systems.509  
Principles, topics and cooperative forms510 
In detail the Agreement was established with the principles, covered in Article 3: 
a) “Mutual benefit based on an overall balance of advantages 
b) reciprocal opportunities to engage in cooperative activities 
c) equitable and fair treatment  
d) timely exchange of information which may affect cooperative activities.” 
 
The list of topics (“cooperative activities”) outlined in the STA broadly corresponded 
with the thematic programs of FP5. These were described in Article 4 of the STA. The 
range of topics was not only limited to natural sciences, but also broadened to include 
information and communication technologies, social science research, science and 
technology policy, management, and training and mobility of scientists.  
 
Several areas were excluded, such as military research as well as research related to 
plant and animal varieties.511 Nuclear research was also left aside, as the cooperation 
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in this area was dealt with in a separate agreement (1996) between EURATOM and the 
USA.512 
 
The form of cooperative activities, described in Article 5 of the STA, was two-fold:  
on the one hand, they referred to the intergovernmental level, which was to provide 
the basis for research cooperation (laws, regulations, policy). On the other hand, “joint 
research projects” were envisaged. Here, “training of scientists and technical experts” 
as well as “visits and exchanges of scientists, engineers or other appropriate 
personnel” were cited. Both were regarded as an important asset in the education and 
career planning of the scientific workforce.513 
Promotion and discussion on impact 
When the STA was concluded, its implementation was questioned: how should it be 
publicized and become effective and efficient? 
 
Officials on both sides therefore contacted the National Research Council’s Board on 
Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in Washington D.C. (STEP) to organize a 
conference. The conference was the first action under the STA, but served also as a 
promotion. The STA was presented to the  “scientific community” in order to raise 
interest in the new possibilities.514 
  
At this conference, a review of the existing projects in the diverse research areas, as 
well as their progress was reviewed. Subsequently, a conference book titled “New 
Vistas in Transatlantic Science and Technology Cooperation”515 was published. 
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Government officials and the private sector contributed to the book, which secured 
the Agreement wider and stronger support: 
 
Some of the most relevant speakers are presented in the following section in order to 
discuss the possible impact of the STA. 
 
Charles W. Wessner, Programme Director, Technology, Innovation, and 
Entrepreneurship at the USA National Academies, praised the S&T Agreement as a 
“significant achievement”, which was “creating a bridge between the research and 
development (R&D) on both sides of the Atlantic”. He believed it would have 
“immediate and positive effect on transatlantic cooperation”.516 One effect might have 
been that tasks, which were too expensive or too big, could be solved jointly. Wessner 
rejected the picture of the EU as a fortress and pointed to cooperation with third 
countries, even if the USA was the EU’s major competitor:  
“We are convinced that such openness to cooperation, which may have been a 
choice in the past, has become a must in today’s global society (…) because in 
the long run such cooperation is in everyone’s interest.”517 
Rainer Gerold, put the Agreement in relation to the FP: both were “addressing the 
strategic questions” 518 the society was facing, such as disease control, aging society, 
and global climate change. Those questions should be solved by “common effort”. In 
addition, in his opinion, the “challenges of the information society or of mobility” 519 
could be successfully addressed by a transatlantic cooperation. In conclusion, Gerold 
pointed out that mutual confidence was important as there had to be an “overall 
balance and both partners must be convinced that cooperation is in their interest”.520 
Despite his positive outlook, he stated that this process might take some time.521 
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Melinda Kimble, at that time Acting Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the USA Department of State, saw a clear 
benefit for science. She pictured a great future for the S&T Agreement as it would 
prevent “duplicative efforts”.522 
 
The above-mentioned statements on the original STA were published in the 
conference book, all of them predominantly praising and little to none bringing 
forward critical thoughts on the Agreement. Some criticism was then addressed in the 
first assessment and impact report of 2003. 
5.2.3. Assessments and extensions  
In Article 12b of the initial STA523, the possibility of extending the STA for a further five-
year-period was provided. This Article also offered the possibility of changes and 
amendments to the Agreement. In order to extend the STA, an assessment report had 
to review the activities and impact of the existing Agreement. The STA has been 
extended twice: in 2004 with a simple extension agreement and in 2009524 with some 
amendments.  
 
At this point of the thesis, the discussion of the policy level will stop and the emphasis 
will be put on the STA’s practical effects: 
 
The first extension was made on 8 October 2004525, based on the 2003 assessment 
report by Jyrki Kettunen, Keith A. Harrap and Claude Wolff.526 The major outcomes, 
                                                 
522 Kimble, Melinda 1998. p.29 
523  AGREEMENT for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and 
the Government of the United States of America 
524  Council Decision of 30 March 2009 concerning the extension and amendment of the Agreement 
for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and the 
Government of the United States of America (2009/306/EC). Published in Official Journal of the 
European Union 2 April 2009 L90/20 
525 Council of the European Union 2004 Brussels, 8 October 2004 12893/04 (Presse 279) 
526 Kettunen, Jyrki / Harrap, Keith A. / Wolff, Claude 2003. p.14 
138 | International Cooperation in S&T 
 
concerns and recommendations of this assessment report were then presented to the 
policy leaders. Although the STA in general was regarded as useful and indeed 
enhanced the EU-USA S&T collaboration, disappointingly, both in the EU and the USA 
awareness about the Agreement was low. In the context of the FP5 projects (a total of 
140 projects), only 1% was executed between the USA and the EU. Therefore, one 
major recommendation for the future was to develop a strategy to raise awareness in 
science, industry and governments in order to “better exploit the potential.”527 
 
Another outcome was that there was confusion about the EU-USA STA on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Next to the STA, various bilateral agreements with individual European 
Member States existed. The recommendation was therefore to establish more 
effective communication, preferably from the EU Delegation in Washington D.C. jointly 
with the embassies of the Member States. Both suggestions were supposed to clarify 
the essential differentiation.528 
 
The second extension of the STA was on 30 March 2009.529 In general, the content 
remained the same and only some amendments were made. Two new areas of 
cooperation were included, thus paying tribute to the changed context: the Lisbon 
Treaty and the FP7. Joint “research on security and space” was included into the STA.  
 
The basis for the extension was the assessment report for the period from 2003-
2008530, written by Manfred Horvat and Keith A. Horrap. This review was based on 
interviews with EU science counselors in Washington D.C. as well as U.S. officials and 
an online survey of FP6 and FP7 participants.  
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In general, the participation rate of EU partners in U.S. research projects and vice versa 
was again low, but the authors saw the huge potential of the STA. Some relevant 
outcomes and suggestions of the review were: a staff exchange between USA agencies 
and the research directorates of the European Commission. A reduction of the deficits 
in the implementation of the Marie Curie action, which was the most important 
specific action for the EU-USA collaboration. Furthermore a discussion of an 
appropriate strategy in order to balance the number of incoming and outgoing 
researchers would be of great importance. A “House of European S&T” in the USA 
could increase the visibility of European S&T in the USA; hence this was to be 
discussed with the Member States.531 
5.3.  EU S&T cooperation policy - Opening the European 
Research Area 
The EU’s international S&T cooperation policy is rather young. It was in 2000, when 
the Commission published the Communication on “A strategic European Framework 
for International Science and Technology Cooperation”.532 Since then, an explicit policy 
has been formed. However, the Communication did not arise out of nothing. Some of 
the steps that led to its creation are presented in the following sections. 
 
The earliest study discussing international S&T cooperation goes back to 2004, when 
De Miranda/Okubo/Senker finished the final report of the project “GLOSPERA”.533 The 
study “Global Systems and Policy Design for the European Research Area” started in 
2001 and was funded under the FP5. The objectives were to find best practices of 
international S&T cooperation and to investigate the possibilities of participating in 
global knowledge and innovation production. In addition, ways of creating a new 
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dialogue were suggested, in which researchers would give a strong impetus to the 
design of policies regarding international S&T cooperation. The study was done by 
analyzing the origins, implementations and major evaluations of four programs of 
international research cooperation: the Human Frontiers Science Programme (HFSP), 
the Intelligent Manufacturing Systems (IMS), the Human Genome Project (HGP) and 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). As a result, several practical 
recommendations for future international scientific cooperation were submitted to 
the policy makers.  
 
The study identified three rationaleswhy the EU should become active in international 
S&T cooperation: 534 
• To “benefit the international competitiveness of European industry”,  
• To “help European access to advanced scientific knowledge”,  
• Or to “contribute to European foreign policy objectives”.” 
 
Further on, the report concluded that it might be necessary to become active, since 
the globalization produces problems for humanity, such as global warming, AIDS and 
BSE.535 Probably, it was this study, in which the broad basis for the EU’s international 
S&T cooperation policy was presented.  
 
It took another three years until, in the context of the development of the ERA, the 
topic “international research cooperation” was discussed. It was suggested that the tie 
between S&T cooperation policies and “other areas of external relations” should 
become closer.536 
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Four groups of countries (due to the economic status) rather than thematic 
partnerships were identified:537  
• First, the neighboring countries. This group should be included in a broader 
ERA and the respective policy should become part of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
• Secondly, the developing countries. A possible link to development aid should 
be envisaged. 
• Thirdly, the emerging economies. 
• Thirdly, cooperation with industrialized countries. This partnership shall have a 
mutual benefit. In this regard bilateral STAs play a major role.  
 
In the aftermath of the consultation process on the ERA Green Paper, seven Expert 
Groups were installed by the DG Research, which worked on the identified seven 
dimensions of the ERA: 
“Realising a single labour market for researchers, developing world-class 
research infrastructures, strenghtening research institutions, sharing 
knowledge, optimising research programmes and priorities, opening to the 
world: international cooperation in S&T, and Rationales for ERA.”538 
 
Expert Group number six was called “Opening to the world: International cooperation 
in S&T” and was set up with Daniele Archibugi as the chairperson.539 Its task was to 
discuss how to enhance the openness of ERA. The 118 pages long report of the Expert 
Groupwas presented in 2008. It was divided into three parts: 540 
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In part one, the globalization of knowledge was stated as the reason why 
“international cooperation is vital for the EU”. This challenge was to be met with the 
Lisbon Strategy. Furthermore, the rationales for international S&T cooperation were 
explained. These rationales will be discussed in greater detail in the next sections of 
this thesis. 
In part two, the already ongoing “instruments” of cooperation were described, which 
were embedded in the FP7 and in bilateral agreements between the EC and partners 
worldwide.  
And lastly, in part three, ideas about a potential future “framework” for a more 
effective EU approach towards international S&T cooperation were presented. 
Moreover, the principles for cooperative partnerships and priority setting in 
coordination were outlined. 
 
This report laid the basis for the following 2008 Conclusion by the Commission. The 
Commission adopted “A strategic European Framework for International Science and 
Technology Cooperation”, in which two main activity lines were identified:541  
 
1. “Strengthening the international dimension of the ERA”542: including 
the geographic dimension “Europe’s neighbours”; stimulating strategic 
collaboration with key third countries. 
2. “Improving the framework conditions for international S&T 
cooperation”:543 including the general conditions for global research 
infrastructures, enabling mobility of researchers and paying attention to 
global challenges and intellectual property rights as well as making 
research programs more open. 
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For achieving those goals, six key principles were outlined: 
“Widening the ERA and making it more open to the world, Ensuring coherence 
of policies and complementary of programmes, Fostering strategic S&T 
cooperation with key third countries, Developing the attractiveness of Europe as 
a research partner, Launching results - oriented partnerships on information 
society regulation (and) The European Community and Member States working 
together”.544 
 
Thus, a closer collaboration between the European Community and its Member States, 
in order to contribute “to stability, security and prosperity in the world” was 
suggested.545 
 
In 2009, in the second EU-US STA assessment report – as already discussed - this 
strategy was judged to be highly adequate and its implementation was recommended. 
The general importance of the international S&T cooperation was recognized and the 
authors praised the possibilities within the current FP7 as well as the allocation of 
higher funding.546 
5.4.  Rationales of international S&T cooperation  
In the above described report of the ERA Expert Group on international S&T 
cooperation, four lines of argumentation were provided, which should form the 
ground for opening the ERA to the world. These argumentation lines for an 
international S&T cooperation were:547 
1.  “Economic competitiveness” 
2. “Responding to global challenges” 
3. “Meeting the demographic and educational challenge of human resources” 
4. “Promoting political cooperation, dialogue and trust” 
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Although it was recognized, that cooperation and competition has to be balanced, this 
report strongly argued for the advantages resulting from cooperation, namely the 
welfare of European citizens and the innovative potential. 548 
 
In 2009 a study commissioned by the EC DG Research was published. In this study the 
“Drivers of international collaboration in research”549 were identified. The study was 
initiated due to the need of a strategic and efficient policy on international S&T 
cooperation in times of globalization.550 The authors were Jakob Edler, Paul 
Cunnigham and Kieron Flanagan from the Manchester Institute of Innovation 
Research. The study was edited by Patries Boekholt from the Technopolis Group. 
 
The authors took into account an intensive analysis of literature as well as an analysis 
of the international S&T cooperation policy in ten EU-countries and ten non-EU 
countries, including the USA, and suggested a set of indicators, which could “measure 
the progress and success”551 of international S&T cooperation policy. Moreover, input 
from the conference on international S&T coopeartion from October 2008 in Brussels 
was included. 
 
In the report, a graphic overview was presented, which shows the complexity of the 
drivers, policy domains and policy goals: 
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Figure 8 Policy domains, drivers and goals of international collaboration in research 552 
 
For a better understanding, Boekholt et al.553 suggested a differentiation between two 
types of rationales of science, technology and innovation (STI) cooperation: 
1) “The narrow STI cooperation paradigm” 
2) “The broad STI cooperation paradigm” 
 
The categorization of these two paradigms serves as the backbone for the following 
sections of this thesis, enhanced with material by additional authors. As diverse 
authors use diverse labels for “reasons for cooperation”, such as “drivers”, 
“rationales”, “direct benefits” or “justification”, in this thesis, these terms are used as 
synonyms. 
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5.4.1. The narrow STI cooperation paradigm 
The “narrow paradigm” 554 of international STI cooperation aims at raising the “quality, 
scope and critical mass in science and research”.555 This shall be achieved by 
connecting national funds and human resources with the respective ones from other 
nations. According to Boekhalt et al., this paradigm is the strongest for international 
S&T cooperation. The desire for collaboration often comes from within the scientific 
community, which is why it can also be referred to as the “intrinsic” paradigm. 
 
Boekhalt556et al. identified the following as “intrinsic drivers”, whereas Georghiou557 
called them “direct benefits” from global cooperation: 
 
• Improvement of the quality of science by access to world-class researchers, 
facilities and groups, as well as competition or combination of complementary 
know-how. Georghiou regarded this access to different and excellent research 
infrastructure for research groups from different countries as vital. Thus, even a 
small country may gain expertise. This is for example crucial in geosciences.  
• Solving scientific problems by combining international expertise. 
• Extension of the research range by pooling funding and human resources, thus 
sharing the costs and risks of large-scale research. This is especially important for 
large facilities. Georghiou used the example of the Anglo-Australian telescope, 
which was set up in 1970.  
• Extension of access to scientists, researchers or qualified personnel. Georghiou 
considered this to be the most prominent rationale for taking cooperative actions 
among industrialized countries. In addition, it is easier to find a fitting research 
partner if the geographical boundaries of the specific program are as wide as 
possible. The access to knowledge, expertise or skills from outside is especially vital 
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to smaller countries since their knowledge base might not be as advanced in each 
scientific area (e.g. Finland). However, also bigger countries (e.g. Japan) lack certain 
knowledge in specific areas and may profit from international collaboration. 
Human resources issues are also taken into account in the rationale “Meeting the 
demographic challenge”. 
• Cost of science: In addition to these rationales, the cost of large-scale science and 
research has to be mentioned. Especially infrastructures and costs in hi-tech fields 
of research justify international collaboration “even for the biggest players”.558 
 
In the study, the thematic areas for collaboration are regarded as “limited”559. 
Cooperation is undertaken in the areas of nanotechnology, bio-technology (and life 
sciences), research related to climate change, physics and ICT, as well as 
oceanography, energy and disease related medical research.  
5.4.2. The broad STI cooperation paradigm 
The “broad paradigm” of international STI cooperation includes further aims, which 
were originally not scientific ones. The actions taken are “driven by external goals of a 
political, economic or cultural nature.”560 
 
Again, for describing the “broad S&T cooperation paradigm” several studies are 
relevant. The study of Boekholt et al.561 serves as a backbone for the following sections 
of the thesis. Besides, Georgiou’s “indirect benefits of global cooperation” 562 are also 
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presented. Additionally, reference is made to the report of the ERA Expert Group563 on 
S&T cooperation. 
The following rationales will be discussed: 564   
• “Competitiveness and innovation” 
• “Responding to global challenges” 
• “Human Resources” 
• “Promoting political cooperation, dialogue and trust” 
5.4.2.1. “Competitiveness and innovation” 
As discussed earlier, according to Article 130f  SEA (Article 179 Lisbon), the European 
research policy was a supporter of industrial competitiveness. With the Maastricht 
Treaty, research applies to all of the EU goals. As a consequence, the policy of 
international S&T cooperation is also supportive of competitiveness. One driver for 
international S&T actions might be the fear of the migration of nationally based R&D 
industries to low cost areas in the world.  
 
In order to achieve industrial competitiveness, Boekhalt et al. identified two policy 
strategies:565  
• Outward oriented policy strategies: where national actors gain access to 
expertise abroad. 
• Inward oriented policy strategies: where investment and business is 
attracted to the own country.  
 
These strategies can be exemplified as follows. While having the overall goal of 
becoming the most dynamic and competitive knowledge based economy in the world, 
the EU also has to accomplish becoming the “most open knowledge based economy in 
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the world”. 566. To achieve this goal, European companies need an efficient access to 
knowledge and if this is not available inside of the EU, ”they should be able to access it 
elsewhere.“ 567.  
 
An example for the inward oriented policy strategy on the EU level is the idea of the 
“European Innovation Area”. By enhancing the attractiveness of the national 
innovation systems the national industries are meant to perform better. As a result, 
foreign investment in R&D would follow.568 
 
Several policy instruments are concentrated on either outward or inward oriented 
competitiveness and innovation:569 
• Programs tailor-made for commercialization of internal technologies. 
• Opening of national programs with activities under the FP7 or earlier funding 
schemes under the special Program INCO. 
• Collaboration with trade agencies and information services abroad such as 
attachés for S&T. These institutions may provide national enterprises with 
important knowledge, contacts and expertise and may build the ground for 
market access. Here, the linkage between international S&T cooperation and 
trade policies is very strong. Or, to put it differently, the division between 
international S&T cooperation and trade and export policies is rather 
insignificant.570 Such information services are for example: the Office of 
Science and Technology at the Austrian embassy in Washington D.C (OST) or 
the section Science, Technology and Education at the EU Delegation to the 
USA. 
 
                                                 
566  European Commission DG Research 2008c. p.13 
567  ibid p.13 
568  Boekholt, Patrice / Edler, Jakob / Cunningham, Paul / Flanagan, Kieron 2009.p.14 
569  ibid p.18 
570  ibid p.14 
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Nevertheless, a pre-condition for this openness of the ERA is a coordinated policy of 
the EU members, as is “speaking with one voice.” In this way European STP can 
become a “label” and can become internationally noticeable.571  
5.4.2.2. “Responding to global challenges” 
Finding answers to global challenges is not a “policy option but a necessity”572. This 
was a provocative statement by the European Commission. However, keeping in mind 
cross-border issues like climate change, energy production, biodiversity or diseases, it 
might be realistic. No country alone can tackle these challenges, as they are simply too 
extensive. Therefore, large multi-lateral institutions or programs emerged in the past 
and in the future, in order to respond to global challenges worldwide, also less 
developed countries will have to be be included in the process.573  
 
If global challenges are dealt with, the following benefits may result: 574  
• Cost sharing: by cooperating with partners, the financial burden to the EU would 
be limited. 
• Economic advantages: global challenges and commitments in international 
agreements need new and appropriate technologies. Therefore, the private sector 
could find a market for its new innovative technologies. 
• Europe’s prosperity: meeting the global challenges could lead Europe into a 
prosperous future. 
• Worldwide stability, security and prosperity: these concerns might be met by STI 
capacities built abroad. Thus, it has to be linked to external policy as well as 
developmental aid. 
• International treaties: The EU already participated in several international 
agreements related to climate change, helping to safe the environment for future 
generations.  
                                                 
571  European Commission DG Research 2008c. p.29 
572  ibid p.26 
573  Boekholt, Patrice / Edler, Jakob / Cunningham, Paul / Flanagan, Kieron 2009. p.15 
574  European Commission DG Research 2008c. p.26 
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Although the EU together with the USA and Japan is one of the largest R&D funders on 
the globe and can therefore strongly influence the scientific and technological process, 
its budget is rather restricted. Nevertheless, in diverse fields such as environmental 
and medical research as well as basic knowledge, the EU already takes action vital to 
the world.575 
5.4.2.3.  “Human Resources” 
Human Resource in Science and Technology (HRST) is essential for an innovative 
research system, as the best-equipped research facility is worth nothing without 
people having the appropriate skills for using them. The picture of the future drawn by 
the Expert Group576 in the field of HRST was not promising: The European innovation 
system might experience a lack of qualified workers. Universities and public centers 
but also the private sector such as industrial laboratories might be affected by this 
situation. 
 
There are two main reasons577  for this development: First, because of the 
demographic change, the labor market lacks specialists. Secondly, in the OECD 
countries, already today, students’ interest in science and engineering is low.  
 
Therefore, several policies have to address the lack of HRST: 578  The priority should be 
put on European born students. A higher investment in S&T education and training for 
a large number of people will raise the HRST. Then, the strategy is reaching out over 
the boarders of the ERA in order to attract more personnel. The intense training in 
engineering and S&T taking place in some parts of the world can be used to the EU’s 
advantage. A prerequisite is an easier access to the EU STI labor market for non-
                                                 
575  ibid p.12 
576  ibid p.28 
577  ibid p.28 
578  ibid p.28 
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Europeans and recruiting talents from other countries has to be accompanied by other 
actions, such as exchange programs.  
 
Exchange of HRST has two further implicit benefits. First, the so-called “tacit 
knowledge”579 can be enhanced by international working teams. This type of 
knowledge stands in contrast to explicit knowledge. It can be referred to as 
knowledge, which cannot easily be transferred to others and if, only with trust and 
personal contact. And secondly, scientists may become “diplomats”. This aspect falls 
under the rationale of international science and technology cooperation discussed in 
the follwing section of the thesis. 
5.4.2.4. “Promoting political cooperation, dialogue and trust” 
This rationale seems to become more and more important. Until 2008, different 
authors put their ideas on this rationale up for discussion. Until in 2010, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science’s (AAAS) Center of Science Diplomacy 
then introduced an analytical framework for the relationship between foreign policy 
and science policy. 
Science and technology in context of external relations 
Ahmed/Stein580 argued that by opening the ERA’s institutions and infrastructures to 
the rest of the world international relations could be built. Industrialized countries, 
developing countries and emerging economies may want to establish relations with 
Europe due to the attractiveness of the European research system, rather than by 
force. This way of using S&T as political power puts it in the context of external 
relations. 
 
                                                 
579  Polanyi, Michael 1966. The Tacit Dimension. Library of Congress. Online: 
http://www.chaight.com/Wk%208%20E205B%20Polanyi%20-%20Tacit%20Knowing.pdf [23 April 
2011] 
580  Stein, Josephine Anne / Ahmed, Allam 2007. The European Union as a Model of International Co-
operation in Science, Technology and Sustainable Development. In: British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations. vol.9, 654-669, 
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De Miranda/Okubo/Senker  even spoke of a “mutual relationship” 581  between EU 
foreign policy and EU research policy. They mention the goals of following this 
rationale: globally enhancing the prestige of Europe (thus attracting foreign 
investment, people, and ideas); contributing to good relations with, and the stability 
of, countries in the geographic periphery of Europe; and supporting developing 
countries, particularly in “priority areas for European foreign policy”.582 
Internal and external effects  
Earlier, Stein583 identified internal and external effects of the actions in scientific and 
technological cooperation. Looking at the internal effect, S&T cooperation is a 
“component of European integration” itself. On the other hand, looking at external 
effect, it is a significant feature of the EU’s foreign relations. According to Stein, the 
global challenges urge for the necessity of international S&T cooperation. 
 
Stein mentioned the relation between foreign policy and S&T cooperation policy and 
regards it as not “explicit and certainly not systematic”. Further on, she argued that in 
the aftermath of 9/11, global cooperation became even more important. Although a 
colaboration of the science community and the diplomatic community may require a 
lot of strength, by joining forces, “the quest for a better global future” could be 
achieved.584 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis, the situation has changed. Slightly and 
step by step policies have become more systematic and coordinated. The way the EU 
manages the integration process in general and especially the integration of the 
science and research area, could serve as a model for international cooperation.  
                                                 
581  De Miranda, Alvaro / Okubo, Yoshiko / Senker, Peter 2004. GLOSPERA- Global Systems and Policy 
Design for the European Research Area. Project under the FP5. P.5 
582  ibid p.5 
583  Stein, Josephine Anne 2002. Science, technology and European foreign policy: European 
integration, global interaction. In: Science and Public Policy. volume 29, number 6 December. 
pp.463 
584  ibid p.476 
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Scientific aspects of foreign policy versus foreign policy aspects of science 
Wagner refered to Skolnikoff 585 as she explained his ideas on the relationship 
between science and diplomacy. He saw the “scientific aspects of foreign policy”. 
With treaties on issues such as climate change, collaboration between the foreign 
policy community and the science community was necessary. An obvious example is 
the cooperation between the USA and the former Soviet Union in the International 
Space Station (ISS). 
 
To paint a complete picture of the relationship between science and diplomacy, the 
“foreign policy aspects of science”586 has to be mentioned. This includes 
considerations about the connection to foreign scientists. It refers to questions of with 
whom, when, where and how to cooperate. The aim is to improve the “knowledge 
creation”. 
Science and diplomacy: two different communities 
Wagner587 examined the “foreign policy aspect of science”. She investigated the 
relationship between the two acting communities: the science community and the 
diplomacy community. Her analysis showed, that both systems are equipped with 
totally different dynamics. The science community works in networks and with peers, 
while the diplomacy community works in strict hierarchies and traditions. Both 
communities see each other’s agendas increasingly overlapping. She critisized that the 
budget used for international scientific cooperation is quite limited even in advanced 
countries. She specifically analyzed the USA policy on S&T cooperation. 
                                                 
585  Wagner, Caroline 2002. The elusive partnership- Science and Foreign Policy. In. Science and Public 
Policy, vol. 29, number 6, p.410 cited Skolnikoff 
586  ibid p.410 
587  ibid p.410 
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Raising Prestige 
Several authors mentioned the raising of prestige as a rationale of international S&T 
cooperation. This was the case in the EU studies GLOSPERA588 as well as by the ERA 
Expert Group589. Already in 1975, Schumacher590 wrote on Salomon’s rationales: one 
of which is that international cooperation in science raises the prestige of the country. 
 
All of these authors regarded STP as positive for the achievement of diplomatic goals. 
Thus, to analyze this relationship between science and diplomacy, a more theoretical 
framework was needed. As already mentioned, in 2010, the Royal Society and AAAS 
Center for Science Diplomacy assumed this task. 
Understanding the relationship between science and foreign policy 
In 2008, the AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy in Washington D.C. opened. The 
center’s goal is to assist the international science community to “build and knit 
together the global science enterprise” 591  and to advance science diplomacy. In the 
second year of its existence, the Center together with the Royal Society in the UK, 
defined the term “science diplomacy” as threefold: 592 
• “Science in diplomacy” 
• “Diplomacy for science” 
• “Science for diplomacy”/”science diplomacy” 
                                                 
588  De Miranda, Alvaro / Okubo, Yoshiko / Senker, Peter 2004 p.5 
589  European Commission 2008b. Challenging Europe´s Research: Rationales for the European 
Research Area (ERA). Report of the ERA Expert Group. Brussels, p.21 
590  Schumacher, Dieter 1975. Perspektiven einer internationalen Forschungspolitik. Problemskizze am 
Beispiel der Europäischen Gemeinschaften [Perspectives of an international research policy.The 
European Union- an analysis]. Verlag Otto Schwartz&Co. Göttingen. p.12 
591  American Association for Advancement of Science (AAAS). Center for Science Diplomacy 2009. 
2008-2009 Inaugural Year in Review. Washington D.C.:AAAS p.12 
592  ibid p.12 
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“Science in diplomacy: informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice”593 
The predicted global changes in water supply, energy, climate, mass migration or food 
production, would broaden the tasks of international foreign policy. In tackling those 
challenges, science can play a major role by putting qualitative input into policy 
making. One “best practice” in the information cycle between the science community 
and the diplomacy community is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), which together with Al Gore in 2007 received the Nobel Peace Prize. 
 
In order to firmly establish a deep relationship between the two communities, it is 
crucial to inform each other, so the AAAS. The science community has to be informed 
about “realities of policy making” and the diplomacy community needs information on 
the “role and limits of science in policy”.594 
“Diplomacy for science: facilitating international science cooperation” 595 
Diplomacy under that aspect is in charge of facilitating scientific goals. For this purpose 
either a top-down approach or a bottom-up approach could become practice. 
 
Top-down approach: diplomacy could enhance the participation of various countries in 
large projects. By cooperating the high costs and risks would be shared, which no 
country would be able bear on its own. Such extensive projects are often done in 
specific areas of science. An example is the European Organization for Nuclear 
Research (CERN). 
 
The bottom-up approach: diplomacy could assist scientists with visa issues and IPR or 
even in finding project partners. These supportive measures are important, especially 
                                                 
593  The Royal Society / AAAS 2010. New frontiers in science diplomacy. Navigating the changing 
balance of power. London.p.5 
594  ibid p.6 
595  ibid p.9-10 
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in cases, in which political relations are weak and “science can be a bridge to 
communities”.596  
“Science for diplomacy” /” science diplomacy”  
Science can support the establishment of contacts or the cooperation between 
civilians, organizations or entire nations. Therefore, science can play a major role in 
building a “positive engagement”. 597 Several “types” of science diplomacy can be 
identified: 598 
 
• Establishing new institutions: CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear 
Research, is a best practice for the creation of institutions. After WWII, former 
enemies such as Israeli and German scientists had the chance to work with each 
other. 
• Rewarding educational scholarships: this is not only useful to the training of young 
scientists, but also vital for a broader network building. 
• Organizing science festivals and exhibitions: such events can promote general 
cultural interests or the “universality of science”. 
• Signing science cooperation agreements: such agreements can be forerunners for 
initiating political relations. Also Wagner paid attention to science cooperation 
agreements. She referred to them as “door-opener”, because the approval of an 
STA may initiate a collaboration in a broader set of activities.599 Usually mutuality 
lies within. 
 
Even though the framework looks quite reasonable, some criticism has to be made. 
When looking at the framework, scientists surely will raise the question about the 
“politization” of science. There certainly is the risk of science losing its freedom by 
                                                 
596  ibid p.9 
597  American Association for Advancement of Science (AAAS). Center for Science Diplomacy 2009. 
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599  Wagner, Caroline 2002. Science and foreign policy. In. Science and Public Policy, vol. 29, number 
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being abused as a means of politics. In this context, the line between science and 
foreign policy, although often thin, has to be clear. 
5.4.3. Rationales differ depending on the technology areas 
According to the ERA Expert Group based on geo-political terms, the rationales for 
cooperation differ.600 This also occurs in different technology areas. The research areas 
nanotechnology, information and communication technologies (ICT), life sciences, 
energy and environment are good examples. 
 
First of all, what makes them significant is that they all contribute to economic 
competitiveness. Usually many countries work together in these fields, since they are 
cost- and resource-intensive. Cooperation is therefore almost a pre-condition. 
Secondly, these research areas are significant for the often-cited “global challenges”. 
Nanotechnology could lead to lesser pollution, ICT could help to increase the outcome 
of other research areas, life sciences could tackle worldwide health issues, and 
environment and energy technologies could support sustainability.  
 
Therefore, the EU should cooperate as follows: 601 
• In nanotechnologies with the USA and Japan as well as China, India and Russia 
• In the information technologies with the USA and Japan 
• In the communication sector with the emerging economies  
• In energy and environment with Japan 
5.4.4. Rationales differ from state to state  
When looking at the rationales for international S&T cooperation on the European 
level, one can easily identify the different rationales based on geo-political divisions.602 
                                                 
600  European Commission DG Research 2008c. Opening to the world: International cooperation in 
Science and Technology. Report of the ERA Expert Group. Group 6 chaired by Daniele Archibugi 
Brussels. Brussels. p.30 
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As already mentioned before, four groups of countries can be differentiated: 
industrialized countries, emerging economies, developing countries and neighboring 
countries. 
For this thesis, rationales regarding industrialized countries are especially relevant. 
The main target is not to build new relations, but to deepen existing ones. The 
broadening of market access can also be a rationale. The enlargement of mutual 
access to knowledge and skills as well as shared risks and costs in large projects can 
then be a positive outcome of this type of cooperation. 
 
In the special case of the USA, the European Commission published a booklet, in which 
the drivers were outlined as:603 
• “The sharing of knowledge towards a common knowledge base in support of 
other broader policies. 
• The promotion of scientist training and mobility in a multicultural context. 
• The identification and design of research infrastructures of mutual interest. 
• The more effective and rapid development of global public goods through joint 
research activities. 
• The elaboration of common agendas in international arenas.” 
 
In the case of emerging economies, cooperation is a prerequisite to tackle the big 
challenges like health, energy and environment protection. The topic of intellectual 
property rights, too, has to be targeted when cooperation is taking place. One of the 
famous examples are pharmaceuticals, where the R&D investment is enormous. 
 
When it comes to cooperation with developing countries, security, prosperity and 
stability are of great relevance. Furthermore, capacity building plays a major role in 
order to foster the advancement in science and in order to take responsibility in 
tackling the global challenges. The benefits for the developing countries are especially 
                                                                                                                                               
602  European Commission DG Research 2008c.. p.30 
603  European Commission 2007b. EC-U.S. Scientific and Technological Cooperation: Reaching New 
Frontiers p.2 
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important in research fields like health, economic advancement and environment. 
Thus, joint projects in these fields support the countries. 
 
The last category is neighboring countries. The exchange of knowledge and skills as 
well as technology and personnel contributes to the socio-economic advancement of 
the region. Also business and R&D infrastructures have to be more connected.  
 
All of these measures share the underlying assumption that international and 
transnational cooperation in S&T is not only beneficial for both partners, both is in fact 
key to the successful development of the world as such. Nowadays, human civilization 
to a great degree depends on globalized policies and thus also the global sharing of 
knowledge and the results of scientific research.  
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6. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
6.1. Conclusion 
1) How did the European Union’s science and technology policy evolve and did 
the USA play a role in this process? 
 
Hypothesis: Similar to the economic and political integration, European science and 
technology policy (STP) evolved over time and its competence was extended with each 
EU treaty. 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the European science and technology policy (STP) 
has evolved parallel to the overall integration process. Although there were related 
articles in the ECSC, EURATOM and the EEC, an explicit legal basis for research and 
technology was provided only later.  
 
Until 1987 (SEA), any actions in the area of research were primarily based on the 
“general ‘elastic’ clause” (Article 235 EEC/Article 352 Lisbon Treaty), thus having a 
rather precarious legal basis. This also applied to the first two Framework Programmes 
(FPs). However, the “Spinelli report”, which is regarded as a draft law for the 
establishment a European Union, mentioned science and education in its Article 60 as 
a European responsibility. The changing point came with the SEA, in which science and 
technology became a policy field of the European Community with the multi-annual 
FPs as the main policy instrument. Then, in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty research 
articles applied to all other policy fields. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam clarified 
that the Council had to adopt the FP by a qualified majority. In 2000, the creation of a 
European Research Area (ERA) was announced. Its aim was the enhancement of a 
common European science and technology identity and it focused on innovation and 
competitiveness. (Lisbon European Council, 23-24 March 2000, Presidency 
Conclusions). Finally, in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon extended the chapter on research to 
include space policy. 
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Hypothesis: The USA played several roles in the history of European integration process 
as well as in the process of establishing a European STP.  
 
At the end of WWII it was the U.S. Marshall Plan that helped Western Europe to 
rebuild its economic as well as technological basis. In this historic period, the USA was 
perceived as a “midwife” or an “ally” of Western European countries. However, in the 
mid1970s, the “fear of American dominance” became prevalent. The perceived 
technology gap entailed actions on the European level. In this development, the USA 
played an indirect role as a “threat” or a “negative driver”. Hence, the evolution of the 
SEA has been described as an answer to the need to compete with the USA. 
Consequently, research was to enhance competitiveness and to strengthen European 
technology in order to face the competition with the USA. U.S. research policy became 
a role model for the European Union’s policies. Compared to the USA, EU Member 
States invested relatively little into research, which was continuously pointed out in EU 
documents. 
   
The establishment of the ERA in 2000 had the goal to raise investment in research and 
to reorganize its structure. This was perceived as an improvement of Europe’s position 
in comparison to the USA. In 2002, the Barcelona European Council once again 
stipulated to raise R&D spending to 3% of the GDP by 2010. Science, technology and 
innovation became one of the EU’s major hopes concerning economic 
competitiveness.  
 
2) When did the EU-USA cooperation start and what was the role of science, 
research and technology in this cooperation? 
 
Hypothesis: The transatlantic relationship had a specific starting point in history and 
has developed since then. The topics science, research and technology have formed an 
integrate part from the beginning.  
 
The starting point for the formal of EU-USA relations was the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. 
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In 1990 the first bi-lateral Agreement, the Transatlantic Declaration, made references 
to science and technology cooperation and especially to the mobility of researchers. 
Cooperative research was a goal in the areas of medicine, environment protection, 
pollution prevention, energy, space, high-energy physics, and the safety of nuclear and 
other installations. Five years later, in 1995, the New Transatlantic Agenda, in its 
chapter “Building Bridges across the Atlantic” stated, that exchanges in cultural, 
educational, commercial and scientific should be expanded with the aim of ensuring 
“public understanding of and support for the transatlantic relationship”. Moreover, 
the New Transatlantic Agenda and the Joint EU-USA Action Plan scheduled a 
comprehensive cooperation agreement in science and technology for 1997. In 1998, 
the Transatlantic Economic Partnership stressed cooperation among scientists, in 
intellectual property rights, food safety and biotechnology. In 2007, the Transatlantic 
Economic Council (TEC) emphasized research cooperation in additional areas such as 
intellectual property rights as well as innovation and technology. 
 
Since 2007, science, technology and innovation have been topics of the TEC meetings, 
the bi-annual ministerial meetings and the annual EU-USA Summits. 
 
3) What reasons can be identified for the EU and USA cooperation in science 
and technology? 
 
Hypothesis: Even though competitiveness is a strong rationale for European STP, it is 
not the only one. There are other relevant rationales, which might not follow the same 
logic. 
 
As pointed out in this thesis, competitiveness was a very strong rationale for the 
creation of a European STP. However, with the Maastricht Treaty and the FPs, 
competitiveness was no more the prime rationale of the EU STP. Gradually other 
rationales such as “global challenges, human resources and promoting political 
cooperation, dialogue and trust” became more and more important. All of these 
rationales probably had an impact on EU-USA cooperation. In the bulletin published by 
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the European Commission in 2007 specific key drivers for the EU-USA cooperation 
were listed: 
• “Sharing of knowledge towards a common knowledge base in support of other 
broader policies. 
• Promotion of scientists’ training and mobility in a multicultural context. 
• Identification and design of research infrastructures of mutual interest. 
• More effective and rapid development of global public goods through joint 
research activities. 
• Elaboration of common agendas in international arenas.” 
 
In the case of the relationship between the EU and the USA, research cooperation 
cannot be seen as a dooropener for diplomatic relations, as described in the concept 
of science diplomacy, because strong diplomatic relations already existed long before 
research cooperation started. Nevertheless, it has been and still is a means of 
deepening already existing relations. Access to knowledge, skills and infrastructure can 
be called a good of mutual benefit. Besides, “partnering with the best” and thus raising 
one’s own prestige also plays a major role.  
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6.2. Outlook  
International S&T cooperation has become increasingly important on the political 
agendas. The establishment of the AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy in the USA 
underlines this also institutionally. In the years to come it will be interesting to observe 
the EU’s actions in international S&T cooperation especially towards emerging 
economies such as China.  
 
The further developments in the ERA will also be of utmost interest. Shortly before this 
thesis was printed, the European Commission604 proposed the next FP under the title 
“Horizon 2020”, which is supposed to be a “flagship” under the new policy “innovation 
Europe”. The decision-making process, the people involved as well as the objectives of 
“Horizon 2020” would certainly be an interesting field of study for political scientists.  
 
Another aspect, which could be further discussed and analyzed by academic 
researchers are specialized programs such as INCO or Human Resources. In the case of 
INCO, it would be rewarding to look at the connection between the EU and the USA 
and to analyze the topics covered. In the case of Human Resources it would be 
especially interesting how to reconcile the “global competition of talent” with mobility 
programs such as the Marie Curie Action, again with a special emphasis on EU-USA 
human mobility. Furthermore, it would be fascinating to describe and evaluate BILAT-
USA/Link2Us, a specific program. 
 
This thesis ends with the saying: 
”Umwege erweitern die Ortskenntnis“ 
 
                                                 
604 European Commission 2011. “Horizon 2020: Commission proposes €80 billion investment in research 
and innovation, to boost growth and jobs” Press release  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1475&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
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7. ANNEX 
7.1. Overview S&T Articles 
 
Single 
European 
Act 
Maastricht Amsterdam Lisbon 
Abbreviation 
and official name 
(SEA) 
 
(TEU)  
Treaty on 
European 
Union/ EU 
Treaty  
 
 
Treaty amending 
the Treaty on 
European Union  
 
(TFEU) 
Treaty of Lisbon 
amending the 
Treaty on 
European Union 
 
Signing year/ into 
force 
1986/1987 1992/1993 1997/1999 2007/2009 
Titel Titel VI Titel XV Titel XVIII Titel XIX 
Objectives 130 f 130 f 163 179 
Activities 130 g 130 g 164 180 
Coordination 130 h 130 h 165 181 
FP 130 i 130 i 166 182 
FP-Council 130 k 130 j 167 183 
Multilateral 
programmes 
130 l 130 k 168 184 
130 m 130 l 169 185 
Third country 
cooperation 130 n 130 m 170 186 
Joint undertakings 130 o 130 n 171 187 
Financing 130 p (cancelled)   
Decision - making 
process 130q 130 o 172 188 
Space    189 
Evaluation - 130 p 173 190 
Table 11 Overview of renumbering of S&T Articles in the Treaties. Own work 
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7.2. Changes S&T Articles   
Year Treaty Article Changes Amendment 
1951  ECSC 55   
1957  EURATOM (TEC) 4-11   
1957  EEC (TEC) 35 and 308   
1987 SEA TITLE VI 
130f-130q 
New and explicit basis for 
RTD policy based on mulit-
annual Framework 
Programmes 
 
1993 TEU TITLE XV 
130f-130p 
Co-decision by Council and 
Parliament for the 
adoption was introduced, 
but still unanimity in the 
Council; 
Research applies to other 
policy areas 
To Article 163 
“while promoting all the 
research activities deemed 
necessary by virtue of other 
Chapters of this Treaty”  
1997 TEC TITLE XVIII 
163-173 
Council adopts the FP now 
with a qualified majority 
 
2007 Lisbon TITLE XIV 
170-190 
Article for space policy 
was added 
 
Table 12 Changes Science and Technolgy in EU Treaties. Own work. 
7.3. Policy Changes in Framework Programmes 
FP Duration Policy change 
FP1 1984-1987 “Community RTD activities were for the first time coordinated as part of a single, 
structured framework 
FP2 1987-1991 “Was to develop technologies for the future, integrating major Community Programmes 
in the areas of information technology (ESPRIT), materials (EURAM), industrial 
technologies (BRITE) and advanced communications technologies (RACE). 
FP3 
 
1990-1994 “broadly followed the same lines, focusing on fewer lines of action, but also on the 
dissemination of research results.” 
FP4  1994-1998 “This Programme built on the previous initiatives, but contained several important 
innovations, such as a new Programme on targeted socio-economic research” 
FP5 1998-2002 
 
“marked a shift from research concentrating largely on technical performance towards 
research and innovation addressing targeted socio-economic objectives.” 
FP6 2002-2006 “to promote the establishment of the European Research Area (ERA)” + ERA-NET scheme 
“aims at stepping up the coordination of national and regional research Programmes” 
FP7 2007-2013 (reduction to only four activities) 
Table 13 Policy changes of Framework Programmes605 
 
                                                 
605  European Parliament. 2006 Factsheets European Union online: Policy for Research and 
Technological Development EN 4.14.0 edited by M. Györffi  Table own work 
 7.4. Science, Technology, Education and Culture in Transatlantic Agreements 
Agreement Year Relevance Fields of science Rationale 
Transatlantic 
Declaration 
(TD) 
1990 “exchanges and 
joint projects in 
science and 
technology” 
Medicine, environment protection, pollution 
prevention, energy, space, high-energy 
physics, nuclear and other installations 
“strengthen mutual cooperation” 
which “directly affect the present 
and future well-being of their 
citizens” 
New Transatlantic 
Agenda and Joint 
Action Plan 
(NTA) 
1995 “broadening science 
and technology 
cooperation” 
Agreement on Intelligent Manufacturing 
Systems, 
“to ensure public understanding 
of and support for the 
transatlantic relationship” 
“to meet global challenges and 
foster economic growth” 
Transatlantic 
Economic 
Partnership (TEP) 
1998 “co-operation 
among scientists” 
Intellectual property rights, food safety, 
biotechnology 
 
Transatlantic 
Economic Council 
(TEC) 
2007  Intellectual property rights, innovation and 
technology, 
Framework shall “benefit the 
citizens and the competitiveness 
of our economies” 
“global benefits” “market access 
for third countries” 
 
Table 14 Coverage of science, technology and education in Transatlantic Agreements since 1990. Table own work
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7.5. European Commissioners for research 
Commission Duration Commissioner 
Malfatti and Mansholt 
Commissions 
(1970 - 1972) Altiero Spinelli - IT 
 
Ortoli Commission  (1973 - 1976) Ralf Dahrendorf - DE 
Jenkins Commission  (1977 - 1980)  Guido Brunner - DE 
Thorn Commission  (1981 - 1984) Etienne Davignon - BE 
Delors I Commission  (1985 - 1988)  Karl-Heinz Narjes - DE 
Delors II Commission  (1989 - 1992)  Filippo Maria Pandolfi - IT 
Delors III Commission  (1993 - 1994)  Antonio Ruberti - IT 
Santer Commission  (1995 - 1999)  Edith Cresson - FR 
Prodi Commission  (1999 - 2004)  Philippe Busquin - BE 
Barroso I Commission  (2005 - 2009)  Janez Potočnik – SI 
Barroso II Commission  (2010 - 2014) Máire Geoghegan-Quinn - IR 
Table 15 European Commissioners for Research606 
7.6. Relevant Articles Lisbon Treaty607 
 
                                                 
606  European Commission- DG Research “Architects of European Research” 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/research-eu/59/article_5934_en.html [8 December 2009] Table 
own work 
607  Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. Official Journal C83. 2010/C 83/01 Vol.53. 30 March 2010 
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ABSTRAKT 
Das Erkenntnisinteresse dieser Diplomarbeit liegt in der Analyse der Entstehung und 
Begründungen der Policyebene der transatlantischen Forschungszusammenarbeit. 
Dabei wird das Spannungsfeld von Zusamenarbeit und Wettbewerb dargestellt. 
 
Nach einer allgemeinen Einleitung zu Wissenschafts- und Forschungspolitik sowie den 
transatlantischen Beziehungen werden im nächsten Kapitel grundlegende Begriffe der 
Arbeit definiert sowie relevante analytische Zugänge präsentiert. “Soft Power” von 
Joseph Nye spielt dabei eine relevante Rolle. Die Darstellung der nächsten zwei Kapitel 
erfolgt aus historischer Perspektive. Dazu werden Rechtstexte und weitere offizielle 
Dokumente, wissenschaftliche Literatur und Politikstudien herangezogen. Zunächst 
wird die Entwicklung der europäischen Wissenschafts- und Forschungspolitik ab 1951 
dargestellt und nach dem Einfluss der USA gefragt. Im nächsten Teil wird in den 
transatlantischen Verträgen ab 1990 nach der Relevanz und Einbettung von 
Kooperation in Forschung gesucht. Nach dieser historischen Abhandlung werden im 
letzten Kapitel verschiedene Aspekte von internationaler Forschungskooperation 
dargestellt. Einerseits das Herz der EU-USA Kooperation- das “Abkommen über 
wissenschaftlich-technische Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft und der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika” von 1997, und 
die Öffnung des europäischen Forschungsraumes. Die Begründungen von 
internationaler Forschungskooperation im allgemeinen und der transatlantischen 
Forschungskooperation im Speziellen werden zum Abschluss dargestellt. Man 
unterscheidet zwischen dem „engen“ und dem „breiten Paradigma“ in internationaler 
Forschungskooperation. Aktionen unter dem „engen Paradigma“ zielen auf die 
Qualität und Größe von Wissenschaft und Forschung ab und wird als das stärkste 
Paradigma gesehen. Auch andere Ziele verfolgt welche das „breite Paradigma“ 
darstellen: Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Innovation, globale Herausforderungen, 
Humanressourcen und die Herstellung von politischer Zusammenarbeit, Dialog und 
Vertrauen. Dieser letzte Aspekt gewinnt zunehmend an Aufmerksamkeit und ist 
bekannt als “sience diplomacy”. Er kann im Zusammenhang mit “Soft Power” gesehen 
werden. Im Falle von den EU-USA Beziehungen ist die Forschungszusammenarbeit 
nicht als Türöffner zu sehen, sondern als Vertiefung der bestehenden Beziehungen.  
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ABSTRACT 
The topic of this thesis is an analysis of the development and justification of 
transatlantic research cooperation. Within this policy field cooperation and 
competition are investigated. 
At first, an introduction to science and technology policy and to transatlantic relations 
in general is given. Then follows a definition of essential terms and an outline of 
relevant theoretical approaches. In this regard, “Soft Power” by Joseph Nye plays a 
relevant role. In the next two chapters, a historical point of view is chosen with legal 
and official documents, scientific literature as well as diverse policy reports as sources. 
The development of the European research and technology policy since 1951 is 
presented with a focus on the USA’s role in it. The next chapter describes the 
transatlantic agreements since 1990. The chapter focuses on the role and pertinence 
of cooperative actions in science and technology. The “Agreement for scientific and 
technological cooperation between the European Community and the Government of 
the United States of America” of 1997 and the opening of the ERA to 3rd countries are 
especially significant in this respect. Finally, the general rationales of international 
science and technology cooperation are presented: the “narrow paradigm” as well as 
the “broad paradigm”. In addition, the specific rationales of the transatlantic S&T 
cooperation are presented. The “narrow paradigm” includes intrinsic reasons such as 
the  quality and scope of science and research. The “broad paradigm” includes reasons 
outside of science and research such as competitiveness and innovation, global 
challenges, human resources and the building of dialogue and trust. This last aspect 
seems to gain an increasing amount of attention and is known as “science diplomacy”. 
This can be linked to “soft power”. In the case of the EU-USA relations, science and 
technology cooperation is not a door opener for diplomatic relations, but rather a 
means of deepening the already existing relationship. 
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